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Discourse ethicists generally are anti-realists about moral rightness, in that the rightness of 
moral norms is a matter of discursive justification, and is not grounded in or by any objective feature 
of the world. Put differently, the position is that rightness is wholly constructed by our moral practices. 
Further, discourse ethics and liberal theories of justice more broadly generally rely on a distinction 
between goods that are generalizable, and goods that are in some way context-bound and 
particularistic. Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics makes the distinction wholly formal, abstaining from 
any theoretical commitment to which goods are generalizable and leaving this as a matter for discursive 
deliberation. Those goods that are discursively determined to be generalizable are the object of valid 
moral norms, and those that are not generally justifiable as goods involve at best ethical values. In this 
dissertation, I argue – against Habermas – for a moral realist conception of discourse ethics, and for 
a substantive modification of the formal structure of Habermas’ position, in order to accommodate a 
validity claim attaching to ethical discourses. I argue that Habermas’ position requires a goodness 
claim, in addition to the rightness validity claim attaching to moral discourses. 
In the first chapter, I consider a couple of Habermas’ more idiosyncratic arguments, defending 
quasi-moral obligations to non-human animals, and arguing against non-therapeutic pre-birth genetic 
manipulation, governed only by market forces (or what he terms ‘liberal eugenics’). I argue that 
Habermas’ discourse theory of morality depends on a background general ethics that is at least under-
 v 
theorized, a point which Habermas himself seems to begin to acknowledge, in The Future of Human 
Nature, in developing an ethics of the species when faced with the question of how to ethically value 
morality as a whole, suggesting the need for a specifically ethical validity claim. 
In the second chapter, I shift from the discourse theory of morality and ethics to the discourse 
theory of law and democracy, considering Habermas’ defenses of civil disobedience and his variable 
responses to humanitarian military intervention, particularly in Kosovo and Iraq. I argue that, as in 
the discourse theory of morality, Habermas’ discourse theory of law and democracy contains an 
implicit ethics. At the end of the second chapter, I consider Jacques Rancière’s theorization of a 
politics of dissensus, showing that Rancière is unable to justify his normative claim that there are better 
and worse sorts of policing. I show that this difficulty for Rancière is conceptually related to Habermas’ 
rejection of the possibility of an ethical validity claim.  
In the third chapter, I argue that moral feeling stands in a realist grounding relation to moral 
rightness, and that ethical feeling operates rather differently, and provides further guidance in 
developing an ethics integral to the discourse theory of morality and the discourse theory of law and 
democracy. I argue that Habermas’ account of moral feeling provides a referent, analogous to sense 
perception in truth-oriented discourses, a referent that is not wholly discursively produced. This 
suggests that Habermas must reject his antirealist reading of discourse theory. Then, I turn to the 
ethical feeling of hope, considering the role played by hope in discourse theory, and drawing out the 
implications for an ethical validity claim. I conclude by arguing that the presuppositions of discourse 
– including the values of inclusion and civility – are themselves ethical values. I argue that Habermas' 
necessary pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action are those of a particular – if 
generalizable – form of life, such that there is a worldview in discourse ethics, that they take the form 
of necessary preconditions of the moral point of view, much like the values put forward in Habermas’ 
“ethics of the species,” but that this means that, as Habermas himself maintains, these 'necessary 
 vi 
presuppositions' are not moral oughts, and yet, contra Habermas, they are worth valuing. Put 
differently, Habermas argues that the necessary pragmatic presuppositions are justified functionally or 
pragmatically, but I aim to show that the presuppositions are neither moral nor merely pragmatically 
justified but are properly ethical. This move would pluralize without radically relativizing the normative 
discourses of Habermasian discourse theory. 
In order to situate this dissertation within the broader contexts of ethics and political 
philosophy, in two appendices I critically engage the work of Allen Gewirth and Iris Marion Young. 
In the first chapter, I argue, against Allen Gewirth’s defense of universal moral human rights to 
freedom and well-being, that rather than leading to what he terms a ‘dialectically necessary’ conclusion, 
Gewirth’s argument is contingent on affirmation of the principle of strict correlativity of rights and 
duties, which he uses as a logical principle. Further, I argue that this in fact exhibits a larger problem, 
that Gewirth equivocates between sorts of necessity, conflating pragmatic necessity with logical 
necessity.  
In the second appendix, I start with a reconstruction of Young’s theory of justice, in order to 
deal with what appears to be an equivocation between two senses of ‘justice’: procedural justice 
understood in terms of democratic legitimation, governed by procedural norms including equality, 
inclusion, publicity, and reasonableness; and ideal justice understood in terms of self-determination 
and self-realization. Then, I argue that both the procedural and ideal accounts of justice rest on another 
ideal, the principle of the equal moral worth of persons, such that her overall account has a 
foundationalist structure: both procedural norms and the ideals of self-determination and self-
realization are grounded in the ideal of the equal moral worth of persons. However, Young argues 
that ideals are only useful for awakening political imagination concerning alternatives to present 
conditions, such that the foundational ideal of Young’s theory provides a viable basis neither for the 
procedural norms Young defends nor for the norms of ideal justice. 
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Dissertation Introduction 
Discourse ethics and liberal theories of justice more broadly generally rely on a distinction 
between goods that are generalizable, and goods that are in some way context-bound and 
particularistic. Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics makes the distinction wholly formal, abstaining from 
any theoretical commitment to which goods are generalizable and leaving this as a matter for discursive 
deliberation. Those goods that are discursively determined to be universalizable are the object of valid 
moral norms, and those that are not universally justifiable as goods involve at best ethical values. In this 
dissertation, I argue for a substantive modification of the formal structure of Habermas’ position, in 
order to accommodate a validity claim attaching to ethical discourses. I argue that Habermas’ position 
requires a goodness claim, in addition to the rightness validity claim attaching to moral discourses. In 
Chapter One, I consider two of Habermas’ more idiosyncratic arguments, defending quasi-moral 
obligations to non-human animals, and arguing against non-therapeutic pre-birth genetic 
manipulation, governed only by market forces (or what he terms ‘liberal eugenics’). I argue that 
Habermas’ discourse theory of morality depends on a background general ethics that is at least under-
theorized, a point which Habermas himself seems to begin to acknowledge, in The Future of Human 
Nature, in developing an ethics of the species when faced with the question of how to ethically value 
morality as a whole, suggesting the need for a specifically ethical validity claim. 
In Chapter Two, I shift from the discourse theory of morality and ethics to the discourse 
theory of law and democracy, considering Habermas’ defenses of civil disobedience and his variable 
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responses to humanitarian military intervention, particularly in Kosovo and Iraq. I argue that, as in 
the discourse theory of morality, Habermas’ discourse theory of law and democracy contains an 
implicit ethics. At the end of the chapter, I consider Jacques Rancière’s theorization of a politics of 
dissensus, showing that Rancière is unable to justify his normative claim that there are better and 
worse sorts of policing. I argue that this difficulty for Rancière is conceptually related to Habermas’ 
rejection of the possibility of an validity claim attached to ethical values.  
Discourse ethicists generally are anti-realists about moral rightness, in that the rightness of 
moral norms is a matter of discursive justification and is not grounded in or by any objective feature 
of the world. In Chapter Three, I argue that moral feeling stands in a realist grounding relation to 
moral rightness, and that ethical feeling operates differently, and provides further guidance in 
developing an ethics integral to the discourse theory of morality and the discourse theory of law and 
democracy. I argue that Habermas’ account of moral feeling provides a referent, analogous to sense 
perception in truth-oriented discourses, a referent that is not wholly discursively produced. This 
suggests that Habermas must reject his antirealist reading of discourse theory. Then, I turn to the 
ethical feeling of hope, considering the role played by hope in discourse theory, and drawing out the 
implications for an ethical validity claim. I conclude by arguing that the presuppositions of discourse 
– including the values of inclusion and civility – are themselves ethical values. I argue that Habermas' 
necessary pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action are those of a particular – if 
generalizable – form of life, such that there is a worldview in discourse ethics, that they take the form 
of necessary preconditions of the moral point of view, much like the values put forward in Habermas’ 
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“ethics of the species”, but that this means that, as Habermas himself maintains, these 'necessary 
presuppositions' are not moral oughts, and yet, contra Habermas, they are worth valuing. Put 
differently, Habermas argues that the necessary pragmatic presuppositions are justified functionally or 
pragmatically, but I argue that the presuppositions are neither morally nor merely pragmatically 
justified but are properly ethical. This move pluralizes without radically relativizing the normative 
discourses of Habermasian discourse theory. 
_____________________________ 
In two appendices, I present essays on related concerns developed in the process of 
researching this dissertation, which are nonetheless not strictly part of my core argument. In the first 
appendix, I argue, against Alan Gewirth’s dialectical – rather than dialogical – defense of universal 
moral human rights to freedom and well-being, that rather than leading to what he terms a ‘dialectically 
necessary’ conclusion, Gewirth’s argument is contingent on affirmation of the principle of strict 
correlativity of rights and duties, which he uses as a logical principle. I argue that this in fact exhibits 
a larger problem, that Gewirth equivocates between sorts of necessity, conflating pragmatic necessity 
with logical necessity. Further, I argue that this parallels the frequent conflation of pragmatic and 
moral necessity that has attended the Anglophone reception of Habermasean discourse theory. 
In the second appendix, I start with a reconstruction of Iris Marion Young’s theory of justice, 
in order to deal with what appears to be an equivocation between two senses of ‘justice’: procedural 
justice understood in terms of democratic legitimation, governed by procedural norms including 
equality, inclusion, publicity, and reasonableness; and ideal justice understood in terms of self-
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determination and self-realization. Then, I argue that both the procedural and ideal accounts of justice 
rest on another ideal, the principle of the equal moral worth of persons, such that her overall account 
has a foundationalist structure: both procedural norms and the ideals of self-determination and self-
realization are grounded in the ideal of the equal moral worth of persons. However, Young argues 
that ideals are only useful for awakening political imagination concerning alternatives to present 
conditions, such that the foundational ideal of Young’s theory provides a viable basis neither for the 
procedural norms Young defends nor for the norms of ideal justice. However, I argue that as Young 
takes herself to have good reasons to accept the ideals she endorses, she might better be understood 
as supplementing her procedural theory of justice with a general ethics, an ethics that is general and 
that suggests normative responsibilities, although not the strict, categorical moral obligations involved 
in democratically legitimated human rights. Further, that both her ethics and her theory of justice are 
presented as depending upon their capacity to “resonate” with others, I suggest further that there 
seems to be a disavowed realist basis for her normative views: the capacity of humans to be affected 
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Chapter One: Ethical Validity  
In the period following the publication of Knowledge and Human Interests (1971), Jürgen 
Habermas was already concerned about the justificatory proceduralism he was moving toward, a 
concern powerfully expressed in “Walter Benjamin: Consciousness Raising or Rescuing Critique 
(1972)”: 
Can we preclude the possibility of a meaningless emancipation? In complex societies, 
emancipation means the participatory transformation of administrative decision structures. Is 
it possible that one day an emancipated human race could encounter itself within an expanded 
space of discursive formation of will and yet be robbed of the light in which it is capable of 
interpreting its life as something good? The revenge of a culture exploited over millennia for 
the legitimation of domination would then take this form: Right at the moment of overcoming 
age-old repressions, it would harbor no violence but it would have no content either. Without 
the influx of those semantic energies with which Benjamin’s rescuing criticism was concerned, 
the structures of practical discourse – finally well established – would necessarily become 
desolate (Habermas J. , 1983, p. 158). 
That is, if societies have become sufficiently complex that substantive ethical (and religious) ways of 
life are no longer broadly shared, then emancipation could only involve the opening up of collective 
procedures of will formation, but with the focus on formal democratization, the substantive content 
or meaning once provided by ethical (and religious) forms of life could no longer be legitimated.  
In The Future of Human Nature, Habermas addresses the analogous worry that playing the 
language game of morality cannot itself be justified, or put differently, that once we accept that moral 
claims are discursively justified, an obligation to discursively justify claims – or to enter discourse – 
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cannot itself be justified.1 Habermas accepts the consequences: we cannot say justifiably that discursive 
non-violent resolution of conflict is good. Habermas is concerned that liberal views that are neutral 
with respect to ethical values – a feature of his own moral theory – are ill-equipped to deal with a 
possible future in which our genetic inheritance is in part determined by consumer choice, or, to 
criticize non-therapeutic intervention in the genetic material of pre-personal human life, governed by 
market forces and consumer choice, which he terms ‘liberal eugenics’. Further, Habermas argues that 
liberal eugenics would put at risk morality as a whole, a consequence that leads him to put forward, 
admittedly tentatively, the idea of an ethics of the species. He denies that a threat to morality as a 
whole – or to our capacity to justify moral norms – is itself a moral problem. But though he argues 
that liberal eugenics should not be seen as violating moral norms because pre-personal human life can 
neither be seen as the subject of rights nor the object of duties, nonetheless he argues that we have 
reason to value, ethically, the moral point of view, and so, to proscribe liberal eugenics. It seems, then, 
that thirty years after “Walter Benjamin… (1972)”, Habermas is looking for a way to justifiably say 
that non-violent discursive conflict resolution is good. 
In this chapter, I offer an initial overview of Habermas’ discourse ethics, with a focus on the 
need for actual justificatory discourses in lieu of monological justificatory strategies (I.1); argue that 
his distinction between moral norms and ethical values is a formal, epistemic distinction (I.2); present 
 
1 This is the same concern that motivated Alan Gewirth’s rejection of John Rawls’ theory of justice, 
on the basis that there is no reason that one must enter the original position, and that I argue still 
plagues Gewirth’s own argument, in that it depends on the contingent acceptance of the principle of 
the strict correlativity of rights and duties. See discussion of Gewirth, below. 
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a reading of Habermas’ argument for quasi-moral duties to non-human animals, considered in light 
of his argument for the moral principle of universalization (I.3); give a reading of Habermas’ argument 
defending an ethics of the species, occasioned by the possibility of a liberal eugenics that would put at 
risk morality as a whole, which I argue opens up new possibilities for specifically ethical justification 
(I.4); and argue that Habermas’ discourse theory of morality depends on a background general ethics 
that is at least under-theorized (I.5). 
 
(I.1) Habermas’ Discourse Ethics 
A core intuition of Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory is that moral inquiries conducted in foro 
interno, or monologically by the philosopher, cannot justify moral norms or judgments.2 Seyla Benhabib 
 
2 This intuition parallels Alan Gewirth’s rejection of what he termed the assertoric method of 
argument, discussed below, although Habermas’ would see the shift to the dialectical method as still 
relevantly monological, in that the dialectic is still internal to the individual subject, and so, heir to the 
many problems Habermas sees attendant on the philosophy of the subject, and affecting the 
philosophical discourse of modernity from Immanuel Kant through Michel Foucault. Habermas 
accepts that at least Foucault’s diagnoses of the problem of the philosophy of the subject, in The Order 
of Things, is compelling (Habermas J. , The philosophical discourse of modernity: Twelve lectures, 
1987, p. 294) (Foucault, 1984 (1970), pp. 303-43). See discussion of Gewirth, below. Habermas sees 
Foucault as failing to emancipate himself adequately from the philosophy of the subject, however, 
arguing that the only remaining way out for the philosophical discourse of modernity is a shift from 
individual reason to communicative reason (Habermas J. , An alternative way out of the philosophy 
of the subject: Communicative versus subject-centered reason, 1987). Hence, the concern with 
collective procedures of theoretical justification and will formation, a core concern that discourse 
theorists share more generally. Some version of this intuition is also involved in the work of many 
philosophers who are not Habermasian discourse theorists: Hannah Arendt’s distinction between 
collective civil disobedience and individual conscientious objection depends on an analogous intuition, 
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distinguishes discourse theory from Rawlsian approaches using the specifically discourse-ethical 
version of this claim:  
[T]here is a methodological divide between the Rawlsian and discourse-theoretic approaches 
about the use of counterfactual thought experiments and/or dialogue situations ... [Discourse 
ethics proceeds] not by counterfactually imagining, let us say, what a Buddhist and a Catholic 
may hypothetically agree to as constructed by the theorist, but by framing and encouraging a 
real rather than a virtual dialogue between a Buddhist and a Catholic person such that a reasonable 
agreement between them may result (Benhabib S. , 2011, pp. 82-3). 
Benhabib argues that discourse ethics ‘frames and encourages’ real rather than virtual discourses, 
rather than that discourse ethics requires real rather than virtual discourses, but the fact remains that to 
the extent that a theorist relies on virtual rather than actual discourses, the gap between discourse-
theoretic approaches and Rawlsian (or Gewirthian) approaches tends to vanish. So, justification 
requires actual rather than only virtual discourses according to discourse theorists, which is the 
distinctively discourse-theoretic position, shared by Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib and Raïner 
Forst.  
 
as does Enrique’s Dussel’s conception of antihegemonic validity, which prioritizes collective claims 
emerging on the periphery voiced against the consensus of the center. Habermas’ most extensive 
account of discourse and communicative action in terms of social theory is in his massive two-volume 
Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas J. , The theory of communicative action (volume one): 
Reason and the rationalization of society, 1984) (Habermas J. , The theory of communicative action 
(volume two): Lifeworld and System: A critique of functionalist reason, 1987). He presents the 
corresponding normative theory particularly in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990) and 
Justification and Application (1993), and mildly revises his theoretical position in Truth and Justification 
(2003). Habermas’ most recent overview of his entire architectonic – presented in response to Apel’s 
teleological “Part B” – is in Between Naturalism and Religion (Habermas J. , Between naturalism and 
religion, 2008, pp. 77-98). 
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Forst might appear to move toward a ‘Rawlsian’ position on virtual discourses. He does 
consider the “subjective practical certainty” potentially achieved by discourses conducted in foro interno 
to be at least “sufficient for the agent”, or put differently, he considers reflective consideration of 
normative issues in anticipation of discursive engagement to be valuable to the agents themselves (Forst, 
2012, pp. 67, 292n80). But since Forst accepts that such moral judgments are “not thereby ultimately 
grounded” or justified, as “subjective moral reflection” is at best an “anticipation of discursively 
achieved consensus”, his position at least on the significance of actual discourses is basically in accord 
with that of Habermas and Benhabib (Forst, 2012). What is achieved in personal reflection is at best 
a subjective practical certainty, or, certainty from within the worldview of some persons or communities. 
Forst’s position is more complex than it might appear, as it seems that he is talking about something 
more like ethical confidence, or confidence that one’s own or one’s community’s way of life is valuable. 
This seems rather different from a claim that subjective moral reflection results in anticipatory moral 
justification, for example. I return to anticipatory moral justification in later chapters. But the relevant 
point here is only that for Habermas as for Forst, monological reflection might be sufficient for 
achieving subjective practical certainty, but justification requires actual dialogical engagement.  
So, discourse ethicists generally insist that moral norms are not, in principle, justifiable through 
solely virtual or hypothetical discourses. Rather, inclusive actual discourses are necessary, though not 
sufficient, for justifying moral norms. Actual discourses are necessary to forestall monological, 
paternalistic justificatory practices, yet are not sufficient, as taking the conclusions of actual discourses 
to be justified would reduce rational, discursive justification to de facto agreement. By contrast, Iris 
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Marion Young tends to slide between these two claims. Generally, her procedural account of justice 
focuses on justification through actual deliberative procedures (or, de facto agreement), but at times she 
frames her view counter-factually, in such a way that it slides toward ideal justification through virtual 
or hypothetical discourses.3 Habermas rejects justification solely through either actual or hypothetical 
discourses. 
Consider Habermas’ explanation of discursive procedures, showing his concern with avoiding 
paternalism:  
Discursive procedures make egalitarian decisions dependent on prior argumentation (only 
justified decisions are accepted); they are inclusive (all affected parties can participate); and 
they compel the participants to adopt each other’s perspectives (a fair assessment of all 
affected interests is possible). This is the cognitive meaning of an impartial decision-making 
process. Judged by this standard, the ethical justification of a unilateral undertaking by appeal 
to the presumptively universal values of one’s own political culture must remain fundamentally 
biased (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 185). 
In this passage, Habermas lays out the basic structure of justificatory discourses. Habermas 
understands justificatory discourse as a practice that is fundamental at least in the sense that we have 
no other practice that could replace it as a means of coming to an understanding with others as the 
basis for what he terms ‘communicative action’, or, action based on shared understanding (Habermas 
J. , Truth and justification, 2003, p. 11). That is: if we want to settle conflict non-violently, then we have 
no alternative to its discursive resolution. Justificatory discourse as a practice is governed implicitly by 
necessary presuppositions, including the presuppositions of equality and inclusion, which Habermas 
thinks pragmatically must be presupposed in communicative action. Basically, Habermas argues that we 
 
3 See discussion of Young’s position, below. 
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cannot take ourselves to have come to an understanding with others, or to be engaged in 
communicative action, if we have prevented some persons from speaking or if equal weight is not 
given to the views of all participants in the process of decision-making. This is not a morally normative 
claim, but rather, a functional requirement of discourse as a practice, without which we would not be 
engaged communicatively, such that any agreement achieved would only have the force of a de facto 
agreement rather than the normative force of a decision reached through communicative engagement.  
In Habermasian discourse theory, rightness is the validity claim at stake in moral discourses and 
is analogous to the truth claim at stake in truth-oriented discourses. Rightness is epistemic in that there 
is nothing beyond ideal warranted assertibility for rightness to be, or equivalently, in that rightness 
consists wholly in justification: 
Ideal warranted assertibility ... exhausts the meaning of normative rightness itself as the 
worthiness of recognition. A norm’s ideal warranted assertibility – unlike that of a justification-
transcendent claim to truth – does not refer beyond the boundaries of discourse to something 
that might ‘exist’ independently of having been determined to be worthy of recognition. The 
justification-immanence of ‘rightness’ is based on a semantic argument: Since the ‘validity’ of 
a norm consists in that it would be accepted, that is, recognized as valid, under ideal conditions 
of justification, ‘rightness’ is an epistemic concept (Habermas J. , Truth and justification, 2003, 
p. 248). 
Although Habermas retains an epistemic account of moral rightness, he now accepts an analogous 
distinction between truth and justification, having rejected his earlier epistemic account of truth. Put 
differently, Habermas has rejected his earlier coherence theory of truth, but he retains a coherence 
theory of moral rightness (Habermas J. , Truth and justification, 2003, p. 8). The claim that rightness 
is epistemic implies that Habermas is an anti-realist about morality. Rightness is constructed by our 
practices, and is not grounded in anything pre-discursive, so, rightness is epistemic. Habermas is, now, 
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a realist about truth, as he sees the presupposition that we are referring to the same physical world as 
pragmatically necessary. Truth, then, is grounded in the existence of the physical world, and not wholly 
constructed by our practices.  
For Habermas, justification is in a sense both contextual, in that all actual discourses occur in 
some particular context, and context-transcending, in that justified claims are taken to be justifiable in 
any context. Habermas explains this “Janus-faced character of unconditional validity claims” justified 
through communicative engagement thusly:  
As claims, they depend on intersubjective recognition; hence the public authority of a 
consensus arrived at under discursive conditions in which it is possible to say ‘no’ cannot 
ultimately be replaced by the private insight of an individual who knows better. As claims to 
unconditional validity, however, they point beyond every factual agreement (Habermas J. , 2008, 
p. 75). 
The subordinate clause of the first sentence illustrates Habermas’ rejection of monological justificatory 
strategies: “the public authority of a consensus arrived at under discursive conditions in which it is 
possible to say ‘no’ cannot ultimately be replaced by the private insight of an individual who knows 
better”. More significantly, this passage shows the “Janus-faced” nature of Habermasian moral 
rightness, the validity claim in moral discourses: both validity as what has been determined through 
actual discourses to be worthy of recognition and as what would be accepted under ideal conditions 
that are never actual. The idea seems to be that we can take ourselves to be justified in asserting a 
moral norm, and in taking it to be generally valid, to the extent that we have engaged in actual 
justificatory discourses that approximate ideal conditions. However, since ideal conditions never 
actually pertain, the justification – and any claim that a moral norm is valid – is fallible and subject to 
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revision, or put differently, is subject to the fallibilism proviso. Habermas’ position is that we need not 
refer to something extra-discursive, and so not to hypothetical or virtual discourses, but only to ideals 
that are implicit in actual discourses, such as the egalitarian communicative ideal of inclusion.  
Again, the egalitarian communicative ideal of inclusion is a pragmatic presupposition of 
discourse as a practice and is not the same as the norm of moral egalitarianism. To the extent that 
moral egalitarianism involves a valid norm, this must be as a result of discursive engagement between 
persons, according to Habermas.4 Raïner Forst and Karl-Otto Apel object to Habermas’ functional 
arguments that discourse is fundamental in that there is no functional equivalent, and that the 
necessary presuppositions implicit in discourse must (functionally) be presupposed in order to be 
engaged in the practice itself. Forst defends a moral right to justification, against Habermas’ functional 
defense of the procedure of discursive justification; Apel argues for a moral/teleological “Part B” for 
discourse theory (Apel, 2002) (Forst, The right to justification, 2012). Habermas’ view remains that 
we justify moral norms discursively, but that discourse itself is functionally governed by implicit norms 
that are not themselves morally normative. Both the ideal and the actual moments are necessary, and 
neither ideal hypothetical discourses nor actual discourses alone are sufficient to justify moral norms, 
according to Habermas. 
Importantly, Habermas leaves it in principle an open question whether there are any 
universalizable moral norms, as this must be resolved discursively and never with any finality. Given 
 
4 This contrasts, for example, with Iris Young’s position that moral egalitarianism is the basis for 
procedural norms, on my reading  See discussion of Young, below. 
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a “morally justified pluralism of [ethical] life projects and life-forms,” philosophy can at best clarify 
the moral point of view, or, reconstruct the procedures through which moral norms can be justified, 
and reflectively analyze the ways in which ethical questions are generally answered (Habermas J. , 1993, 
p. 75). Habermas frames this as a retreat from substantive normative content to formal analysis: 
“philosophy no longer has the right to intervene in this struggle of gods and demons ... [but] retires 
to a meta-level and investigates only the formal properties of processes of self-understanding, without 
taking a position on the contents themselves” (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, p. 4). 
Habermas’ philosophical reconstruction of morality limits Habermas to the role of a participant in 
discourse, in the authority he can claim for any statement of what valid moral norms there are, as the 
positing of moral norms with any real content is a move within discourse, and subject to the “yes” or 
“no” responses of anyone and everyone. 
The core concept of Habermas’ discourse ethics was – and remains – justice, but where 
‘justice’ is the core idea of morality:  
Habermas’s Discourse Ethics … is a moral theory in the sense that [John Rawls’ A Theory of 
Justice] is not, i.e., it is a general theory of right conduct. This is shown by the fact that in 
Habermas’s work ‘justice’ is equivalent to moral rightness: it is the central normative concept 
of the discourse theory of morality and the central phenomenon to be studied (Finlayson & 
Freyenhagen, Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the political, 2011, p. 4). 
In distinguishing ethics from morality, Habermas acknowledges that discourse ethics ought more 
precisely to be termed ‘discourse morality’ (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 2). By contrast, the core concepts 
in Habermas’ discourse theory of law and democracy are legality and legitimacy, rather than justice. 
For example, here Habermas is distinguishing morality and ethics: “I proceed on the basis of a 
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distinction between a Kantian theory of justice and a Kierkegaardian ethics of subjectivity” (Habermas 
J. , The future of human nature, 2003, p. vii; emphasis added). Similarly, Raïner Forst, who follows 
Habermas on this, describes morally right claims thusly: “what is decisive for deserving the title ‘justice’ 
is whether they discursively satisfy the criterion as candidates for ‘what is equally good for all’” (Forst, 
2012, p. 64; emphasis added). To complicate matters a bit, however, Habermas actually distinguishes 
between two sorts of discourse that count as moral – discourses of justification and discourses of 
application – and also distinguishes two sorts of practical discourse in addition to moral discourses: 
ethical discourses and pragmatic discourses.  
 First, then, Habermas distinguishes (moral) discourses of justification, ideally impartial 
procedures through which we determine which norms are valid, from (moral) discourses of 
application, through which we determine which norms are appropriately applied in some particular 
context. Habermas argues that the uncoupling of morality and ethics leaves “moral theory ... 
competent [only] to clarify the moral point of view and justify its universality, [though] it can 
contribute nothing to answering the question ‘Why be moral?’ whether this be understood in a trivial, 
an existential, or a pedagogical sense” (Habermas J. , Justification and application: Remarks on 
discourse ethics, 1993, p. 77). Habermas attempts to address what he understands as the cognitive aspect 
of morality with the distinction between discourses of justification and of application that together 
exhaust the meaning of impartiality but rejects any morally justifiable solution to the problem of 
motivation. Habermas argues that moral discourses of justification, concerning what is equally in the 
interest of all, must be supplemented by discourses of application, concerning which valid norm is 
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appropriate in context, but that both “discourses of application [and] justificatory discourses are purely 
cognitive undertaking[s] and as such cannot compensate for the uncoupling of moral judgment from 
the concrete motives that inform actions” (Habermas J. , Justification and application: Remarks on 
discourse ethics, 1993, pp. 13-4; emphasis added). Appropriateness in applicative discourses corresponds 
to rightness or moral validity in justificatory discourses, for Habermas: “In discourses of application, 
the principle of appropriateness takes on the role played by the principle of universalization in 
justificatory discourses. Only the two principles taken together exhaust the idea of impartiality” 
(Habermas J. , Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics, 1993, pp. 37, 129). There is 
no analogous distinction in the justification of fact claims, which Habermas takes to be important for 
distinguishing normative discourses from truth-oriented discourses (Habermas J. , Justification and 
application: Remarks on discourse ethics, 1993, p. 38). That is, we do not have to determine which 
truth claim is appropriately applied, given the context, whereas more than one valid norm might be 
appropriately applied, and this does depend on contextual features of the situation. Discourses of 
justification abstract from context and justify norms that are equally in the interest of all, whereas 
discourses of application reverse the abstraction and determine which of the valid norms are 
appropriate in some concrete, particular context.5 
 
5 …such that a full employment of practical reason would involve considering what Seyla Benhabib 
has called the generalized and the concrete other. See: Habermas 1990, 175-81; 1993, 153-4; Benhabib 1987, 
77-96. Klaus Günther’s account of application discourses is generally cited by Habermas: Günther 
1993. 
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 Second, Habermas distinguishes several uses of practical reason, differentiating moral, 
pragmatic and ethical discourses. These different uses of practical reason are differentiated on the 
basis of the sort of question they aim to answer. Moral discourses aim to answer either the question 
of whether adopting a norm would be in the interest of all possibly affected (via discourses of 
justification) or the question of which norm is appropriately applied is some particular context (via 
discourses of application). Pragmatic discourses, in contrast, aim simply to either comparatively assess 
means to a given end, or to assess one’s goals given one’s existing preferences. Pragmatic discourses 
generally result in conditional imperatives, relating “causes to effects in accordance with value 
preferences and prior goal determinations” (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 3). Ethical discourses, as developed 
by Habermas, aim to resolve questions of one’s self-understanding, involving hermeneutic, 
interpretive reflection on existential questions of who one is and/or aims to become. Ethical 
discourses are also “Janus-faced”, according to Habermas, in containing both a descriptive element, 
appropriatively taking up one’s life history as an element of one’s self-understanding, and an evaluative 
element, consisting of a sort of ideal of the kind of person one aims to become, or of the values 
endorsed through one’s decision. So, the resulting ethical-existential validity claim – to authenticity – 
is complex: it consists of both the claim that one’s self-understanding makes sense in light of one’s life 
history and the claim that the values one endorses are worthy, or as William Rehg puts it, that our 
decision “realizes goods that deserve our approval” (Rehg, 2011, p. 134). To take up Rehg’s example, 
consider someone’s deliberations about whether to go to medical school. Deliberation over whether 
this is a valid, authentic choice for someone could involve anyone with knowledge of one’s life history, 
considering for example whether one is well-suited to clinical practice, or has shown an aptitude for 
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the biological sciences, as well as requiring consideration of the values realized by the kind of life under 
consideration. The claims considered in such deliberations might achieve a sort of objectivity. For 
example, the claim ‘going to medical school would be a valid choice for me’, or even the claim ‘given 
who I am and aim to be, I should go to medical school’, can be given rational grounds that are stronger 
than mere preferences, and can be supported with reasons that could in principle be convincing to all 
relevant parties. As such, there is a sort of validity claim at stake in ethical-existential discourses, just 
not the sort of validity claim that appears in moral discourses. Even if, say, helping people (as a doctor) 
is worthy of endorsement, such ethical discourses do not aim to justify general norms in the interest 
of all, and so, do not result in such general norms as (absurdly) ‘we should all go to medical school’, 
or, ‘we should always help others’. That is, ethical-existential discourses that conclude with a validity 
claim are not thereby claiming to justify moral norms, even though in principle, there is no reason that 
the evaluative component of ethical-existential validity claims could not be considered also in moral 
discourses. 
 
(I.2) Moral Norms vs. Ethical Values 
Though Habermas distinguishes between ethical and moral discourses in terms of the questions 
they each aim to answer, this does not, in my view, amount to a difference between moral norms and 
ethical values as such. I argue that Habermas’ distinction between ethical values and moral norms is a 
formal distinction, and that the extension of the categories is constructed discursively. Though at times 
Habermas’ writing seems to suggest otherwise, I think this is a reasonably uncontroversial reading of 
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his normative architectonic. At times, though, Habermas appears to be marking a distinction between 
types of normativity rather than only between the types of justification available in particular cases, 
implying that there are substantive questions of the good that can be identified as such, extra-
discursively, as here, where he writes that he proceeds  
…on the basis of a distinction between a Kantian theory of justice and a Kierkegaardian ethics 
of subjectivity, and defend[s] the restraint that post-metaphysical thinking exercises regarding 
binding positions on substantive questions of the good or the un-misspent life (Habermas J. , 
The future of human nature, 2003, p. vii). 
Similarly, in “Remarks on Discourse Ethics” Habermas’ phrasing suggests that ethical questions can 
be distinguished from moral questions merely on the basis of their form. He claims that an ethical 
question “is already formulated in such a way that it invites an answer whose claim to validity is 
relativized to prior life projects and forms of life” (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 107). Consider a third 
example:  
[E]thical discussions, in contrast to moral arguments, are always already embedded in the 
traditional context of a hitherto accepted, identity-constituting form of life. Moral judgments 
differ from ethical judgments only in their degree of contextuality (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 105). 
And a final example, from The Future of Human Nature: Habermas writes that “ethical questions ... are 
wedded to questions of identity ... Obviously there is no answer to such questions that would be 
independent of the given context and thus would bind all persons in the same way” (Habermas J. , 
The future of human nature, 2003, pp. 3, emphasis added). This point does not strike me as obvious, 
though charitably, the point seems to be only that there is a reasonable pluralism of ethical worldviews, 
which would be implied by an account of ethical values as not justifiable for reasons all could accept. 
The phrasing is not helpful, though, as for Habermas moral claims likewise initially arise “in the 
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context of [particular life histories] or unique form[s] of life,” such that Habermas acknowledges the 
situatedness of reasoning in both ethical and moral discourses; it’s just that valid moral claims have 
been “translated” such that they are universally justifiable [ (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 
2003, p. 3); see also: (Habermas J. , A genealogical analysis of the cognitive content of modernity, 2005 
(1998)); (Habermas J. , The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights, 2012)]. 
For example, the conception of human dignity as requiring recognition of certain universal human 
rights is reconstructed by Habermas as a secular translation of an earlier ethico-religious conception 
only valid in some communities, whereas (at least some) human rights are justifiable universally. My 
specific concern here, though, is that Habermas at times seems to be suggesting that ethical values are 
connected to identities intrinsically and so are fundamentally different from moral norms. 
Habermas has an epistemic account of moral rightness, which I think provides the key to 
understanding what he intends, in distinguishing the normative judgments of a Kantian theory of 
justice from those of a Kierkegaardian ethics of subjectivity. Since Habermas’ account of moral 
rightness is epistemic, there is nothing extra-discursive for moral rightness to be: “discursively 
achieved consensus ... ‘grounds’ a norm that cannot ‘consist’ in anything but that it ‘merits’ 
intersubjective recognition” (Habermas J. , Truth and justification, 2003, p. 257). So one might read 
the initial passage not as arguing that values are extra-discursively different from norms, nor that what 
counts as a “substantive question of the good” is determinable extra-discursively, but rather that, as 
he writes in “Remarks on Discourse Ethics,” “[m]oral judgments differ from ethical judgments only 
in their degree of contextuality” (Habermas J. , 1993, pp. 105, emphasis added). I believe this amounts 
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to an epistemic point about justification. Put differently, it is not that there are different sorts of claim. 
Rather, some normative claims are universally justifiable, or worthy of recognition, and others – those 
Habermas categorizes as ethical claims – are not similarly justifiable, or, are only justifiable from some 
perspectives. Such claims might be justifiable from within an ethical worldview that may be sufficient 
for those who share that worldview, such that these claims might achieve subjective practical certainty, 
just not universal validity. Habermas uses the same language to refer to context-dependent ethical 
“justification” as Forst uses to describe “subjective practical certainty” with respect to moral rightness. 
What differs “only in ... degree of contextuality” is the justification of moral and ethical judgments. For 
Habermas, ethical claims are not universally justifiable, so there is no validity claim associated with 
ethics. If it were the case that ethical questions were “always already” embedded and context-
dependent and Habermas were claiming that the philosopher could determine which questions those 
were from the armchair, he would be deciding monologically what ought to be left to controversy and 
decided discursively (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 105).6 However, although Habermas is distinguishing 
between types of normativity in a sense, that distinction reduces to the difference in forms of 
justification, because for Habermas there is no gap between justification and rightness: we know that 
a moral norm is not an ethical value to the extent that the norm has been discursively justified. 
 
6 This would leave him open to the objection he levels against John Rawls, in “Reconciliation through 
the Public Use of Reason,” an objection equally applicable to both Alan Gewirth’s assertoric and 
dialectic methods: Habermas argues that Rawls determines monologically what should be left to 
participants in actual discourses (Habermas J. , 1998, p. 57). See discussion of Alan Gewirth, below. 
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This interpretation of Habermas’ distinction between moral norms and ethical values is 
consonant with Raïner Forst’s formulation of the distinction between morality and ethics, in The Right 
to Justification: “The distinction between ethics and morality is thus a formal and procedural a priori 
distinction (prior to discourse), and only becomes substantive a posteriori” (Forst, 2012, p. 64). Still, 
Forst’s phrasing also sometimes suggests an extra-discursive differentiation of sorts of normativity: 
“[A]n ethical justification rests on a notion of the good life, even if it is a very general one, while a 
moral justification is supposed to be neutral as to the question of the good or worthwhile life” (Forst, 
2010, pp. 718-19). However, Forst’s point here concerns ethical justification, which helps resolve any 
problematic implication that there are different sorts of normative claim. The point seems to be that 
even “very general” ideas of the good life are still not properly universalizable, or justifiable to all for 
reasons they could accept, or “equally good for all”, such that an ethical justification is at best a 
justification for those who accept the relevant value. For this reason, ethical justification is not 
associated with a universal validity claim – e.g. rightness or truth, the validity claims associated with 
justification in moral discourses and truth-oriented discourses respectively – for Forst as for 
Habermas. 
Habermas’ philosophical “restraint ... regarding binding positions on substantive questions of 
the good” is sometimes clearer when considering more concrete concerns (Habermas J. , The future 
of human nature, 2003, p. vii). For example, Habermas writes that “the possibility cannot be excluded 
that abortion is a problem that cannot be resolved from the moral point of view at all” (Habermas J. 
, 1993, p. 59). Further, he writes that he does “not wish to preclude a priori that some vegetarians 
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exhibit a moral sensibility that may prove to be the correct moral intuition under more auspicious 
social circumstances” (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 111). Both passages demonstrate that Habermas does 
not take what count as justifiable moral norms to be distinguishable from substantive ethical values 
extra-discursively. However, Habermas also states that “it is possible to deduce from the inconclusive 
outcome of practical discourses that the problems under consideration and the issues in need of 
regulation do not involve generalizable interests at all” (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 60). The pragmatic 
discourse-ethical point is clear enough: inconclusive outcomes of practical discourses show at least 
that, at present, we do not have sufficient warrant for taking the normative claim under consideration 
to involve a valid moral norm. However, Habermas states this too forcefully. It is not that inconclusive 
discourses show that the normative claim does not involve generalizable interests, and certainly not 
that there is an available deduction from failure to achieve consensus presently to consensus being 
unachievable in principle, but rather that thus far we have not shown that the normative claim is 
justifiable and so concerns at best an ethical value.  
So, on my reading, the distinction between moral norms and ethical values is formal, in that it 
does not refer beyond procedures of justification, and the historically changing extension of the 
categories of moral norm and ethical value is only determinable procedurally, in actual discourses. 
Habermas only defends a formal distinction between normative claims that could be universally 
justified, the realization of which would be equally good for all, and normative claims that cannot be 
so justified, which suggests that such claims depend on contextual features that limit the scope. The 
further implication would be that ethical values are in some way dependent on specific differences 
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between persons and/or groups. It is not that there are two sorts of normativity, extra-discursively. 
Rather, some normative claims could be universally justified, which are those that Habermas 
understands as falling under a ‘Kantian theory of justice’. Some normative claims can at best be 
justified to some persons, such that they must be dependent on subjective differences between persons 
or groups and so Habermas considers them as falling under a ‘Kierkegaardian ethics of subjectivity’. 
This should clarify Habermas’ claim that he proceeds “on the basis of a distinction between a Kantian 
theory of justice and a Kierkegaardian ethics of subjectivity, and defend[s] the restraint that 
postmetaphysical thinking exercises regarding binding positions on substantive questions of the good 
or the un-misspent life” (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, p. vii). Despite any 
appearance that Habermas determines extra-discursively which questions are “substantive questions 
of the good or the un-misspent life”, I think the claims intended are far less problematic for Habermas’ 
formal architectonic than the implication that normative claims can be adequately categorized prior to 
actual discourses.  
 
(I.3) Quasi-Moral Obligations to Non-Human Animals & The Principle of 
Universalization (U) 
Perhaps surprisingly, Habermas argues that we have quasi-moral obligations at least toward 
non-human animals with which we interact, obligations which are not reciprocally associated with 
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rights held by those animals.7 Non-human animals are not possible participants in discourse, and so 
cannot – for Habermas – have moral rights. Perhaps surprisingly, though, in “Remarks on Discourse 
Ethics”, Habermas acknowledges that the “anthropocentric profile of theories of the Kantian type 
seems to render them blind to questions of the moral responsibility of human beings for their 
nonhuman environment” (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 105). Basically, the idea seems to be that Kantian 
moral theories depend on features of rationality only human animals are taken to possess, and so, the 
theories are anthropocentric in this sense.8 Further, this obviates any direct moral responsibility to non-
 
7 Note that the language used in this section reflects Habermas’ position that animals lack personhood, 
and so, do not face threats to their personal integrity of the sort faced by human persons. Defenders 
of stronger accounts of animal personhood would likely prefer “animals with whom we interact” to 
“animals with which we interact” [For example, Peter Singer uses ‘who’ rather than ‘which’ to 
emphasize the individuality of animals (Corbett, 2016) ]. 
8 Jacques Rancière argues that political philosophy originates as a practice in Aristotle’s Politics, with 
the distinction between speech and voice. According to Aristotle, other animals have voice, but only 
humans can speak, and it is in speech that the difference between good and evil may be indicated; 
non-human animals can merely express their pleasure and suffering (Aristotle, Politics, 1253a 9-17). 
Further, according to Aristotle, a household or state is formed where there is a shared understanding 
of what is good and evil: “What speech expresses, what it makes evident for a community of subjects 
who understand it, is the useful and the harmful, and consequently, the just and the unjust. The 
possession of such an organ of expression marks the separation between two kinds of animals as the 
difference between two modes of access to sense experience: that of pleasure and suffering, common 
to all animals endowed with a voice, and that of good and evil, exclusive to human beings and already 
present in the perception of the useful and the harmful. On this rests not the exclusivity of a bent for 
politics, politicity, but a politicity of a superior kind, which is achieved in the family and the city-state” 
(Rancière, 1999, p. 3). So, on Rancière’s reading of Aristotle, just politics is based in a shared ethical 
understanding concerning good and evil. This ethical understanding is based in a prior understanding 
of what is useful or harmful, following from experiences of pleasure and suffering. Only the last is 
given voice in cries of pleasure or pain by non-human animals. Though Habermas rejects the direct 
grounding of ethics in sense experience, and also rejects the direct grounding of justice in ethics, he 
retains the concern with the normative significance of speech – as the faculty, broadly conceived and 
not limited to verbal expression, that allows us to come to an understanding with others in language 
– as opposed to mere voice. Both of these moves – rejecting the grounding (political) justice in ethics 
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human animals. The anthropocentric feature of Habermas’ position is its reliance on discursive 
justification of validity claims, a practice Habermas takes to be uniquely human. Habermas claims this 
anthropocentricity results in theory that appears out of touch with “our moral feelings, judgments, and 
actions,” which are “directed not only to subjects capable of speech and action, but also to animals” 
(Habermas J. , 1993, pp. 104-5, empasis added).9 The issue that Habermas then confronts is that 
anthropocentric theories, including his own, do not seem able to clarify intuitions that animals have 
moral status, and are unable to make sense of moral feelings concerning cruelty to animals. 
Habermas’ moral principle, the principle of universalization (U), demands that valid moral 
norms satisfy the condition that 
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are 
preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation) (Habermas J. , 1990, p. 65). 
Non-human animals are unable to meet the condition of symmetrical reciprocity required by this 
principle, on Habermas’ view, both in that they are unable to take themselves to be under obligation 
to others and in that they are unable to object discursively to the consequences and side-effects some 
norm’s general observance might have on their interests. Nonhuman animals are unable to take a ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ position in discourse: “Apart from their ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses it cannot be determined whether 
such a norm could meet with the agreement of all and hence is valid” (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 108). 
 
and the grounding of ethics in sense experience – are discussed below. Martha Nussbaum, and less 
obviously Carol C. Gould, have theories of justice of the sort outlined here by Rancière. 
9 See discussion of moral feeling – which Habermas takes to serve as a sort of evidence suggestive of, 
though not constitutive of, our justifiable moral duties – below. 
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For Habermas, morality requires a symmetrical relation between rights and duties that non-human 
animals cannot recognize, as non-human animals are neither possible participants in discourse nor 
possible addressees of moral norms. Therefore, Habermas does not have an animal rights view.  
Nonetheless, Habermas argues that we have quasi-moral obligations toward at least some non-
human animals, while denying the reciprocity that would be implicit in taking there also to be animal 
rights. These quasi-moral obligations are categorical and deontological, Habermas argues, primarily 
based on the evidence of our moral feelings, as would be properly moral duties, which would be 
connected with symmetrical rights held by those to whom they are owed. So, Habermas objects to 
Günter Patzig’s defense of animal rights, because Patzig accepts a gradation of duties that suggests a 
utilitarian weighing of goods according to their preferability.10 Habermas sees this as summarily 
dispensing with the categorical nature of strict deontological duties, which he understands our moral 
feelings to suggest that we have toward at least those non-human animals with which we interact: “We 
‘ought’ not to neglect animals callously, much less cruelly torment them” (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 107). 
I take it that enclosing the “ought” in quotation marks indicates that it is a quasi-ought, if still a categorical 
ought, where the norm specified is in some as yet unspecified sense justified, and yet “quasi” in that 
it is only analogous with the moral ought. These quasi-moral duties are only analogous to the duties 
persons bear to one another 
 
10 Patzig 1984. 
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Habermas’ argument for quasi-moral duties to non-human animals proceeds in a pattern 
analogous to his argument concerning moral responsibilities proper, starting from the claim that “the 
feeling of duty has its roots in the fundamental relations of recognition we always already presuppose in 
communicative action” (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 108; emphasis added). Habermas’ view is that we are 
only individuated as persons through processes of socialization into socio-cultural forms of life, and 
that our individual identities remain dependent on social processes, generating vulnerabilities for 
which morality compensates: 
The integrity of individual persons requires the stabilization of a network of symmetrical 
relations of recognition in which nonreplaceable individuals can secure their fragile identities 
in a reciprocal fashion only as members of a community. Morality is aimed at the chronic 
susceptibility of personal integrity implicit in the structure of linguistically mediated 
interactions, which is more deep-seated than the tangible vulnerability of bodily integrity, 
though connected with it (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 109). 
That is, socialization involves a sort of interdependence that leaves individual persons vulnerable, and 
the institutions of morality counteract the socially produced vulnerabilities of socialized persons.11  
Habermas’ view depends significantly on his social theory, itself dependent upon indirect 
empirical confirmation via sociological and anthropological research, as he acknowledges: “From this 
anthropological viewpoint, morality can be conceived as the protective institution that compensates 
for a constitutional precariousness implicit in the sociocultural form of life itself” (Habermas J. , 1990, 
 
11 Iris Marion Young argues similarly that our moral responsibilities derive from our social 
connections, rather than preceding them, which she sees as the “great insight of social contract 
theory,” particularly crediting John Locke (Young, Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social 
Connection Model, 2006, p. 105). 
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p. 109). In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990), Habermas gives his most extensive 
account of the indirect empirical confirmation of discourse ethics using evidence from sociology and 
psychology. In Between Facts and Norms (1996) he uses functional arguments from the sociology of law 
in the justification of liberal rights, a move criticized by Raïner Forst, following John Rawls, as 
providing a justification that is “overly immanent to law” (Forst, 2012, p. 109) (Rawls, 1995). Forst’s 
criticism of Habermas’ version of a discourse theory of morality is, analogously, based on it being 
“overly immanent” to empirically existing practices of moral justification, and thus lacking a way of 
accounting for a moral motivation for entering discourse in the first place (Forst, 2012, pp. 76-8). 
Habermas accepts that it is not possible to morally justify an obligation to enter discourse, for the 
reason that it is only in discourse that one can justify moral claims. On Habermas’ reading, Forst’s 
position, on which there is a pre-discursive moral right to discursive justification, introduces a 
troubling circularity. Descriptively, Habermas accounts for the motivation to enter discourse in terms 
of socialization processes involving ethical and religious ways of life, arguing that moral discourses 
cannot of themselves produce moral motivation, only moral justification.  
However, Habermas claims that since we do not attribute personal identity – or personality, 
or personhood – to non-human animals, there is a morally significant distinction between the harms 
to personal integrity faced by socialized persons and (mere) harms to bodily integrity, also experienced 
by non-human animals. Moral obligations generally are “grounded in the potential for harm inherent 
in all social interactions” (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 109). For Habermas, our quasi-moral obligations 
toward at least those non-human animals with which we interact are likewise grounded in the potential 
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harm involved in such interaction, even if the potential harm for which there is a legitimate expectation 
that “we will assume a fiduciary responsibility” is less “deep-seated” than would be harm to personal 
integrity (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 109). Habermas denies that animals are persons, and so also denies 
that they have the sort of “dignity” that indicates “inviolability” and a right to life: “the command to 
refrain from inflicting suffering on animals does not encompass – as in the case of human beings – 
the further duty ... not to kill animals” (Habermas J. , 1993, p. 108). Habermas argues that we have 
categorical duties to non-persons with which we interact that speak against inflicting suffering on these 
non-persons, and yet these non-persons have no right whatever to life. 
In the decade between the publication of “Remarks on Discourse Ethics” (1993) and The 
Future of Human Nature (2003),12 Habermas has not shifted his position:  
The community of moral beings creating their own laws refers, in the language of rights and 
duties, to all matters in need of normative regulation; but only the members of this community 
can place one another under moral obligations and expect one another to conform to norms in 
their behavior. Animals benefit for their own sake from the moral duties that we are held to 
respect in our dealings with sentient creatures. Nevertheless, they do not belong to the 
universe of members who address intersubjectively accepted rules and orders to one another: 
“Human dignity”, as I would like to show, is in a strict moral and legal sense connected with 
this relational symmetry. It is not a property like intelligence or blue eyes, that one might 
“possess” by nature; it rather indicates the kind of “inviolability” which comes to have a 
significance only in interpersonal relations of mutual respect, in the egalitarian dealings among 
persons (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, p. 33). 
 
12 “Remarks on Discourse Ethics” was originally published in German in Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik 
(1991) and “The Debate on the Ethical Self-Understanding of the Species”, the core essay in The Future 
of Human Nature, was first published as “Auf dem Weg Zu einer liberalen Eugenic? Der Streit um das 
ethische Selbstverständnis der Gattung” in Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur. Auf dem Weg zu einer 
liberalen Eugenic (2001). 
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Habermas’ position here is that non-human animals, even if they are involved interactively in our 
lifeworlds and are able to communicate their interests to us in some generally non-discursive manner, 
are not members of the community of moral beings. He allows that non-human animals could benefit 
“for their own sake” from the “moral duties” we take ourselves to have to sentient creatures, seeming 
to claim that we have moral and not merely quasi-moral duties to animals. However, he promptly 
reasserts the necessity of reciprocity, arguing that human dignity is “in a strict moral and legal sense 
connected with ... relational symmetry” (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, p. 33). 
Habermas still holds that we have categorical duties toward at least some non-human animals that are 
analogous to moral duties, and he still denies that the interactive nature of our relations with animals 
could generate moral rights, rather than merely quasi-moral duties. 
 
(I.4) Liberal Eugenics and an Ethics of the Species 
Habermas’ central concern in The Future of Human Nature is pre-personal human life, rather 
than non-human animals. He affirms the significance of “the archaic remnants of emotions which may 
linger in our revulsion before the prospect of chimera created by genetic engineering, at bred and cloned 
human beings, and at embryos being destroyed in the process of experimentation” (Habermas J. , The 
future of human nature, 2003, p. 25; emphasis added). Habermas is concerned that it may be that the 
“rather ordinary contingency [of the material substrate of human life] proves to be – in the very 
moment we can master it – a necessary presupposition for being-able-to-be-oneself and for the 
fundamentally egalitarian nature of our interpersonal relationships” (Habermas J. , The future of 
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human nature, 2003, p. 13). He argues that the possibility of ‘liberal eugenics’ – non-therapeutic 
intervention in the genetic material of pre-personal human life, governed by market values and 
consumer choice – draws attention to a “natural presupposition for the self-understanding of the affected 
person as an autonomous and responsible agent,” heretofore unconsidered (Habermas J. , The future 
of human nature, 2003, p. 79). This “natural presupposition”, as just noted, is that we are all subject 
to the genetic lottery in the same way.13 But, since such non-therapeutic genetic intervention would 
be on pre-personal human life, Habermas will not allow that it could be morally wrong, because on 
Habermas’ reconstruction of the moral point of view, justified moral norms concern relations between 
persons and are constructed through discourses in which pre-personal human life, like non-human 
animals, cannot engage.  
Habermas accepts that specifically therapeutic interventions could be antecedently justified as 
involving generalizable interests via anticipatory presumption of consent to genetic intervention 
insofar as such practices aim to prevent “extreme evils rejected by everyone”, in much the way 
emergency medical care might be justified when consent cannot be obtained prior to invasive 
treatment (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, pp. 66, 91). The hypothetical consent that 
Habermas argues may provide sufficient anticipatory moral justification for specifically therapeutic pre-
birth intervention might put some pressure on the core claim of discourse ethics, that justification 
requires actual discourses. I distinguish advocatory discourses from anticipatory discourses. Advocatory 
 
13 This could be seen as having a more strongly naturalistic implication – in the sense of ethical 
naturalism – than is usual in Habermas’ work, though he does defend a non-scientistic “weak” or 
“soft” naturalism (Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 153). 
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discourses are discourses in the interest of entities that are not possible participants, such as non-human 
animals and pre-personal human life. Anticipatory discourses are discourses in the interest of entities that 
presently are not possible participants in discourse, as in cases of humanitarian military intervention and 
therapeutic pre-birth genetic intervention. The case of therapeutic intervention on pre-personal 
human life, which presumably could be justified retroactively in discourses involving the future person, 
shares at least some features with anticipatory discourses employed in justifying humanitarian military 
intervention. I consider challenges generated by advocatory discourses in this chapter and return to 
anticipatory discourses below. 
Unsurprisingly, though, Habermas objects to religious efforts directed toward the ‘re-
enchantment of inner nature’, which aim to treat all human life as sacred, because this involves 
endorsing an at least arational worldview. Still, Habermas’ position on religion has softened. In work 
over the last decade, he seems more deeply concerned with the (at least genealogical) dependence of 
moral discourses on content – and moral motivation – provided by substantive religious and ethical 
traditions. His earlier “methodological atheism” is now more often framed as “methodological 
agnosticism”, and he argues against viewing religion as irrational, giving a genealogy of religion that 
positions secular, moral concepts as translations of earlier, religious ideas.14 Nonetheless, Habermas 
 
14 See further discussion of Habermas’ views on religion below. Habermas’ most extensive engagement 
with these issues is (Habermas J. , Between naturalism and religion, 2008), though also see (Habermas 
J. , Religion and rationality: Essays on reason, god, and modernity, 2002), including the helpful 
introduction by Eduardo Mendieta, which traces the evolution of Habermas’ position on religion, 
considered in relation to that of earlier Frankfurt School theorists. Also helpful are Habermas’ essays 
engaging with: Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (Habermas & Ratzinger, Dialectics of secularization: On 
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objects to erecting “artificial barriers in terms of taboos”, whether religious or secular, because this 
move would invoke a misplaced moral claim of inviolability on behalf of the (supposed) dignity of 
pre-personal human life. He argues that proponents both of “scientistic naturalism” and of religious 
(and moral) claims of inviolability “fail to see that something may be ‘not for us to dispose over’ and 
yet not have the status of a legal person who is the subject of inalienable human rights”, in that 
scientistic naturalists advocate treating pre-personal life wholly instrumentally, and the religious argue 
that pre-personal life should be accorded inalienable human rights (Habermas J. , The future of human 
nature, 2003, p. 31). Habermas rejects the claim that pre-personal human life possesses the inviolability 
he argues attends human dignity.15 Nonetheless, he argues that this does not mean that pre-personal 
life may be simply instrumentalized.  
Habermas argues that liberal eugenics – which is enhancing in some sense, rather than 
specifically therapeutic – might undermine a necessary precondition of the moral point of view, or, 
something of value in an “ethics of the species”, something he thinks we ought not surrender. 
Habermas argues that the contingent formation of the pre-personal material substrate of human life is a 
necessary precondition of both ethical freedom and moral responsibility, and so, a sort of contingency 
 
reason and religion, 2006); theologians of the Jesuit School in Munich (Habermas J. e., 2010); and 
Judith Butler, Charles Taylor, and Cornel West (Habermas, Butler, Taylor, & West, 2011). Lastly, 
Habermas’ developing views on religion have been treated in two monographs (Adams, 2006) (Junker-
Kenny, 2011); and a collection of essays (Calhoun, Mendieta, & VanAntwerpen, 2013)  
15 On human dignity, see: (Habermas J. , The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of 
human rights, 2012). 
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that we ought to value as a condition of the possibility of any recognizably human form of life at all. 
At issue is the value of morality as whole:  
No argument from the moral language game itself can be mustered against a eugenic self-
instrumentalization of the human species [that] changes the very rules of the game (Habermas 
J. , The future of human nature, 2003, pp. 75n58, 92).  
Habermas argues that the question of the value of morality as a whole cannot be addressed adequately 
from the moral point of view, but rather, must be addressed in very general ethical terms. He thinks 
practices of liberal eugenics could have a few possible consequences: (1) a possible consequence for 
the ethical self-understanding of the ‘genetically programmed person’; (2) a possible consequence for 
moral responsibility, and so, for the possibility of moral community; and (3) a consequence for the 
contingency of the biological basis of human life. 
Habermas’ first concern is that liberal eugenics might undermine the possibility of ethical 
freedom, from the first-person perspective of the person whose “genetic inheritance” was subjected to 
non-therapeutic intervention, even if that intervention was intended as enhancing in some way 
(Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, pp. 18, 83, 90, 98). This first consequence is 
phenomenological rather than metaphysical, in that it concerns the ethical self-understanding of 
individuals, from their own points of view. That is, Habermas does not claim that persons would 
necessarily be less free as a result of non-therapeutic pre-birth genetic manipulation, but only that they 
might be less able to take themselves to be free to determine their ethical form of life, and so, less able 
to be authentically themselves. Further, Habermas argues that those so engineered might not readily 
be able to see themselves as the equals of those who had intervened, because they might not readily 
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be able to see themselves as ethically free, and as the sole authors of their lives. Though Habermas’ 
argument here is admittedly tentative, and carefully couched in terms of possible consequences, he takes 
it to be at least possible that someone would interpret alteration of the biological background 
conditions for identity formation as problematizing the self-interpretation necessary for ethical 
freedom, or, for taking oneself to be the sole author of one’s life history. 
This potential undermining of individuation and ethical authenticity points to a need – if not 
a properly moral need – to consider the ethical self-understanding of the species and the value of 
morality as a whole. Habermas is worried that liberal eugenics might have the further effect that such 
persons would be at least less able to take moral responsibility for their actions. If someone were unable 
to take themselves to be the sole author of their lives, or were in some way compromised with regards 
to the phenomenological experience of ethical freedom, Habermas thinks there might be a further 
risk of indirectly damaging the genetically modified person’s capacity to achieve “the moral self-
understanding [that] must be expected from every member of a legal community” (Habermas J. , The 
future of human nature, 2003, pp. 78-9). Leaving decisions about the genetic engineering of children 
to the market might undermine the potential for achieving the moral point of view, although such 
engineering would not itself be properly immoral, as it would not involve persons who could 
themselves participate in discursive justification of the relevant norms. This would be a harm to one’s 
moral self-understanding, or, to “a subjective qualification essential for assuming the status of a full 
member of a moral community” (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, p. 81). If one were 
unable to view oneself as the sole author of one’s life because of unilateral and irrevocable pre-birth 
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intervention, then this subjective precondition for achieving the moral point of view and for taking 
on moral responsibilities might be blocked (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, pp. 62-
5). Therefore, allowing parents – or any persons – to intervene in our “genetic inheritance” might 
undermine the capacity to view all persons as equals from a moral point of view, because those 
subjected to liberal eugenics might not be able to view themselves as equally free, or to see themselves 
as equally subject to the genetic lottery, or to chance, as the place of (God or) “natural” chance would 
have been at least partially “taken by a peer” (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, p. 115). 
Habermas takes this to put at risk the possibility of justifying moral norms, and so to jeopardize 
morality as a whole, a consequence for the ethical self-understanding of the species.  
Finally, Habermas sees consequences for the contingency of the biological basis of human life to 
which all persons would no longer be subject in the same way, which seems to be the shared basis of 
the possible consequences for the self-understanding of the person and for the self-understanding of 
the species and is the core of what Habermas argues we ought to value, in his proposal for an ethics of 
the species. Habermas is concerned that those so engineered would not be subject to the contingency 
of the natural, biological basis of human life in the same way as (other) persons, undermining a 
necessary connection to contingent biological origins. Habermas argues that there is a necessary 
“connection between the contingency of a life’s beginnings that is not at our disposal and the freedom 
to give one’s life an ethical shape” (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, p. 75). Habermas 
does not claim that we are all radically free to give our lives an ethical shape of our choosing, but 
rather that it is a previously unthematized presupposition of morality that we are all equally subjected 
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to the contingency of the biological substrate of human life. Here, Habermas is concerned not only 
with the phenomenology of ethical freedom and the risk for moral responsibility that follows from it, 
as he asserts a necessary connection between natural contingency and ethical freedom:  
It is only by referring to this difference between nature and culture, between beginnings not at 
our disposal, and the plasticity of historical practices that the acting subject may proceed to 
the self-ascriptions without which he could not perceive himself as the initiator of his actions 
and aspirations. For a person to be himself a point of reference is required which goes back 
beyond the limits of tradition and the contexts of interaction [that] constitute the process of 
formation through which personal identity is molded in the course of a life history (Habermas 
J. , The future of human nature, 2003, pp. 59, emphasis added). 
Habermas cites Hannah Arendt’s concept of natality in defending this position: “the new beginning 
inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity 
of beginning something anew, that is, of acting. In this sense of initiative, an element of action, and 
therefore of natality, is inherent in all human activities” [ (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 
2003, p. 59) (Arendt, The human condition (Second edition), 1998 (1958), pp. 8-11)]. According to 
Habermas, this point of reference preceding both socialization and individuation would be lacking for 
those subjected to liberal eugenics. 
 
(I.5) Substantive Ethics 
Though the position Habermas takes on pre-personal human life is different from his position 
on non-human animals, there are significant similarities. Habermas argues that we may simply 
instrumentalize neither non-human animals nor pre-personal human life – that neither is for us to 
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dispose over as we wish – and yet neither is subject to the strong protections attending “human 
dignity”, nor can either claim the sort of inviolability that attends persons socialized into human forms 
of life. In each case, Habermas posits a normative category beyond the two at the core of discourse 
ethics: potentially universally justifiable reciprocal moral norms and unjustifiable particularistic ethical 
values.16 In the case of non-human animals, he posits quasi-moral duties not symmetrically connected 
with rights. In the case of pre-personal human life, Habermas posits general ethical values that are not 
morally justifiable, and yet are justifiable in some sense that is never made explicit. For such claims of 
ethical value to be justifiable, they would have to be associated with a validity claim, it seems: a claim 
to ethical goodness, as opposed to moral rightness. Habermas might work out an account of this sort of 
validity claim in terms of such claims protecting a necessary precondition of ethical life and morality. 
Justification, for Habermas, is connected with the possibility of justifying a claim with reasons all could 
accept, and this sort of justification is not available in the case of ethical values. Still, Habermas takes 
there to be some ethical values that are mostly justifiable, suggesting the need for another sort of validity 
claim, not requiring universal justifiability. 
Recall that in a previous section, I introduced the core discourse-ethical claim, that moral 
justification requires actual discourses. Returning to the debate concerning the moral status of non-
human animals, it is clear that Habermas’ position is consistent with this claim, and further provides 
the basis for his rejection of animal rights’ views. By contrast, in their recent defense of the inviolability 
 
16 To be clear, although Habermas does think there is a sort of validity claim attached to ethical 
discourse, what is not justified through ethical discourse is any particular ethical value as binding on 
all, as can be achieved in moral discourse.  
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of animal lives, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka argue – following Paola Cavalieri – that “it’s time 
to take the human out of human rights,” and further, that “in virtue of being sentient individuals with 
a subjective experience of their world,” animals possess inviolable rights (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 
2011, pp. 15, 21). Habermas would reject the claim that simply being a sentient individual is sufficient 
basis for moral rights claims for precisely the reason that Donaldson and Kymlicka anticipate: “animals 
are not capable of engaging in the processes of ‘public reason’ or deliberative rationality that theorists 
like John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas say are essential to democratic agency” (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 
2011, p. 57). More precisely, Habermas argues both that non-human animals are unable to take 
themselves to have duties and that they are unable to communicate their interests discursively. Both 
of these claims are open to empirical contestation, and they are amply debated in the animal rights 
literature. Habermas, though, remains consistent on this issue, and maintains the need for actual 
discourses in justifying moral rights, not rejecting the anthropocentricity of his position.17 
Seyla Benhabib’s account of rights suggests an extension of discourse theory in the direction 
of moral rights for non-human animals, though like Habermas, she does not articulate a claim of 
animal personhood. Habermas’ position differs from Benhabib’s, and at least on this point, Habermas’ 
view at first appears to be the more consistent discourse-ethical position, in that he denies that entities 
that cannot participate in discourse can be the subjects of moral rights. There is a tension in Seyla 
Benhabib’s work between the need for actual discourses in justifying moral norms and her account of 
 
17 For a powerfully executed polemic attacking human supremacy (also cited by Donaldson & 
Kymlicka), see Charles Patterson (2002). 
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rights as making advocatory claims in the interest of those entities irreparably affected by our actions, 
but which do not participate in our (human) discourses:  
[R]ights articulate moral claims on behalf of persons and even on behalf of non-human beings 
such as animals and the environment that can be deeply and irretrievably affected by our 
actions (Benhabib S. , 2011, p. 79). 
Benhabib appears to defend at least the possibility of justified moral rights of entities that could not 
participate in discourse, including non-human animals and the environment, whereas Habermas, 
because of this difficulty with such advocatory discourses, makes the more limited claim that we have 
quasi-moral obligations to at least those animals with which we are interactively engaged. Still, it does 
seem open to Benhabib to claim that it would be in the interest of all affected who are possible participants 
in discourse to support norms speaking against, for example, cruelty to animals, even using Kant’s 
argument: people who treat non-human animals cruelly are more likely to treat other persons cruelly. 
This suggests, as Benhabib argues, that animal rights are potentially justifiable, even if we have not so 
justified them discursively, and even without non-human animal participation in moral discourses. 
However, I think there is a better way of understanding our duties to non-human animals available, 
within a strictly Habermasean discourse theory, in terms of general ethical obligations. 
Recall that in a previous section I argued that Habermas’ distinction between morality and 
ethics must be a formal distinction, particularly given the core discourse-ethical claim. The concept of 
quasi-moral duties that are categorical, and yet only in some way analogous to genuine moral duties, 
challenges this formalism. It is unclear how to situate such quasi-moral duties with respect to the 
distinction between sorts of normative justification, differentiated only in terms of context-




Ethical Validity  42 
dependence/independence, such that these quasi-moral duties are justifiable. Given that the formal 
distinction between moral norms and ethical values appears to exhaust the conceptual space, and that 
the distinction is drawn precisely in terms of the possibility of justification, Habermas’ positing of 
another sort of valid normative claim seems to present a substantive challenge to the architectonic of 
discourse ethics. Habermas rejects the idea that quasi-moral duties involve a sort of ethical value, and 
yet these quasi-moral duties cannot be discursively justified nor correlated symmetrically with rights, 
leaving them context-dependent at least in the sense that these quasi-moral duties depend on 
(presently existing) human contexts of justification. This becomes an issue at precisely the point at 
which discourse ethics attempts to account for binding obligations to beings that cannot – or cannot 
discursively – take on obligations. However, context-dependence is a feature of ethical justification.  
I suggest that Habermas’ efforts toward developing an account of our responsibilities toward 
animals might be more profitably understood as an early effort in the direction taken, still tentatively, 
in The Future of Human Nature, toward a general ethics of the species. In both cases, Habermas defends 
a generalizable value that nonetheless is not universalizable, in that it is not justifiable in discourses 
potentially involving all affected. Habermas’ position on our obligations to animals might be better 
described as making a goodness claim, categorical in that it is fully general, yet not associated with 
reciprocal rights held by non-human animals. It seems that the quasi-moral obligations Habermas 
defends depend on ethical judgments – pending indefinitely deferred discourses in which animals 
cannot participate – because even if the value of not torturing animals could be justified to all persons 
as Benhabib suggests, it cannot be reciprocally justified to all affected, such that our quasi-moral 
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obligations to animals might be better understood as involving species-ethical values. If it is the case, 
as Habermas suggests, that we cannot easily take ourselves to be moral beings while engaged in cruelty 
to non-human animals, because it violates our normative feelings or intuitions, and the value of not 
engaging in cruelty to non-human animals is a value that all participants in discourse could accept, 
then we have another instance of a contingent, subjective pre-condition of achieving the moral point 
of view that could be justified as a species-ethical value, though not as a properly moral norm.  
In this chapter, I have considered possible difficulties faced by the core claim of discourse 
ethics – that justification requires actual discourses – when considered in concert with Habermas’ 
distinction between moral norms and ethical values, a distinction sometimes presented by Habermas 
as if it involved different kinds of normativity. I argued that Habermas’ distinction between moral 
norms and ethical values only marks a formal difference in justification: what Habermas considers 
moral norms involve normative claims that are justifiable in any context, and what Habermas 
considers ethical values involve normative claims that are only justifiable in some contexts, presently. 
Further, I argued that the appearance of extra-discursive philosophical differentiation is merely an 
artifact of Habermas’ wholly epistemic account of moral rightness.  
However, this way of interpreting the distinction between moral norms and ethical values as 
merely formal presents a further difficulty. The distinction between moral norms and ethical values 
merely hangs upon whether the norm/value is justifiable regardless of context. Habermas’ claims 
concerning our quasi-moral obligations to animals puts pressure on the formal architectonic of 
discourse ethics in generating a new category of normative validity, beyond ethical values and moral 
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norms, that does not fit his formal procedure for dividing normative space. The norm/value 
distinction is a formal distinction between those normative claims that can be discursively justified to 
all and those that cannot be so justified, exhausting the conceptual space. I suggest that Habermas’ 
ethics of the species, though formulated tentatively in response to the possibility of liberal eugenics, 
provides the beginning of a general ethics that could complement Habermas’ reconstruction of the 
moral point of view in terms of communicative rationality, though with this move, some modification 
his formal architectonic would be required.  
The move I propose here, then, is a shift from merely pragmatic justification to ethical 
justification, rather than a shift from moral formalism to substantive ethics. I argue that in at least 
most circumstances, discursive resolution of conflict would be ethically preferable to violent resolution 
of conflict, rather than, as Habermas argues, merely that, pragmatically, we have no alternative to 
discursive resolution of conflict if we want to resolve conflict without violence. Certainly, this move 
complicates questions of ethics substantially, as it (re)opens the question of whether there are better 
and worse forms of life. I accept, with Habermas, that we cannot resolve such questions with universal 
validity, but I deny Habermas’ position that we must consign such ‘struggles of gods and demons’ to 
a more benighted past of normative reason. I believe that we can accept that we cannot justify to all 
with reasons they could accept the moral demand that all conflict be resolved nonviolently, and 
further, we can accept that attempting to morally justify the moral point of view involves one in 
viciously circular reasoning. Still, I do not believe that accepting these claims commits one to the 
further claim that we can only pragmatically justify an obligation to discursive conflict resolution, nor 
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to the further claim that the moral point of view can only be pragmatically justified. Rather, most of 
us, most of the time, have good reason to resolve conflict nonviolently, thru civil discursive 
engagement. This does not mean that we have a moral obligation of civility. Rather, I suggest that we 
have an ethical duty, in general, to aim for consensual resolution of conflict, a duty with normative 
heft, but weighted with neither moral nor pragmatic necessity. More simply, it seems to me that we 
have good reason to say that nonviolent resolution of conflict is good, even if we also have good 
reason to say that nonviolent resolution of conflict is not morally obligatory. 
___________________________________ 
Somewhat more casually, the distinction I develop in this dissertation has turned out to be of 
practical use in non-academic contexts, in disagreements surrounding political controversies. For 
example, in early July of 2018, I spent some time with a cousin from rural southwest Georgia. Let’s 
call her Angie. Angie has been teaching elementary school in a deeply impoverished school district for 
roughly the last thirty years, and calls herself a ‘Republicrat’, as she takes herself to identify with the 
political center. After dinner one night, Angie asked my mother and I to consider this position: “I feel 
like women who wait twenty years to come forward are to blame for all the later rapes, and anyway, 
she knew what she was getting into when she went to his hotel room, because she’s obviously a slut”. 
My mother, who never really yells at anyone, was instantly irate, and nearly started yelling. I tried, as 
calmly as I could, to get Angie to clarify her concerns. I left the claim about the particular woman in 
question alone and pursued instead the question of whether the moral blameworthiness of the rapist 
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was really the same as whatever Angie saw as wrong about the victims of sexual violence not coming 
forward immediately.  
Gradually, it became clear that one issue was that coming forward immediately was more 
honest and honesty seemed to be a sort of moral duty. But more importantly for Angie, not coming 
forward allowed further harms to other women to take place, harms that at least potentially could have 
been prevented by promptly pressing charges. So, the victim’s lack of action was inserted into the causal 
chain that enabled further sexual violence. I pointed out that victims of sexual violence have 
historically rarely been believed, and certainly were not twenty years ago, such that coming forward 
led to often extreme further harms to the victim coming forward. This sort of harm would, it seems, 
need to be put on the balance with any possible harms, which would only be possibly averted by 
coming forward. That is, since victims of sexual violence have so rarely been believed, and perpetrators 
so rarely found guilty, the extent to which coming forward twenty years ago would have even been 
likely to avert further acts of sexual violence is unclear, while the harms to anyone coming forward are 
rather clearer. Further, concerning the honesty claim, it seems less than clear that not saying anything 
publicly about being a victim of violence is dishonest. Dishonesty would seem to require making 
specific false claims. And finally, even if one accepts that victims of sexual violence who do not come 
forward are in some sense morally blameworthy, there is no reason that this blameworthiness need be 
seen as displacing the moral blameworthiness of the perpetrator of sexual violence, and that, in my 
view, was the most unsettling aspect of Angie’s original position, that somehow, in not coming 
forward, the victim of sexual violence takes on the responsibility for later acts of sexual violence, in a 
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way that leaves the perpetrator at least less culpable. Angie went on to argue that we should have much 
shorter limitations on possible prosecution, for precisely this reason, limitations of only a few years. 
I suggested to Angie that perhaps there was a distinction between what it would be ethically 
good to do, and that which is morally obligatory. Both have normative heft, but only the latter involves 
a categorical violation. That is, it is necessarily wrong to enact sexual violence, but not necessarily 
wrong to not report it, even if the good effects overall at least might be greater, in coming forward. 
Because of the harms to the victim of sexual violence that often attend coming forward, though, it is 
not altogether clear that the victim must come forward, even if it might be better for the community 
as a whole, or for women in that community. Put yet another way: under ongoing conditions of 
heteropatriarchal violence, demanding that women report being victims of sexual violence amounts 
to a demand that victims subject themselves to further harms, precisely because of being victimized, 
already. And, under ongoing conditions of heteropatriarchal violence, men reporting being raped do 
not generally fare much better, because in all too many contexts, the simple fact of having been raped 
leads to the victim being seen as no longer a man, in a normative sense. Even as rape jokes concerning 
women have generally become unspeakable in most contexts, people often still seem altogether too 
comfortable with prison rape jokes involving men. In any case, this distinction seemed to clarify things 
for Angie. She was able to accept that on her view it would, in most cases, be ethically better to report 
being a victim of sexual violence, but that – at least under conditions in which victims are rarely 
believed and usually subjected to further harms – it is not morally obligatory. Having available a 
normative category not attached to necessity nor to categorical obligation helped her to make sense 
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of her feeling that it was better to come forward, and that coming forward could prevent further acts 
of sexual violence, while not displacing the moral blameworthiness of the perpetrators of sexual 
violence. 
An analogous argument could be developed in response to the not uncommon claims that (1) 
HIV+ persons, and (2) trans* persons, have a duty to disclose their status under certain conditions, 
usually conditions of sexual intimacy, even though disclosing that one is HIV+ and/or trans* under 
contemporary conditions greatly increases the likelihood that one will be subjected to violence. 
Teaching at Hunter College, I have received term papers arguing positively that there is a duty to 
disclose in each of these cases, and in many states, failure to disclose HIV status is criminalized.18 As 
with the previous case, however, my point here is only to illustrate the distinction I would like to 
defend, between universalizable moral duties and general but non-universalizable ethical 
responsibilities. 
One of my concerns with Habermas’ earlier arguments, on this point, is that the pragmatic 
claim that ‘if we want to settle conflict nonviolently, we must do so discursively’, which is – and 
remains – his basic position, far too easily slides into – or is easily misunderstood as – the moral 
imperative that ‘we must settle conflict nonviolently’. At least, it seems to me that Habermas’ basic 
position easily leads his readers to what Alison Jaggar and Cheshire Calhoun have, in other contexts, 
called problematic ‘nonlogical implications’ [ (Jaggar A. M., 2005, pp. 60-1) (Calhoun C. , 1988)]. Jaggar 
 
18 See: https://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/map-hiv-criminalization-united-states-center-
hiv-law-and-policy-2018 (last accessed 7/22/18). 
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writes that Martha Nussbaum and Susan Moller Okin’s focus on “injustices faced by poor women in 
poor countries” tends to lead their readers to endorse a series of theses that do not actually follow 
from their claims, including that the West is best for women, and that cultures are autonomous, and 
are responsible for most of the injustices faced by women (Jaggar A. M., 2005, pp. 60-1). Calhoun 
argues that Western moral philosophy has tended to focus on the moral concerns of propertied men, 
producing a lopsided moral viewpoint obscuring the moral concerns of others, including women 
(Calhoun C. , 1988). Analogously, I argue that Habermas’ position leads his readers all too easily to 
the understanding that we have a moral obligation to settle conflict discursively. Indeed, in several 
consecutive graduate seminars at the City University of New York – Graduate Center, I found it 
difficult to convince both graduate students and faculty, even after reading Habermas’ work, that 
Habermas did not defend a moral obligation to enter discourse. Further, in presenting an early draft of 
this paper to the Committee for the Study of Religion at the Graduate Center (CUNY), several 
participants were simply unwilling to consider the possibility that Habermas did not defend a moral 
obligation to settle conflict nonviolently. I do not think this is a logical implication of Habermas’ work, 
but it is a persistent nonlogical implication. 
I have argued that conceptualizing an ethical “validity claim” is necessary in order to make 
sense of the idea that we have reasons to do things that are not merely based in self-interest or group 
interest, and yet are not universalizable,19 for a variety of reasons, but which approach 
 
19 …which is an element of what a validity claim is, for Habermas, and is why ethical values on his 
account cannot be valid. And this is so even though he does theorize a sort of validity claim – a claim 
to authenticity – attached to ethical discourse. 
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universalizability, such as in the case of civility, or discursive resolution of conflict, and wherever 
morality as a whole is put at risk, as by liberal eugenics, on Habermas’ reading. This approach has the 
added benefit of – hopefully – addressing the reasons internal to Habermas’ basic position that seem 
to lead to the worrisome nonlogical implication. 
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Chapter Two: Jürgen Habermas on Civil Disobedience and Military 
Intervention 
Consensus views in general tend to privilege agreement, and to view disagreement or dissent 
negatively or as problematic in some way, as already recognized by John Stuart Mill: “Not the violent 
conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil”.20 
Carol C. Gould argues that  
Habermas’ proposal of consensus as the aim of communication puts too exclusive an 
emphasis on agreement, and insufficient emphasis on the recognition and appreciation of 
individual differences. Further, the focus on consensus may itself create pressures for 
conformity and the denigration of dissent as something necessarily to be overcome (Gould, 
1988, p. 18).  
The worry is that to the extent that the rationality of discourses is tied directly to agreement, the 
likelihood that one will view disagreement as irrational seems to be increased.  
Habermas’ arguments defending civil disobedience within constitutional democracies and 
affirming the possibility of retroactive legitimation of illegal humanitarian military interventions each 
suggest a tension. In the case of military action, the tension is between the claims that:  
• The moral and epistemic import of law produced through inclusive democratic procedures 
wherein all affected have their views considered at least indirectly or via representatives 
 
20 Mill, On Liberty, cited in Solomon 2001, 97.  
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trumps the willful choices of individual agents, whether persons or states, as Habermas 
argues against the actions of the ‘coalition of the willing’ in Iraq. 
• The moral "spirit" that guides the law can be divined independently of inclusive 
procedures of will formation in such a way that, as in the case of the Kosovo intervention, 
military actions that are illegal under existing international law could be embraced as 
morally justifiable in the present, and retroactively legitimated.  
In the case of civil disobedience, the tension is between the claims that:  
• Domestic procedures of popular sovereignty in constitutional democracies that meet 
certain demanding procedural conditions generate legitimate, binding law. 
• Constitutional democracies ought to tolerate nonviolent, illegal, public actions intended to 
raise public awareness of what the law-breakers take to be an unjust institutional practice, 
based on a differing interpretation of constitutional norms, on which there is already broad 
consensual agreement.  
The way in which this works varies between the cases considered, not least because legitimacy is 
understood differently in the cases of constitutional democracy and of international law, and I do not 
mean to imply that the cases are strictly analogous. To be fair, Habermas also analogizes such cases: 
“[C]ivil disobedience in the constitutional state is related to active resistance against the unjust state as 
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authoritarian legalism in the constitutional state is related to the pseudo-legal repression of the unjust 
state” (Habermas J. , 1985, p. 112). Generally, however, Habermas does not work with a strict analogy 
between domestic and international cases (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 127-34). Rather, 
he theorizes law, democracy, constitutionalism, legality, and legitimacy differently in the different cases 
of constitutional democracies, transnational or regional constitutionalism as in the European Union, 
and the constitutionalization of international law [Respectively, see:  (Habermas J. , Between Facts and 
Norms: Toward a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 1996, pp. 82-131); (Habermas J. , The 
crisis of the European Union: A response, 2012, pp. 1-70); (Habermas J. , Between naturalism and 
religion, 2008, pp. 312-52) and (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 115-93)]. Still, he works in 
each case with a conception of procedural legitimation, “understand[ing] democratic procedures as a 
method by which legitimacy is generated from legality” (Habermas J. , Between naturalism and 
religion, 2008, p. 104). And in both cases of civil disobedience and of humanitarian military 
intervention, Habermas allows that a matter of moral principle might to some extent trump legitimate 
law, without reference to a procedural failure that would indicate that the law(s) broken were 
themselves not binding (e.g. as President George W. Bush argued, for example, in claiming that the 
democratic deficit of international law was sufficient to undermine the relevant laws broken in the 
invasion of Iraq). In this chapter, I consider Habermas’ arguments concerning civil disobedience and 
illegal humanitarian military intervention, concluding that the emphasis on consensus need not have 
deleterious consequences, but that in both cases, the support of an ethical framework going beyond 
morality and legitimacy is useful. 
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(II.1) Habermas on Civil Disobedience 
Habermas develops the discourse theory of law and democracy particularly in Between Facts and 
Norms (1996), the final essay of The Divided West (2006), and Europe: The Faltering Project (2012); and 
discourse ethics particularly in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990), Justification and 
Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics (1993), and Truth and Justification (2003). Both are discourse 
theories driven by an orientation toward consensus, and there is a deep internal connection between 
them, not least because the content of (legal) human rights can be supported wholly by moral 
arguments, though his current view is that the moral principle of rightness and the democratic 
principle of legitimation are independent specifications of the discourse principle.  
Recall that Habermas has rejected his earlier consensus account of truth, and so theorizes a 
gap between truth and justification, a gap that is not present between rightness and justification. 
Habermas has a non-epistemic account of truth but an epistemic account of moral rightness, or put 
differently, Habermas is a realist about truth and an anti-realist about rightness. Rightness is epistemic 
in that there is nothing beyond ideal warranted assertability for rightness to be, or, in that rightness 
consists wholly in justification (Habermas J. , Truth and justification, 2003, p. 248). The content of 
basic rights – which can also be justified with moral arguments – is legitimated procedurally though 
inclusive democratic processes wherein all affected have their views considered at least indirectly or 
via representatives. I take these to be analogous features of Habermas’ reconstruction of the moral 
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point of view and of democracy and human rights, in his discourse theory of morality and his discourse 
theory of law and democracy respectively. 
Habermas’ arguments concerning human rights appeal to “the West’s own traditions”. The 
history of the idea of human rights is long and complex, but the contemporary idea of human rights 
as a foundational element in international law came to prominence following the Second World War, 
with significant support from the United States. The United Nations, established in 1945, adopted the 
most significant human rights instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt chaired 
the Human Rights Commission (1947–51), and she was significantly involved in the drafting of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Habermas takes the basic political values of the West to be 
“the procedure of democratic self-determination and the vocabulary of human rights”, Throughout 
his long career, Habermas has viewed the United States Constitution as exemplary of these values.  
Habermas denies that there is a valid specifically political – rather than moral – conception of 
justice. Rather, he has a conception of political legitimacy, according to which normative legitimacy is 
generated out of legality, from the fact of law produced through certain sorts of procedure. For 
Habermas, legitimacy requires inclusive procedures of democratic will formation in which citizens 
freely enact their will collectively, wherein all those subject to the law are able to see themselves at 
least hypothetically and via representatives as authors of the law. These procedures must respect 
equally the capacity of each citizen to take a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ position on any policy. Put differently, political 
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legitimacy demands the paradoxical balancing of democracy and human rights. In this sense, 
Habermas has a procedural account of legitimacy. 
The worry, differently expressed by John Stuart Mill, Carol C. Gould and Jacques Rancière, 
that consensus views tend to see dissent and protest as irrational, is certainly recognized by Jürgen 
Habermas, and his plea for tolerance of civil disobedience in constitutional democracies is, in part, a 
response to this challenge. Habermas’ earliest engagement with civil disobedience, in “Student Protest 
in the Federal Republic of Germany” (1970), was somewhat critical of student protest, though he did 
argue that that the protests represent the “first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany 
[that] students are playing a political role that must be taken seriously” (Habermas J. , Student protest 
in the federal republic of Germany, 1970, p. 18). Habermas views the “tactics … of infringing rules 
and of civil disobedience” as borrowed from the United States, by German student protesters 
(Habermas J. , Student protest in the federal republic of Germany, 1970, p. 19).  
Habermas’ most extensive statement on civil disobedience, “Civil Disobedience: Litmus Test 
for the Democratic Constitutional State” (1985), a revised version of a speech given to the Cultural 
Forum of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1983, was composed on the occasion of the 
decision by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to place nuclear missiles belonging to the United States in 
West Germany, a decision only narrowly approved in the Bundestag. This action led to the 
disintegration of Schmidt’s governing coalition, and in the next election Helmut Kohl and the 
Christian Democrats (together with the Free Democratic Party, which had abandoned the liberal SPD) 
formed the new government, which succeeded in winning approval of the missiles by a much wider 
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margin. A large antinuclear movement staged massive protests, with civil disobedience as their central 
tactic. Kohl responded, rather darkly, that the line between the supporters and enemies of democracy 
is getting blurry. At some length, this is Habermas’ account of the situation:  
Determined and variegated demonstrations against the expected stationing of cruise missiles 
and Pershing II rockets, including blockades, human chains designed to disrupt traffic, “die-
ins”, and other expressions of civil disobedience, have been announced for the coming fall 
months. … The press reports these plans as if they were the war preparations of an aggressor 
that threatened national security. … Every new disturbance that occurs in conjunction with 
demonstrations that proceed otherwise without incident … strengthens the fatal impression 
among the public that the peace movement, of all things, offers new targets for those 
apparatuses which have been expanded and armed more heavily in recent years in the effort 
to control terrorism. Thus develops a perspective according to which the transgressions of 
small but mobile detachments of violent vandals merge with the acts of morally justified civil 
disobedience (Habermas J. , 1985, p. 99).  
In this context, Habermas is concerned about increasing restriction on protest, as those opposed to 
the protests “attempt to extend the juridical concept of violence beyond actual violent acts to include 
unconventional means of influencing the formation of public will,” asserting: “‘Nonviolent resistance 
is violence’” (Habermas J. , 1985, p. 96).  
In response to this, Habermas argues that constitutional democracies ‘feed’ off the resistance 
of minorities and that minority resistance to an established consensus is a procedural mechanism for 
shifting consensus. In a constitutional democracy that institutionalizes popular sovereignty (or 
democracy) and basic rights, Habermas argues that legitimacy demands tolerance of civil disobedience, 
out of respect for the individuality of each, when civil disobedience involves public, illegal action based 
on a dissenting interpretation of constitutional norms at odds with the one currently institutionalized: 
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The central features [of civil disobedience] derive from the purpose of appealing to the 
capacity for reason and sense of justice of a majority of citizens … Civil disobedience is a 
morally justified protest which may not be founded only on private convictions or individual 
self-interests; it is a public act which, as a rule, is announced in advance and which the police 
can control as it occurs; it includes the premeditated transgression of individual legal norms 
without calling into question obedience to the rule of law as a whole; it demands the readiness 
to accept the legal consequences of the transgression of those norms; the infraction by which civil 
disobedience is expressed has an exclusively symbolic character – hence is derived the restriction 
to nonviolent means of protest (Habermas J. , 1985, p. 100). 
For Habermas civil disobedience is morally justifiable, although it necessarily (i.e. definitionally) 
involves breaking positive law, and in the cases Habermas considers, involves breaking the normatively 
binding law of the constitutional state, in support of a dissenting interpretation of what constitutional 
norms require.  
Habermas cites John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice as a primary source used in developing his 
account of civil disobedience, and as the subject of much debate among German jurists:  
Rawls names three conditions that must be fulfilled for justified civil disobedience: the protest 
must be directed toward well-defined cases of grave injustice; the possibilities for legal means 
of influencing opinion with some chance of success must be exhausted; and the activities 
which constitute the disobedience may not assume such an extent that they endanger the 
functioning of the constitutional order (Habermas J. , 1985, p. 100) (Rawls, A theory of justice, 
revised edn., 1999, pp. 319-23). 
So, largely in line with Rawls, Habermas argues that civil disobedience in a constitutional democracy 
is a form of illegal activity that is justifiable to the extent that it:  
(a) is exclusively symbolic and therefore nonviolent,  
(b) contests a law or practice based on a different interpretation of constitutional principles,  
(c) is conducted publicly rather than in secret, and  




Ethical Validity  59 
(d) is conducted by actor(s) willing to submit to the legal consequences of breaking the law.21  
Nonetheless, an illegal act remains illegal, which points to a paradox – on Habermas’ reading – at the 
heart of any constitutional democracy that views its constitution as an ongoing project, wherein the 
constitution serves both as the basis of legitimate governance (and statutory law), and as the source 
of legislative or judicial extension of rights to new subjects, or in new modes of application (Habermas 
J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 24). The rights guaranteed by the constitution are in a sense both legal 
and moral, in that their content is justifiable solely via moral argument, though for Habermas human 
rights are specifically legal rights. This allows for a gap between the current interpretation of the 
constitution as a legal document, in positive law, and a dissenting interpretation relying on an 
alternative moral reading. There is a gap between legality and morality that cannot be filled, on 
Habermas’ view, leaving the project of any particular constitutional democracy open-ended and 
preventing it from hardening into the present facts of positive law. In the case of civil disobedience, 
Habermas interprets the issues at stake (at least in justifiable cases) as involving discourses of application 
concerning antecedently justified constitutional norms, such that those engaging in civil disobedience 
can appeal to antecedently justified norms under different interpretations. Those engaging in civil 
disobedience, on Habermas’ account, appeal to consensual norms while claiming that the present 
interpretation/application is not appropriate. 
 
21 This account of civil disobedience is later folded into Habermas’ larger discourse theory of law and 
democracy, in Between Facts and Norms, and remains unchanged in the essays collected in The Divided 
West. See: Habermas, The divided west (2006), 23. 
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Examples of resistance that would count as civil disobedience, given Habermas’ account, are 
fairly limited. For example, on Habermas’ account of civil disobedience, the non-violent resistance of 
Mahatma Gandhi to British colonial rule would not count as civil disobedience, in part because Gandhi 
was an advocate of Indian self-rule and his dissenting practices were revolutionary, but also, because 
the British Raj was not a constitutional democracy. Morally justifiable civil disobedience based on 
dissenting interpretations of legitimate constitutional principles only makes sense under legitimate 
governance. Habermas would not count the Raj as a legitimate constitutional democracy. By contrast, 
Henry David Thoreau’s refusal to pay taxes in opposition to the Mexican-American War and to slavery 
were not similarly revolutionary. Rather, Thoreau appealed to consensual norms under different 
interpretations, somewhat more clearly conforming to Habermas’ account. 
Thoreau’s essay was posthumously titled “Civil Disobedience”, but the original tile – 
“Resistance to Civil Government” – has potentially revolutionary implications (Powers, Vogele, 
Kruegler, & McCarthy, 1997, p. 84). Thoreau, like Gandhi, was influenced by Percy Bysse Shelley’s 
poem “The Mask of Anarchy”, among the earliest modern statements of nonviolent resistance. Still, 
Habermas defines civil disobedience as nonviolent, specifically because civil disobedience is purely 
symbolic, though he does not consider property damage violent. Further, Habermas accepts that in 
some cases those engaged in civil disobedience view themselves as resisting the democratic 
constitutional state, but argues that though this terminology might seem to imply revolutionary action 
not respecting the authority of the state, it is only “meant to express the urgency of the object of 
protest” (Habermas J. , Civil disobedience: litmus test for the democratic constitutional state, 1985, p. 
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99). Presuming that persons who engage in civil disobedience see the matter at hand as of sufficient 
gravity to be worth taking risky, illegal measures to increase public awareness, while showing respect 
for the democratic constitutional state in willingly submitting to (or, accepting the risk of) prosecution, 
such “resistance” is not problematically revolutionary, according to Habermas, but rather, oriented 
toward reforms grounded in a changed public opinion. 
Thoreau’s account of civil disobedience is specifically concerned with individual liberty, and 
though he is often credited with coining the term ‘civil disobedience’, his actions might be understood 
rather as conscientious refusal to pay taxes due to a moral objection to the U.S.-Mexico War (1846-48) 
and to the Fugitive Slave Law (1850), without clear reason to anticipate that this personal moral 
objection was based in a principle widely shared. Rather, he objected to being required to support – 
through the Poll Tax – the prosecution of what he saw as an unjust war and the enforcement of what 
he saw as an unjust law, both contrary to his deeply held moral convictions. Similarly, Kim Davis’ 
recent refusal, as country clerk in Rowan County, KY, to grant marriage licenses to lesbian and gay 
couples, appealed to a particular religious understanding of marriage not shared by a majority of 
citizens, and certainly not to a constitutional principle under a different understanding, even if the 
appeal was to a value shared by a fairly large counter-public. So, Davis’ refusal seems also to be a case 
of conscientious objection rather than civil disobedience.22 For Habermas, the appeal of civil 
 
22 This case is further complicated by the fact that in this case we have the conscientious refusal of an 
official to perform the function of their office, but that does not seem to bear directly on the 
distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious objection. 
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disobedience, although certainly conscientious, is to “the capacity for reason and sense of justice of a 
majority of citizens”, and not to privately held moral or religious convictions (Habermas J. , 1985, p. 
100).23 
Like Habermas, Hannah Arendt sees civil disobedience as valuable for democracy, in 
temporarily interrupting the sovereignty of the state (Arendt, Civil disobedience, 1972). As Habermas 
puts in, “the disobedient … assume[s] the plebiscitary role of the citizen in his directly sovereign 
capacity”, which for Habermas is justifiable only to the extent that this action functions as an appeal 
to the existing majority, based in constitutional principles (Habermas J. , Civil disobedience: litmus 
test for the democratic constitutional state, 1985, p. 103). Hannah Arendt, like Habermas, 
distinguishes between cases of conscientious objection, involving individual resistance to policies 
personally viewed as wrong, and collective practices of civil disobedience. Arendt suggests that civil 
disobedience ought to be institutionalized, in continuance of the spirit of revolution that attended the 
founding of the United States, a proposal that Habermas rejects (Habermas J. , Civil disobedience: 
litmus test for the democratic constitutional state, 1985, p. 106). Though Habermas argues that civil 
disobedience ought to be understood by the judiciary as distinct from simple criminality,24 and that 
existing laws may require some modification to give the judiciary room for morally justifiable leniency, 
Habermas objects to legalization of civil disobedience for several reasons. Initially, he argues that 
 
23 Also: “Civil disobedience that is grounded in considerations of conscience knows itself to be 
obligated to the constitutional consensus and may not be confused with forcing private convictions 
on others” (Habermas 1985, 107). 
24 Habermas cites both Rawls (1971) and Ronald Dworkin (1977) on this point. 
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there’s something rather incoherent about the idea of legal civil disobedience, as plainly, legal actions 
are not a matter of ‘disobedience’. More substantively, he argues that legalizing civil disobedience 
removes the element of personal risk involved in law-breaking, and this would seem to damage both 
the moral justification of illegal protest and, more significantly, would largely neutralize it as a mode 
of appeal. But Habermas’ primary reason for rejecting Arendt’s proposal is that it is necessary that 
civil disobedience “remain suspended between legitimacy and legality; only then does it signal the fact 
that the democratic constitutional state with its legitimating constitutional principles reaches beyond 
their positive-legal embodiment” (Habermas J. , Civil disobedience: litmus test for the democratic 
constitutional state, 1985, p. 106). The ‘legitimating constitutional principles’, themselves justifiable 
morally, are the basis of appeal in civil disobedience, such that tolerance of civil disobedience 
acknowledges that the legitimacy of the constitutional state is not reducible to its current legal order 
just as civil disobedience demonstrates that the meaning of constitutional principles is not reducible 
to the current formulation of positive law. 
The case of Edward Snowden is difficult to categorize. Nozomi Hayase, in agreement with 
Rep. John Lewis (D-GA), situates Snowden squarely within the tradition of civil disobedience:  
Computer scientist Nadia Heninger argued that leaking information is now becoming the ‘civil 
disobedience of our age’ ... Snowden’s act was clearly one of civil disobedience. John Lewis, 
US Representative and veteran civil rights leader, recently noted that Snowden was ‘continuing 
the tradition of civil disobedience by revealing details of classified US surveillance programs’ 
(Hayase, 2013). 
Still, Snowden seems to situate himself within the context of conscientious objection rather than civil 
disobedience. He says that when abuses occur, it usually “falls to individual citizens” to reveal the 
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abuses, and that these individuals are “typically maligned”, though they are acting individually to reveal 
abuses to the public:  
But over time that awareness of wrongdoing sort of builds up, and you feel compelled to talk 
about it. And the more you talk about it, the more you’re ignored, the more you’re told it’s not 
a problem, until eventually you realize that these things need to be determined by the public, 
not by somebody who was simply hired by the government (Snowden, 2013). 25 
Snowden’s account seems to be deeply individualistic, and yet, he appeals to the basic idea of a 
constitutional democracy, that the legal order ought to represent the will of the public, which is not 
possible where the functioning of the legal order is shrouded in secrecy, and still less when such 
decisions are made by employees of private corporations that are not expected to be democratically 
responsive. Snowden claimed to be acting on the dictates of his moral conscience, and to be a patriot 
acting in accord with the spirit of the law rather than the letter of the law, but he has refused to return 
to the U.S. to stand trial.  
Snowden also argues that his actions were in opposition to the then current regime in 
Washington, complicating the case substantially. This suggests that his actions were in some sense 
revolutionary, even though he argues that his interpretation of what the U.S. Constitution requires is 
morally preferable to that of the current regime. Arendt would be less likely than Habermas to see this 
as exemplifying civil disobedience, in that for Arendt civil disobedience involves collective practices 
of resistance and assumes (and values) a pluralistic political field, whereas Snowden viewed his actions 
as individual resistance, on the basis of constitutional principles. That the appeal was to consensually 
 
25 Snowden appears to be motivated by moral feeling. See discussion of normative affect, in Chapter 
Three. 
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held principles is less pivotal for Arendt that for Habermas. But, though Snowden’s actions were taken 
in accord with his individual interpretation of the Constitution, he was also explicitly acting “against the 
world’s most powerful intelligence agencies” (Snowden, 2013). Further, although Snowden contrasts 
his own choice to publicly acknowledge that he was the source of the leaks revealing the extent of 
NSA spying with the NSA’s refusal to publicly acknowledge their own actions, he acknowledges that 
“disclosures that are outside of the democratic model” risk “subverting the power of government,” 
and so on his own account are “dangerous ... to democracy” (Snowden, 2013). So, it seems that on 
Habermas’ account Snowden’s actions would not count as civil disobedience, at least because he 
refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the democratic constitutional state in refusing to stand trial, 
but also because his actions seemed to be a form of resistance to the present regime. I will return to 
this below, but for now, notice that despite the fairly broad account of civil disobedience given by 
Habermas, it is not all that easy to find actual cases, even where we might most expect to find them. 
Habermas’ view that the regime in Washington at least since the invasion of Iraq is itself 
embarked upon a basically revolutionary process, in largely rejecting the ‘civilizing constraints’ of 
international law, might lend weight to thinking of Snowden’s actions as counter-revolutionary. This is 
because it seems that Snowden and Habermas agree that the legitimacy of the U.S. government is 
vastly diminished. Habermas is quite blunt: “Make no mistake: the normative authority of the United 
States of America lies in ruins” (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 29). In that case, the regime 
disobeyed would not be a legitimate constitutional democracy, and so civil disobedience would be the 
wrong paradigm for considering Snowden’s actions; as in the case of Gandhi’s non-violent resistance 
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to the Raj, here also an account of revolutionary morality would be needed. I will return to this point 
after considering illegal action in cases of humanitarian military intervention. 
 
(II.2) Habermas on Humanitarian Military Intervention 
With respect to proceduralism in the case of international law and military action, Habermas 
writes that the ban on war as a step toward the ‘juridification’ of international relations  
… is to replace the distinction between just and unjust wars, whether grounded in natural law 
or religion, by the procedural distinction between legal and illegal wars. Legal wars thereby 
take on the significance of global police operations (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 
189).  
Habermas’ critique of the invasion of Iraq on the basis of the illegality of the invasion illustrates his 
approach. Although Habermas thinks that “world society” is on the way to a proper 
constitutionalization, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Kant’s 
cosmopolitan condition is still largely an aspiration rather than a reality (Habermas J. , The divided 
west, 2006, p. 86). International law remains primarily a matter of voluntary treaty arrangements. The 
Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) making wars of aggression illegal, on which Habermas’ illegality claim 
depends, is (merely) a treaty to which states voluntarily commit themselves and does not have the force 
of a constitution that could legitimize coercive prevention of such wars. At present, though, there are 
a few criteria given in treaty-based international law for the justifiable use of military force. The use of 
military force is justifiable if:  
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(a) the party is acting in self-defense;  
(b) the U.N. Security Council approves, generally with reference to gross human rights 
violations or crimes against humanity;  
(c) there is a crime against humanity in progress, in which case the erga omnes clause not 
only permits but mandates military intervention [because crimes against humanity (e.g. 
genocide) are considered more severe violations than violations of individual human 
rights, under international law (following the Holocaust)];  
(d) intervention involves only democratically-constituted states, in which case 
intervention is at least more justifiable (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 29, 
85, 92). The legitimacy of the U.N. itself (and of NATO), such as it is, is based on its 
own (minimally) democratic character, and the decisions of the U.N. are at least more 
legitimate because they are not unilaterally made (although the vetoes of the permanent 
members of the Security Council are unilateral), so any multilateral military 
intervention would seem, similarly, to be more legitimate to the extent that it involves 
only democratically-constituted states, according to Habermas. 
So, in the case of the invasion of Iraq, Habermas argues that a collective of states that are not (or not 
all) democratically constituted decided to act to prevent gross human rights violations, but against the 
Security Council’s decision, so they acted illegally, as there is at present no instrument of international 
law (as so far constituted) to which they could appeal, as there would be in the case of crimes against 
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humanity. Habermas’ arguments concerning civil disobedience are structurally similar to his arguments 
concerning military intervention, although he leaves open the possibility of moral justification of 
(illegal) civil disobedience in a manner that seems to be foreclosed in his argument that the invasion 
of Iraq was illegal and so illegitimate: civil disobedience is justifiable within constitutional democracies, 
at least in some cases, even though it is (definitionally) illegal, and transgresses the boundaries set by 
“the practices and institutions in which [the constitution’s] normative content has been spelled out 
and has acquired binding force,” whereas the invasion of Iraq violated international law and so could 
not be legitimate, since legitimacy is generated from legality (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, 
pp. 23, 29). 
Habermas’ criticism of the “hegemonic unilateralism” of the United States’ invasion of Iraq 
marks a significant change in his attitude toward the United States, though Habermas argues that the 
“change” is actually in the Bush Administration, which Habermas claims is acting against the values 
expressed in the Constitution (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 26-36). Habermas understands 
President Bush as justifying the invasion of Iraq on the basis of a universalized ethnocentrism: “From 
Bush’s perspective, ‘our’ values are universally valid values that all other nations should accept in their 
own best interest” (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 103). Habermas writes: 
The project of a new liberal world order under the banner of a pax Americana advocated by the 
neoconservative masterminds of the current US administration raises the question of whether 
the juridification of international relations should be superseded by a moralization of international 
politics grounded in the ethos of a superpower (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 117) 
It is interesting that when imposed coercively human rights and democracy become for Habermas 
ethical values, losing their connection with morality. This shift – from morality to ethics – needs 
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substantial unpacking. I return to this point below. Basically, Habermas’ claim is that President Bush 
universalizes ‘our’ ethical values and way of life but given Habermas’ understanding of the distinction 
between morality and ethics – valid moral norms are universally justifiable and ethical values are not 
– this move is illegitimate. 
In President Bush’s “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States 
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11”, he equates the “values” of America with the 
values of civilization, offering some support for Habermas’ reading: 
This is not, however, just America's fight, and what is at stake is not just America's freedom. 
This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress 
and pluralism, tolerance and freedom ... I ask you to uphold the values of America and remember 
why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility 
is to live by them (Bush, 2001).26 
In the same Address, President Bush argues – perhaps surprisingly – that the actions of “terrorists” 
are not representative of Islam, but rather involve a “perversion” of Islam: 
Al Qaida is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money. Its goal is 
remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere ... The terrorists practice a fringe 
form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of 
Muslim clerics, a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' 
directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no 
distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children (Bush, 2001).27 
 
26 Emphasis added. 
27 Emphasis added. 
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Here, President Bush appears to be depending upon a distinction analogous to Habermas’ distinction 
between morality and ethics; the claim is that Al Qaida is attempting to ‘remake the world’, violently 
imposing its ethical way of life universally. To be clear, I am not claiming that Al Qaida’s way of life 
is ethical in the sense of ‘good’. Rather, I am using the term ‘ethical’ in Habermas’ sense. An ethical 
way of life is a way of life that is viewed as good by those who participate in it, but that is not 
discursively justifiable to all affected, which in this case is evident in its violent imposition.  
President Barack Obama, speaking in India in 2010 on the bond between India and the United 
States, a bond based on “our shared interests and our shared values”, presents a strikingly similar 
position:  
[S]peaking up for those who cannot do so for themselves is not interfering in the affairs of 
other countries. It’s not violating the rights of sovereign nations. It is staying true to our 
democratic principles. It is giving meaning to the human rights that we say are universal. And 
it sustains the progress that in Asia and around the world has helped turn dictatorships into 
democracies and ultimately increased our security in the world (Obama, 2010).28 
Nonetheless, though President Obama claims that speaking up for those whose human rights are 
violated in other states is neither interfering in the affairs of those states nor violating their sovereignty, 
he further claims, in agreement with President Bush (and with Habermas), that “no nation should ever 
try to impose its values on another,” or, that the local values and ethical way of life of a community 
should never be violently imposed on another (Obama, 2010).  
 
28 Emphasis added. Much turns on how one interprets the ‘our’ and the ‘we’, in each instance. 
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The arguments of both President Bush and President Obama revolve around central 
normative principles of human rights and democracy, precisely the central elements of Habermas’ 
political philosophy, which present the basis for Habermas’ arguments insofar as they go beyond 
current international law. President Bush and his “coalition of the willing” were acting according to 
aspirational norms of democracy and human rights, at least if we take President Bush at his word as 
Habermas suggests: “We would do well to not waste our time with speculations concerning motives, 
but to take the [Bush D]octrine at its word” (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 30). These are 
the same norms that Habermas argues speak against the invasion of Iraq, interpreted differently. 
Habermas gives a normative argument with respect to democracy (or popular sovereignty), and an 
epistemic argument with respect to human rights: 
• Unilateral military action taken to enforce self-determined objectives violates the 
principle of popular sovereignty. 
• Those acting unilaterally in this way lack epistemic access to whether the action is 
actually in the interest of those whose human rights they supposedly intended to protect 
(Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 101, 103, 184-5). 
So, President Bush argues that military intervention is necessary to secure popular sovereignty for the 
people of Iraq. Habermas counters that unilateral action without consultation with the people of Iraq 
to install democracy, or put differently, the violent, undemocratic installation of a democratic 
government, seems to be a performative contradiction. President Bush argues that military 
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intervention is necessary to protect the human rights of the people of Iraq. Habermas counters that 
such actors would be unable to know whether their actions were in the interest of those for whom 
they were taken. Nonetheless, in the context of the invasion of Iraq, these moral and epistemic 
arguments are secondary. Habermas’ primary concern is what he takes to be the illegality of the 
invasion, an illegitimate procedural violation: because the invasion was illegal, it could not be 
legitimate.  
However, in Habermas’ earlier defense of the Kosovo intervention, he is less obviously 
standing on a proceduralist legalism, and seems to offer a strictly moral justification for illegal military 
action. In both cases, I am assuming that Habermas is correct that the military interventions were 
illegal under international law, as my concern is not with the legal status of the interventions but with 
the kind of norms involved. At least in the case of the NATO intervention, others have argued that 
the action was not illegal under international law. Habermas initially defended the anticipatory 
justification of the illegal NATO intervention in Kosovo in “Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the 
Border between Morality and Legality” and he continues to defend this position – without 
modification – in “Interpreting the Fall of a Monument” (2003), reprinted in The Divided West 
(Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 101, 105, 111). Habermas argues that in the case of the 
NATO military humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, democratically-constituted states collectively 
decided to follow the spirit of international law, according to an interpretation of the erga omnes clause 
at odds with that of the Security Council, such that they acted illegally. Still, their actions could be 
legitimated on the basis of proto-constitutional norms governing international society, which is merely 
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on the way to a cosmopolitan condition, or, to a legitimate constitutionalization of international law 
(Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 86). That is, the intervention was not legal and so not a 
legitimate police action but was capable of retroactive legitimation. This only partially parallels the 
analogous case of civil disobedience, in which interpretations of norms are contested. Here, proto-
constitutional norms that have yet to be adequately translated into the medium of law are the basis for 
illegal action, rather than a dissenting moral interpretation of fully institutionalized constitutional 
norms.  
In “An Interview on War and Peace”, Eduardo Mendieta suggests that Habermas’ “Kantian 
project” is leading him “to advocate a form of military humanism” (Habermas J. , The divided west, 
2006, p. 105). Habermas takes Mendieta to be referencing “the danger of a moralization of relations 
between adversaries”, for which Habermas criticizes President George W. Bush (Habermas J. , The 
divided west, 2006, p. 105). That is, Habermas is concerned that the ongoing constitutionalization of 
international law – the Kantian project referenced by Mendieta – now has to face not only the old 
Realist objection, that only brute power can stabilize international relations, but also a new model, on 
which a global liberal order ought to be sustained by the single remaining superpower:  
The project of a new liberal world order under the banner of a pax Americana advocated by the 
neoconservative masterminds of the current US administration raises the question of whether 
the juridification of international relations should be superseded by a moralization of international 
politics grounded in the ethos of a superpower (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 116).  
So, on Habermas’ reading, this model takes the (liberal) ethos of the hegemonic superpower to 
supersede the project of the constitutionalization of international law, and it is moralizing international 
politics in that it is directly imposing, coercively and violently if necessary, its own ethical view, or 
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ethos, rather than taming political violence through a progressive juridification of international relations. 
The terminology here gets a bit confusing. Habermas uses ‘morality’ in at least two senses: 
descriptively/sociologically with reference to norms claiming to be universal, and normatively with 
reference to norms that are valid and taken to be universally justifiable. Likewise, ‘ethical values’ are 
descriptively/sociologically those values that organize individual and collective forms of life, but 
normatively those values that are not taken to be universally justifiable. The coercive imposition of 
even those norms that are taken to be universally justifiable, but which have not been codified legally 
through democratic procedures, must be understood as ethical values in the normative sense, in such 
a context. And the coercive imposition of the (liberal) values of the United States, in the case of the 
invasion of Iraq, exhibits a moralization of politics rather than a juridification of international relations in 
this sense. Here, ‘moralization’ is used descriptively in that the values imposed are said to be universal, 
and ‘ethos’ is used normatively, as their coercive imposition demonstrates that the values in question 
are not presently justified in this context.  
Habermas addresses a parallel criticism to Michael Walzer’s just war theory. Habermas views 
Walzer’s position as grounded in ethical values and norms that are specific to particular cultures, and 
more significantly, are independent of the mediation of law (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006). 
These values include, for example, the value of national sovereignty (which President Obama claims 
not to be violating, when acting to defend human rights and democracy), and the importance of 
distinguishing between civilians and military personnel (as explicitly endorsed by President Bush). 
Principled philosophical objections aside, however, as Habermas notes, Walzer has been critical of the 
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recent ‘hegemonic unilateralism’ of the United States (Walzer, 2003, pp. 101, 104). Still, Habermas 
argues, Walzer’s just war theory directly moralizes political conflict without addressing the specifically 
political need, as demanded by the democratic principle (or the principle of popular sovereignty), for 
mediation via “inclusive and impartial procedures for applying binding norms”: 
[T]he criteria for judging just wars are not translated into the medium of law. Only in this way 
can inevitably controversial substantive notions of “justice” be translated into the verifiable 
criteria of the legality of wars (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 104). 
So, the trouble intimated by Mendieta is that Habermas himself appears, at least in some cases, to 
moralize political conflict directly without the mediation of law. In some cases, Habermas takes 
military intervention to be legitimate for moral reasons, even when in violation of international law, 
as in the NATO intervention in Kosovo (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 29). Habermas 
requires legitimation after the fact, but still, it seems that illegal actions in the present were justified via 
moral norms that had yet to be translated into the medium of law, and so, via anticipation of some 
hypothetical future condition in which the actions might be retroactively legitimated (Habermas J. , 
The divided west, 2006, p. 104). In this sense, Mendieta’s concern that Habermas seems occasionally 
to moralize political conflict in a way that is analogous to the moralizing of political conflict Habermas 
ascribes to the Bush administration seems to mark a significant issue, as in justifying the invasion of 
Iraq, the Bush administration likewise aimed to coercively impose universal norms that seem amenable 
to anticipatory justification, on the presumption that the military action could be retroactively 
legitimated given later constitution-building both in Iraq and in international law. 
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Virginia Held defends the Kosovo intervention using an argument that seems quite similar to 
Habermas’, on the principle that “only those interventions capable of receiving at least retroactive 
justification in international law if not prior Security Council authorization should even be considered 
candidates for morally justifiable intervention” (Held, Military intervention and the ethics of care, 
2008, p. 13). Bat-Ami Bar On, though broadly sympathetic, is nonetheless concerned that Held 
insufficiently distinguishes the moral from the political, and compares Held’s position to Habermas’ 
view, that: 
 …under the current conditions in which one has ‘to act as though there were already a fully 
institutionalized global civil society, the very promotion of which is the intention of the action’, 
one is not forced ‘to accept the maxim that victims are to be left at the mercy of thugs’ (Bar 
On, 2008, p. 28). 
Held’s position is also sympathetically criticized by Jess Kyle, in “Protecting the World: Military 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Ethics of Care”, for insufficiently problematizing the moralization 
of political conflict, and as potentially paternalistic (Kyle, 2013). In Habermas’ case, though, the 
concern that he is moralizing political conflict or justifying military intervention solely on the basis of 
moral argument without recourse to juridification of the relevant moral norms is somewhat 
ameliorated by recognition of the significance of solidarity and moral feeling in Habermas’ argument. 
The “moral feelings” of outrage that Habermas discusses in the face of the “morally obscene 
infliction of shock and terror on a mercilessly bombarded, gaunt, and helpless population” in Baghdad 
play a significant role in his criticism of the invasion of Iraq (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 
26). Habermas takes moral outrage over gross violations of human rights and/or crimes against 
humanity to suggest the beginnings of a global solidarity that could serve as a preliminary source of 
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legitimation from the global public sphere for actions taken to protect human rights and to prevent 
crimes against humanity, as well as a preliminary source of legitimation for claims that military actions 
taken to protect human rights are not legitimate. So, Habermas’ argument against the Invasion of the 
Iraq concerns political legitimation, and not – or at least not only – moral justification. Habermas 
argues that military intervention could, in some cases, be legitimated on the basis of global moral 
outrage, even when it violates international law, in cases of extreme violations of human rights and in 
order to prevent wars of aggression, and that as in the case of the intervention in Kosovo, this provides 
additional support for the argument that the military action would be retroactively legitimated, support 
not equally provided in the case of the Invasion of Iraq. So, unlike Walzer (on Habermas’ reading of 
Walzer), Habermas is not justifying military action simply on the basis of moral argument, nor merely 
criticizing military action on the basis on illegality.  
He takes the NATO intervention in Kosovo to have been legitimizable, but the invasion of 
Iraq to be illegitimate, although both military efforts appealed to human rights while violating 
international law, on his reading. Still, military intervention would only be wholly legitimate, for 
Habermas, if conducted in the context of some future cosmopolitan condition in which there were a 
democratically constituted world organization, answering both to nation-states and to world citizens, 
which could resolve disputes over failures of popular sovereignty, gross violations of human rights, or 
crimes against humanity (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 132). Such a future world 
organization could legitimately intervene, though were it constituted democratically, any such 
intervention would be conceived on the model of domestic policing, and not as military intervention 
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(Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 99-100). The difficulty for Habermas is that the 
‘cosmopolitan condition’ has not been achieved, so world society is still short a legitimate democratic 
constitution, and interventions are thus still military actions rather than police actions, which seems 
to leave us with all military actions as at least in some sense only potentially retroactively legitimate. 
Habermas tries to resolve the challenge of a legitimation deficit in international law with a 
conception of transnational and global constitutionalization building upon historical revolutionary 
achievements, without subverting them, and hence as possible without violence. The globalization of 
the economy and the evolving solidarity of people everywhere in outrage against gross violations of 
human rights and crimes against humanity might, as Habermas argues, suggest respectively that 
democratically constituted trans-national organizations ought to be formed that could intervene 
effectively in the economy, and that a democratically constituted world organization ought to be 
constructed that could legitimately police at least serious violations of human rights and crimes against 
humanity, but in the absence of either, Habermas is largely left appealing to issues of legality 
(Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 94, 100, 175). Differences of interpretation of the meaning 
of constitutional norms can only be a relevant justification for the violation of the law or its condemnation 
where there actually are such democratically legitimated constitutional norms. In the absence of such 
a constitution, is the treaty-based illegality of the invasion of Iraq sufficient to sustain the claim that it 
was wrong? Justification of the invasion of Iraq cannot be given via constitutional norms, but neither 
can its condemnation. In the absence of a legitimate democratic constitutionalization of world society 
– or, in the absence of verifiable criteria of legality – Habermas can at best appeal to what the states 
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and citizens of the world, hypothetically, could assent to in a process of inclusive democratic will 
formation. While the outrage of many in the face of the invasion of Iraq speaks powerfully to an 
evolving global solidarity, we are yet lacking a global constitution (Habermas J. , The divided west, 
2006, pp. 80, 142-3). Solidarity provides only a partial solution here, as legitimation from the informal 
global public sphere is not matched in Habermas’ model by developments in the formal global public 
sphere in such a way that legitimacy can be properly produced from legality. So, this anticipatory 
legitimation puts Habermas’ rather strong legalism into question and provides some support for 
thinking both that his moral theory is less strictly epistemic that it appears, and that his political theory 
is less purely procedural. 
In the Kosovo case as in the Iraq case, the appeal is primarily to international law. Recall 
Habermas’ account of criteria given in international law for intervention: the use of military force is 
justifiable if: (a) the party is acting in self-defense; (b) the U.N. Security Council approves, generally 
with reference to gross human rights violations or crimes against humanity; (c) there is a crime against 
humanity in progress, in which case the erga omnes clause not only permits but mandates military 
intervention; and (d) intervention involves only democratically-constituted states, in which case 
intervention is at least more justifiable (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 29, 85, 92). In the 
case of the Kosovo intervention, the key premise of Habermas’ argument is that the erga omnes clause 
mandates intervention in cases of genocide, setting up the possibility of direct conflict with the 
decision of the U.N. Security Council, which in this case occurred: the Security Council refused to 
authorize NATO military action to stop the genocide. Habermas concludes that this leaves the 




Ethical Validity  80 
intervention illegal for procedural reasons, but morally justifiable and retroactively legitimizable, and 
further, legitimizable based on a differing interpretation of what international law requires. This is 
partially analogous to Habermas’ position on civil disobedience at least with respect to the relation 
between moral justification and legitimacy, in that illegal action is morally justifiable, and retroactively 
legitimizable on the basis of a differing interpretation of legitimate law, though dis-analogous at least 
in that, of course, military intervention is in no sense purely symbolic, nor nonviolent. 
 
(III.3) At the Limits of Habermas’ Discourse Theory of Law & Democracy 
Prior to the development of his discourse theory of law and democracy, Habermas appeared 
to be suspicious of proceduralist accounts of legitimacy, and to endorse a sort of moral 
foundationalism, wherein moral principles, and specifically, basic moral rights, legitimize the 
democratic constitutional state. This point goes some distance toward explaining the early reception 
of discourse ethics in Anglo-American philosophy, where many assumed (a) that the moral theory 
provided grounds for the legitimacy of the democratic constitutional state, (b) that discourse ethics 
was a political theory of justice akin to that of John Rawls, and (c) that Habermas’ distinction between 
morality and ethics was quite close to Rawls’ distinction between the right and the good [Finlayson & 
Freyenhagen provide a helpful survey of these early (mis)interpretions: (Finlayson & Freyenhagen, 
Introduction: The Habermas-Rawls dispute – Analysis and reevaluation, 2011)]. Carol C. Gould argues 
that a “strong conception of justice” would need to provide an “independent basis for the existence 
of human rights of individuals,” but that though “Habermas’ early approach looks to human action 
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and interaction as a basis for norms and therefore seems to appeal to something beyond the mere 
procedure as its ground, … the interaction turns out to be understood as itself procedural, that is, in 
terms of discursive modes of coming to agreement” (Gould, 2004, pp. 27, 31). In Habermas’ early 
work of the 1960s, during the period in which he produced Knowledge and Human Interests, it indeed 
seemed that Habermas, like Gould, was inclined toward views of morality and legitimacy that were 
not purely epistemic and procedural: 
The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be 
apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: 
language. Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first 
sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. 
Taken together, autonomy and responsibility constitute the only Idea [that] we possess a priori 
in the sense of the philosophical tradition (Habermas J. , 1971, p. 314). 
Here, Habermas posits substantive human interests as knowable a priori, hardly a formal, proceduralist 
position. Later, in his most sustained defense of civil disobedience (1985), Habermas appears to reject 
pure proceduralism, and to agree with Gould that just such an “independent basis” is necessary: 
[T]he claim to legitimacy of the democratic constitutional state is hardly redeemed by the fact 
that laws, judgments, or policies are arrived at according to the prescribed procedures. In 
questions of principle, the legitimacy of the procedure does not suffice – the procedures 
themselves and the legal order as a whole must be susceptible of a justification according to 
principles.29 
Aside from the question of whether an independent basis or foundation is necessary to justify the 
procedures of the democratic constitutional state and the legal order as a whole, Habermas also at 
 
29 Habermas 1985, 114n23; citing Habermas, 1985, “Recht und Gewalt – ein deutsches Trauma”, in 
Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit, 110-11. 
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times appears to claim that, independent of discursive procedures, we can at times simply ‘see’ moral 
implications, as if they were “bare facts”: 
[There are frequent cases] where material living conditions and social structures are such that 
moral-practical implications spring immediately to the eye and moral questions are answered, 
without further reflection, by the bare facts of poverty, abuse, and degradation. Wherever this 
is the case, wherever existing conditions make a mockery of the demands of universalist 
morality, moral issues turn into issues of political ethics. How can a political practice designed 
to realize the conditions necessary for a dignified human existence be morally justified? The 
kind of politics at issue is one that aims at changing a form of life from moral points of view, 
though it is not reformist and therefore cannot operate in accordance with existing laws and 
institutions. The issue of revolutionary morality (which incidentally has never been 
satisfactorily discussed by Marxists, Eastern or Western) is fortunately not an urgent one in 
our type of society (Habermas J. , 1990, p. 208; emphasis added). 
For Habermas, revolutionary morality concerns questions of universal morality in contexts in which there 
is insufficient institutional and social support for the realization of its demands, and political ethics 
concerns changing political and social forms of life to better realize the demands of universal morality. 
Habermas suggests that the bare facts of material conditions and existing social structures are 
frequently such that without further reflection we simply ‘see’ that there are issues of political ethics 
at stake, suggesting a need to transform an ethical form of life from “moral points of view” that are 
not mirrored in any actually existing consensual structure. Put differently, revolutionary morality 
demands consonance with the spirit of a law that ought to be embodied in institutional structures that 
do not presently exist.  
Habermas’ confidence in 1990 that in ‘our’ type of society revolutionary morality is not an 
urgent issue has been shaken at least since the invasion of Iraq, as Habermas views the actions of the 
Bush Administration as themselves revolutionary: 
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[T]he proposed alternative to the morality of international law is neither political realism nor 
the pathos of freedom, but a revolutionary vision: if the regime of international law fails then 
the hegemonic imposition of a liberal global order is justified, even when it employs means 
that violate international law. Wolfowitz is not Kissinger. He is a revolutionary, not a cynical 
technician of political power … What distinguishes the neoconservatives from the “realist” 
school of international relations is the vision of an American global political order that has 
definitively broken with the reformist program of UN human rights policy. Although this 
vision does not betray the liberal goals, it shatters the civilizing constraints [that] the UN 
Charter, with good reason, has placed on the means of realizing these goals (Habermas J. , 
The divided west, 2006, pp. 27-8). 
So, Habermas argues here that the Bush administration has responded to the apparent violations of 
the strictures of universal morality by Saddam Hussein by substituting a new vision of political ethics, 
as an alternative to the reformist model adopted by the UN on which the mediation of violence by 
the “civilizing constraints” of law is the preferred approach. Habermas does not deny that Hussein 
grossly violated human rights, nor that liberation from his regime would be a great good: “The 
liberation of a brutalized population from a barbaric regime is a great good; among political goods it 
is the greatest of all” (Habermas J. , Interpreting the fall of a monument, 2003, p. 364). He accepts 
that the aims of the invasion of Iraq were still in accord with liberal goals, understood as incorporating 
the institutionalization of universal human rights and democracy. But he objects to the shift in political 
ethics entailed by this move.  
Conversely, in the case of the Kosovo intervention, his position is strikingly different: “The 
dilemma of having to act as though there were already a fully institutionalized global civil society, the 
very promotion of which is the intention of the action, does not force us to accept the maxim that 
victims are to be left at the mercy of thugs” (Habermas J. , 1999, pp. 270-1). In this case, short of the 
legality from which legitimacy could be produced, Habermas is left, rather, with the far weaker support 




Ethical Validity  84 
of a background sense of solidarity against the genocide taking place, from a nascent global public 
sphere, and an alternative interpretation of what international law requires, suggesting the possibility 
of retroactive legitimation. In this case, he makes the opposite call, that the shift in political ethics is 
justified. But, it seems to me, this is an ethical argument, about what is to be done in a situation in 
which the demands of universal morality are manifestly unmet, and so there is a sense of the 
revolutionary in each case. Further, it seems that there is an appeal to something beyond procedure 
that is crucial to the argument, in that Habermas claims that at times we simply see some forms of moral 
violation, grounded in “bare facts”.  
Habermas’ discussion of civil disobedience contains a relevantly analogous moment: 
[T]he democratic project of realizing equal civil rights actually feeds off the resistance of 
minorities, which, although they appear to be enemies of democracy to the majority today, 
could prove to be its true friends tomorrow (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 23).  
Given a wholly epistemic account of moral rightness and a procedural view of legitimation, it is hard 
to see how such minorities could turn out to have been right all along; rather, establishing consensus 
constructs the rightness of their claims. Habermas views the project of the constitutional state as 
progressively revealing the normative substance of constitutional norms, but to the extent that this 
normative substance or content is progressively revealed, it would seem that the truth of the relevant 
claims precedes whatever procedure justifies them, which again, seems to be a moment in Habermas’ 
discourse theory that is not purely epistemic, at least not with respect to moral rightness. 
Habermas’ legalism is relevant here, as Habermas takes there to be no coherent alternative to 
the progressive constitutionalization of international law, in order to procedurally produce legitimacy 
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out of legality, though continuing political violence suggests that many see alternatives, and in many 
cases, see no alternative to violent action. Further, the many proponents of global imposition of liberal 
democracy by the United States as benevolent hegemon have perfectly coherent arguments based in 
different ethical views. I think that Habermas needs to be seen as giving an ethical argument, and not 
(or, not only) the functional argument that we have no coherent alternative, in defending egalitarian 
decision-making procedures, both in his discourse theory of law and democracy and in his discourse 
theory of morality, a claim I take him to have already begun to acknowledge in The Future of Human 
Nature, faced with the question of how to value morality as a whole, which he recognizes is an ethical 
question. 
Jacques Rancière critiques consensus accounts including Habermas’, wholly rejecting the 
project of political philosophy as invariably concerned with purifying politics, which Rancière takes to 
be necessarily impure:  
The essential feature of [the ethical turn] is certainly not the virtuous return to the norms of 
morality. It is, on the contrary, the suppression of the division that the very word ‘morals’ used 
to imply. Morality implied the separation of law and fact. By the same token it also implied the 
division of different forms of morality and of rights, the division between ways of opposing 
right to fact. The suppression of this division has been given a privileged name: it is called 
consensus (Rancière, Dissensus: On politics and aesthetics, 2010, p. 188).  
To be fair, Habermas also thinks that politics is “impure” in the sense that any actual deliberative 
practice is to some extent non-ideal. Nonetheless, Habermas and Rancière share several theoretical 
commitments. Both Habermas and Rancière start from an account of a speech situation, involving a 
presupposition of the equality of speaking subjects, though plainly there are significant differences in 
their interpretations of these core elements. Because of this related feature of their otherwise very 
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different views, both Habermas and Rancière have difficulty making sense of the “claims” of non-
human animals and of pre-personal human life. Also, both Habermas and Rancière give what could 
be read as formalist accounts of the speech situation, and both Habermas and Rancière object to 
substantive metaphysical commitments in political theory [ (Davis, 2009, p. 59) (Connolly, 2013, pp. 
218-20n11)]. Where they differ is in their accounts of rights and of politics. According to Rancière, 
the “Rights of Man are the rights of the demos, which is the generic name of political subjects, that is, 
subjects that, in specific scenes of dissensus, enact the paradoxical qualification of this supplement” 
(Rancière, Dissensus: On politics and aesthetics, 2010, p. 70). Put differently:  
[T]he Rights of Man are the rights of those who make something of that inscription, deciding 
not only to ‘use’ their rights but also to build cases to verify the power of the inscription … 
Not only do they bring the inscription of rights to bear against situations in which those rights 
are denied but they construct the world in which those rights are valid, together with the world 
in which they are not” (Rancière, Dissensus: On politics and aesthetics, 2010, p. 69).  
Since political “names” are inherently conflictual, for Rancière, no current “distribution of the 
sensible” can finally determine, once and for all, the “proper” meaning of the names ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 
(Rancière, Dissensus: On politics and aesthetics, 2010, pp. 68-9). Of course, Habermas also does not 
think that any aspect of legitimate governance can be determined once and for all. But, for Rancière, 
this means that any currently accepted – and policed – delimitation of the proper, to the extent that 
the possibility of politics is not foreclosed in advance by the governmental logic and practice of what 
Rancière calls “the police”, remains open to future dissensual practice (Rancière, Dissensus: On 
politics and aesthetics, 2010, pp. 53, 56). In this sense, Rancière accepts the Derridean principle that 
“democracy … can never ‘reach itself’ … because it involves an … infinite openness to the newcomer 
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and [a]wait[s] … the event that evades all expectation” (Rancière, Dissensus: On politics and 
aesthetics, 2010, p. 59).  
Still, Rancière is concerned that Jacques Derrida’s reading disappears “democracy as a 
practice” (Rancière, 2010, p. 59). Rancière’s critique of Derrida precisely parallels his critiques not only 
of Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben and Jean-François Lyotard, but also of the Bush Administration 
and of Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt (Rancière, Dissensus: On politics and aesthetics, 2010, pp. 58-60, 65, 
70, 71, 72-5). Further, it is tightly analogous to Habermas’ concern with the moralization of politics, 
in his tightly parallel critiques of Michael Walzer, Carl Schmitt, and the Bush administration. Against 
Derrida, Rancière argues that democracy does not need an Other that comes from the outside, as the 
Other is internal to democracy, which becomes apparent in the staging of the verification of rights 
that is ‘politics’ (Rancière, 2010, p. 53). Without an account of the practice of democracy – as politics, 
understood as the staging of scenes of dissensus – a grave danger is encoded in the simple Derridean 
dichotomy between:  
(1) presently existing institutional forms and the rights they protect so far and… 
(2) the perfectionist ideal of a “democracy to come” that would perfectly protect the ethical 
claims of the ‘Other’ (Rancière, 2010, p. 59). 
Rancière argues that this simple dichotomy allows for (at least nearly) any action in the name of the 
“rights of those who have no rights,” precisely because of Derridean democracy’s ‘infinite openness,’ 
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such that Derridean thought leads, against itself, to the same sort of “right to humanitarian 
interference” that led the Bush Administration to put forward the concept of “infinite justice” 
(Rancière, 2010, p. 74).  
Though Rancière frames these concerns quite differently from Habermas, his formulation of 
the dichotomy at the heart of Derridean democracy parallels the tension considered above with respect 
to Habermas. Habermas and Rancière are both committed to democracy as a practice in which 
conflictual interpretations of norms are staged. They differ, however, in their account of the basis of 
this staging. For Habermas, civil disobedience is restricted to the context of constitutional democracies 
and can only be tolerated to the extent that dissensual action is defended with reference to the 
constitutional norms of the political community. By contrast, for Rancière dissensus is not enacted or 
staged with reference to constitutional norms and may (radically) exceed any possible interpretation 
of constitutional norms so far codified. The legitimation of dissensus cannot proceed via some set of 
consensually-adopted principles, because dissensus, like democratic rule, is grounded in the common 
lack – of anyone and everyone – of an entitlement to rule (Rancière, 2010, p. 53). For Rancière, 
democracy lacks a foundational principle, and the ground for ruling is the lack of ground: “[T]he very 
ground for the power of ruling is that there is no ground at all” (Rancière, 2010, p. 50). Rancière goes 
on to make a far stronger claim, that “[d]issensus cannot stand on anything stronger without running 
the risk of legitimating a messianism that could legitimate atrocities” (Rancière, Dissensus: On politics 
and aesthetics, 2010, p. 61). Importantly however, Rancière does not reject the institutionalization of 
democracy as a pragmatic necessity, for reasons of action coordination for example, but he insists that no 
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set of norms could legitimately serve as the ground of such institutions, and that no such 
institutionalization of democracy and legal rights could legitimately delimit the domain of the proper.  
Rancière counterposes the practice of democracy – never decided in advance, at any level of 
abstraction – to the police logic that progressively colonizes politics, contra Habermas, who argues for 
the expansion of the domain of the “logic of the police” globally, institutionalizing a “global domestic 
politics” in which at least constitutional norms would be decided in advance, and in which military 
interventions and acts of war would be understood as policing [ (Rancière, 2010, pp. 54, 56) (Habermas 
J. , 2006, p. 189)]. But, though Rancière nonetheless insists on a normative distinction between “better 
and worse kinds of police”, he is unable to provide evaluative criteria for assessing this, and one is left 
with an account of always provisional, momentary irruptions of “politics” in the midst of the 
consensual police order. This difficulty faced by Rancière with respect to better and worse police logics 
seems to be conceptually related to the difficulty Habermas sees with attempting to flesh out an ethics 
with an associated validity claim.30  
Omar Dahbour argues that the “root of the problem with theories of ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ – to use Habermas’ phrase (for his own theory, among others) – is that they fail to posit 
substantive values that can serve as a basis for deciding upon particular principles” (Dahbour, Self-
determination without nationalism: A theory of postnational sovereignty, 2013, p. 237n28). Dahbour 
 
30 To be clear, while Habermas does see ethical discourse as associated with a validity claim, he does not 
view ethical values themselves as amenable to normative justification.  
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characterizes the difficulty facing democratic proceduralism with reference to the delimiting of the 
territory, emphasizing a different aspect of what Rancière terms the ‘distribution of the sensible’:  
Plebiscites, as with democratic procedures in general, can only proceed once the parameters – 
in this case, the territory – within which they will operate has been determined. This cannot be 
determined consensually (or democratically) and must be imposed by a power or force of 
some sort, if not mutually agreed upon. The general truth about democratic proceduralism [is] 
that it is only possible once the particular procedure has been established and imposed or 
accepted nonconsensually (Dahbour, Ecosovereignty: Resolving the contradiction between 
self-determination and cosmopolitanism, 2013).31 
Habermas, though, does not seem to be operating with the sort of pure proceduralism that Dahbour 
targets, on my reading. At the very least, it seems that Habermas is committed to the ethical claims that 
it would generally be better to settle conflict non-violently and consensually, and that legally mediated 
conflict resolution would generally be better than resolution through violent conflict. These are 
contestable claims, certainly, but deciding upon these ethical values begins to set parameters for further 
moral principles and their consensual justification. William E. Connolly argues, following Alfred 
North Whitehead, that metaphysical or ontological commitments are unavoidable in political 
theorizing, that speculative work is necessary to making sense of the political, and that such 
“ontocosmologies”, though defensible in general terms, will remain contestable (Connolly, 2013, pp. 
218-20n11). Analogously, I argue that Habermas requires a defensible general ethics, but that such an 
ethics must be understood as contestable, and certainly not as universally necessary, in either a 
normative or a functional sense. Further, such an ethics, although generally defensible, or supportable 
 
31 Dahbour 2013, 32-3.  
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with good reasons, would not be attached to a universal validity claim, and so, would remain in this 
sense speculative. 
Habermas’ claim that we have ‘no coherent alternative’ to this path rings rather hollow in the 
face of ongoing political violence, and also, seems aimed at investing discursive conflict resolution 
with an air of necessity, however pragmatic, that disguises the ethical conversation in play. As long as 
plainly oppressive political structures persist, revolutionary violence will remain an ethical option, and 
simply claiming that we have ‘no coherent alternative’ to discursive resolution of conflict if we want 
to settle conflict non-violently provides little clarity. The pragmatic necessity supported by the 
functional arguments seems to import a bit of universality that is out of place at the ethical level, and 
the defense of discursive – rather than violent, for example – settling of conflict requires an argument 
at that level. Saying that we have no coherent alternative but to resolve political conflict via further 
constitutionalization of international law seems to obscure the ethical claim in play. I argue that 
Habermas requires a defensible general ethics, but that such an ethics must be understood as 
contestable, and certainly not as universally necessary, in either a normative or a functional sense.  
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Chapter Three: Normative Affect: From Immanuel Kant to Jürgen 
Habermas 
 
From his serious philosophical works, such as Justification and Application and Truth and 
Justification, to his more popular writings, such as The Divided West, to idiosyncratic pieces like The Future 
of Human Nature, Habermas is concerned with normative feelings, which at least motivate his 
theoretical interventions. This is not intended as a criticism, or a suggestion that Habermas has been 
corrupted by his emotions or blinded by passion. Habermas explicitly starts with a reconstruction of 
the phenomenology of our normative feelings – both moral feelings and ethical feelings – and I think 
that this element of his reconstruction of morality and ethics is given insufficient weight by Habermas 
himself.  
For example, Habermas claims that “[w]e have an unmistakable sense that the avoidance of 
cruelty toward all creatures capable of suffering is a moral duty,” that “we have a sense of being under 
categorical obligations toward animals,” and that it is morally significant that “[a]nimals confront us 
as vulnerable creatures whose physical integrity we must protect for its own sake” (Habermas J. , 
Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics, 1993, pp. 106-7; emphasis added). This 
“unmistakable sense” is cashed out in terms of moral feeling, in particular, the moral feeling of horror 
at the torture of animals. Events are often described as evoking either horror or outrage at moral 
violation, as when Habermas identifies global experiences of “shared outrage at aggressive war-
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mongering and human rights violations” or “shared horror over acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide” 
(Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 110; emphasis added). The normative feeling most frequently 
cited in discussions of violated moral norms – which I will call moral feeling – is outrage. In his later 
work Habermas maintains a significant role for moral feeling, understood as having both a cognitive 
dimension and as playing a significant role in moral motivation. 
Habermas contrasts moral feelings with feelings such as pity or condescension, which he associates 
with people making little of their lives, by some collective ethical standard or by their own standards 
of authenticity, in that they have failed to live up to their own value(s), or to some value(s) shared with 
(some) others. I will call these feelings associated with failing to live up to ethical values ethical feelings. 
In The Future of Human Nature, Habermas starts from the phenomenological observation that:  
we are still sensitive to the obscenity of this reifying practice, and wonder whether we want to live 
in a society [that] is ready to swap sensitivity regarding the normative and natural foundations 
of its existence for the narcissistic indulgence of our own preferences (Habermas J. , The 
future of human nature, 2003, p. 20). 
The ethical feelings cited most frequently in response to the breeding and cloning of humans are disgust 
and revulsion, as at something obscene. Habermas frequently cites disgust in his discussion of cruel and 
callous treatment of non-human animals, which provides some evidence for thinking that his 
argument defending quasi-moral duties to non-human animals might be better understood as an ethical 
argument. Still, Habermas sees ethical feelings as connected with subjective preferences,32 and so 
specifically ethical critique connected to (and arising from) ethical feelings concerning the “obscenity” 
 
32 By ‘subjective’ I mean associated with some person or persons, but not all persons. 
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of (a possible future involving) market-governed eugenic practices is not justifiable in the way that 
moral critique might be. It is only justifiable within the context of people that share the relevant value 
and does not involve a universal validity claim. But though Habermas spends less time developing a 
reading of the normative feelings connected with ethical values than in developing his reading of the 
feelings associated with moral injury, ethical feeling, and in particular the ethical feeling of hope, plays 
an important role in much of his later work.  
In this chapter, I start with a reading of the role of moral feeling in the work of Immanuel 
Kant, as both motivation or incentive, and as a susceptibility to motivation by the moral law, the 
cultivation of which is a duty. Then I consider Habermas’ transformation of Kant’s moral feeling into 
solidarity, as the non-enforceable yet functionally necessary reverse face of (moral) justice. In this 
chapter, my focus is on normative feeling as developed within a formalism that eschews substantive 
ethical worldviews and makes no (justified) claims concerning moral motivation. I argue that 
Habermas’ account of moral feeling gives reason to see rightness as non-epistemic, or, to adopt a 
moral realist perspective, because of the generalizable ability to be affected by – and motivated by – 
the needs of others, which must be presupposed. Habermas’ presentation of moral feeling as playing 
an evidentiary role in moral discourses analogous to the role of sense perception in truth-oriented 
discourses provides a compelling reason to view his account of rightness as non-epistemic, as he 
depends on the presupposition that human beings are susceptible to the same affective responses, or, 
that there are universalizable moral feelings. Further, this assumption is analogous to the assumption 
that in making truth claims, we are making claims about the same physical world. This is not a claim 
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about generalizable interests per se, but rather, about a human susceptibility to motivation by moral 
concerns, whether they affect our own interests or not, paralleling the Kantian susceptibility to 
motivation by the moral law but transformed from Kant’s transcendental paradigm to that of 
intersubjectivity. This move would further illuminate Habermas’ claims about solidarity: we must 
assume that human beings are capable of being motivated by justified moral norms to make sense of 
such norms as justified at all, and yet, motivation by moral norm is not, strictly speaking, enforceable 
(Habermas J. , Between naturalism and religion, 2008, p. 3).  
Then, I turn to Habermas’ use of the ethical feeling of hope, considered in light of Kant’s 
postulate arguments, and Kant’s claims concerning what we must hope. I argue that implicit in 
Habermas’ account of the necessary pragmatic presuppositions is an ethical hope, that discourse ethics 
might be better understood as a form of ethical realism, and that the necessity in play is ethical rather 
than merely pragmatic. I argue that Habermas' necessary pragmatic presuppositions of communicative 
action are those of a particular – if generalizable – form of life. As such, there is a worldview in 
discourse ethics, which takes the form of the necessary preconditions of the moral point of view, 
much like the values put forward in Habermas’ ethics of the species. However, this means that, as 
Habermas himself maintains, these 'necessary presuppositions' are not moral oughts, and yet, contra 
Habermas, they are worth valuing. Put differently, Habermas argues that the necessary pragmatic 
presuppositions are justified functionally, and I argue that the presuppositions are neither moral nor 
merely functionally justified but are properly ethical. This move would pluralize without radically 
relativizing the normative discourses of Habermasian discourse theory. 
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(III.1) Kant’s Moral Feeling 
Kant presents his project of developing a pure philosophy of morals – pure insofar as it is free 
of any empirical part and is not based on grounds of experience – as to be carried out “only by those 
who feel a calling to it” (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1996, p. 44; emphasis 
added).33 In the “Preface” to the Groundwork, moral feeling is already playing a role, suggesting that 
the common reading of Kant as obviating any role for emotion in acting from duty is too simple. 
From the beginning of the Groundwork, Kant already suggests that moral feelings must in some way 
arise a priori, from pure practical reason, and that though moral feelings are not constitutive of the 
moral law, they do serve as motivation or incentive. As presented in the Critique of Practical Reason, moral 
feeling has both a negative and a positive aspect, explained in terms of what the moral law “must 
effect” in the mind “insofar as it is an incentive” (Kant, Critique of practical reason, 1996, p. 198).34 
 
33 Kant describes the science of ethics (or the doctrine of morals) as concerned with the laws of 
freedom, with ethics further subdivided into practical anthropology, the empirical part “based on 
grounds of experience”, and morals, the rational part that “sets forth its teachings simply from a priori 
principles” (G 388). According to Kant, the rational part of the science of ethics – morals – should be 
“carefully cleansed of everything empirical” so that it is possible to see what “pure reason can 
accomplish … through a priori teaching” on its own (G 389).  
34 Though Kant aims to explain what the moral law must cause in the mind, nevertheless he argues 
that how the moral law is an immediate determining ground of the will must remain an “insoluble 
problem”, and that this is in fact the same unsolvable problem as explaining how freedom is possible 
(C 72). I return to the question of freedom and to the status of the Kantian postulates – freedom, the 
existence of God, and the immortality of the soul – later in this chapter. 
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Moral feeling is understood negatively in the humiliation of sensible inclinations, and positively in 
respect for the moral law (Kant, Critique of practical reason, 1996, pp. 200-1). Kant divides the sum 
of inclinations into those of self-love and those of self-conceit, and he argues that pure practical reason 
“merely infringes upon self-love,” which is restricted by the “condition of agreement with the law,” in 
which case it is understood as rational self-love, while by contrast, self-conceit is struck down or 
humiliated completely, as it is understood to rest “only on sensibility” (Kant, Critique of practical 
reason, 1996, pp. 199-200, 202).35 So, what the moral law must cause in the mind insofar as it is an 
incentive is, negatively, a humiliation of the inclinations associated with “sensible propensity of [one’s] 
nature” as compared with the moral law (Kant, Critique of practical reason, 1996, p. 200). This 
humiliation of the sensible inclinations in comparison to the moral law, however, removes hindrances 
to the doing of one’s duty, furthering the positive causality of pure practical reason, which “awakens 
respect” for the moral law (Kant, Critique of practical reason, 1996, pp. 200-1, 203). On this account, 
moral feeling seems to arise from the moral law, as a subjective response to the action of the moral 
law in subduing sensible inclinations and thereby furthering the positive causality of the moral law 
itself. 
However, Kant understands respect for the law not merely as incentive, but also as “morality 
itself subjectively considered as an incentive inasmuch as pure practical reason, by rejecting all the 
claims of self-love in opposition with its own, supplies authority to the law, which now alone has 
 
35 That the sum of the inclinations of self-love and self-conceit brought into a systematic harmony is 
the aim of happiness seems to be borrowed from David Hume, though Kant’s estimation of this as a 
moral aim differs from Hume’s markedly (C 73). 
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influence” (Kant, Critique of practical reason, 1996, p. 201; emphasis added). Though Kant claims 
that respect for the moral law is in a sense identical with the moral law itself, this is only insofar as the 
moral law is understood subjectively as an incentive, and so is not attributed to all rational beings. 
Because the moral law is only identical with respect insofar as the law is considered subjectively as an 
incentive, the moral law is not objectively identical with respect, for at least the reason that rational 
beings without a sensible nature need no motivation. Respect for the moral law conceived a priori by 
pure practical reason is only an incentive for a finite rational being with a sensible nature to make the 
moral law its maxim (Kant, Critique of practical reason, 1996, p. 201).  
Similarly, in the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant argues that this subjective respect for the law follows 
from reason and neither precedes nor supersedes it (Kant, The metaphysics of morals, 1996, pp. 518-
19). This moral feeling is a disposition “in which the law becomes also the incentive” to the performing 
of one’s duty (Kant, The metaphysics of morals, 1996, pp. 518-19). The moral law considered 
subjectively, which is neither external to reason nor a matter of experience, just is the motivation or 
incentive to satisfy the requirements of duty.36 The law is “a supersensible nature which we give 
objective reality at least in a practical respect, since we regard it as an object of our will as pure rational 
beings,” and considered subjectively this is the moral feeling that motivates doing one’s duty from 
duty, in which case “the law [is] not only the rule but also the incentive of ... actions” [ (Kant, Critique 
of practical reason, 1996, p. 175) (Kant, The metaphysics of morals, 1996, p. 523)]. So, at least for 
 
36 Since this motivation arises from no external object and is not a matter of experience, it is not 
heteronymous (G 433). 
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human beings, Kant seems to be saying that moral feeling is identical with the moral law, if only because 
of our finitude, or rational imperfection. 
Early in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that moral feeling can neither serve as a 
guide to the appraisal of actions nor to ground the objective moral law (Kant, Critique of practical 
reason, 1996, p. 201). In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant goes further, arguing that moral feeling is 
“something merely subjective, which yields no cognition” and as such could not serve as a guide to 
the moral law (Kant, The metaphysics of morals, 1996, p. 529). This seems curious, as Kant also argues 
that the moral law is in a sense identical with respect. If the moral law is in a sense identical with 
respect, then how should this be reconciled with Kant’s claim that moral feeling yields no cognition? 
Kant seems to believe that precisely because moral feeling is subjective – even if it is the moral law 
considered subjectively from the perspective of finite rational beings – it does not involve cognition 
of the objective moral law as such. Rather than being an objective cognition of the moral law, moral 
feeling is a subjective “susceptibility” of finite rational beings to motivation by the law of pure practical 
reason (Kant, The metaphysics of morals, 1996, p. 529). Though moral feeling considered subjectively 
in this way is the moral law, the moral law objectively and in itself can neither be explained by nor 
grounded in moral feeling, because moral feeling only results from the effects of the moral law within 
the pure practical reason of finite rational beings and as such is not identical with the objective moral 
law.  
Kant argues that as finite rational beings, we have a duty to cultivate susceptibility to the moral 
law, or, to cultivate moral feeling. In the second part of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant outlines 
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what seems to be an educational plan, detailing how susceptibility to motivation by the moral law – or 
moral feeling – is to be cultivated. Kant takes pains to differentiate cultivation of moral feeling that 
“is built on concepts” from the cultivation of feeling based on any other foundation, such that 
although the intention is to increase one’s susceptibility to the moral law – which for finite rational 
beings just is moral feeling – the feelings must arise from conceptual cognition of the moral law (Kant, 
Critique of practical reason, 1996, pp. 265-6).37 Kant’s examples of educational demonstrations 
intended to strengthen moral feeling in demonstrating the moral law remove any motivation toward 
happiness for what seem to be pedagogical reasons. Such examples demonstrate most clearly what the 
moral law is, without confusing the resulting moral feeling with a sensible inclination or desire for 
happiness. The point of presenting demonstrations in which the moral action could not result from 
aiming toward happiness is not that action that has moral worth must only be motivated by the moral 
 
37 Otherwise, the resulting affects would be heteronomous, which would be problematic for Kant at least 
because sensible inclinations are unstable, and neither universal nor necessary, as with e.g. a Humean 
orientation toward happiness, which can only produce “seizures”. Kant’s account of moral feeling 
opposes Hume’s account of moral sentiment at least in that (1) moral feeling arises from pure practical 
reason rather than from empirical practical reason; (2) empirical practical reason aims at happiness (at 
best), conceived in terms of experience, whereas pure practical reason is grounded in the moral law, 
which is itself moral feeling, insofar as it is considered subjectively by rational finite beings, and 
motivates the doing of one’s duty from duty; and (3) acting from moral feeling is acting from duty, 
whereas for Hume, acting out of sympathy can only involve acting on empirically conditioned motives. 
On Cristina Lafont’s reading, Kantian constructivism’s claim of anti-realism is motivated by a concern 
to avoid heteronomy. She argues that her moral realist account is not problematically heteronymous 
(or, does not violate autonomy) because though the generalizable interests on which she grounds 
rightness claims are independent of our moral practices, they only show up as moral facts through our 
moral practices (Lafont 2004, 36).  
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law and not at all by a desire for happiness.38 Rather, the point is to clearly demonstrate motivation by 
the moral law.  
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant distinguishes between two duties of self-perfection, which 
parallel the predispositions to humanity and to personality, distinguished in Religion within the Bounds of 
Mere Reason. First, the duty of one’s own perfection requires the perfecting of one’s faculties, including 
the perfection of the understanding. This first duty involves developing one’s ability to set means to 
one’s chosen ends, with clear understanding of the most efficacious means toward any purpose. This 
certainly involves the will, but only in the guise of empirical practical reason engaged in the formation 
of hypothetical imperatives. Humanity, on this interpretation, is that by which finite creatures are said 
to be rational, though this first duty of self-perfection only aims at perfecting the understanding and 
not the will.39 In somewhat more detail, the first duty of self-perfection involves the perfecting of what 
seems to be only empirical practical reason, although this duty is prescribed by pure practical reason 
and not by “merely ... technically practical reason” (Kant, The metaphysics of morals, 1996, pp. 518-
19). This duty requires diminishing ignorance and correcting errors, “so that [one] may be worthy of 
the humanity that dwells within” (Kant, The metaphysics of morals, 1996, p. 518). “Humanity” is here 
 
38 …though certainly this motivation must at least be prioritized (C 156-8). Kant never claims that the 
predisposition to humanity – which involves the propensity to aim for happiness – should be 
eradicated, just that this aim must always be subordinated to the duties required by the moral law. That 
Kant’s cases generally present the two in opposition demonstrates only what he took to be the 
educational value of such examples, and not that he thought that only a subject who eliminates all self-
love could act in a way that would be morally worthy. See below. 
39 …because the will is not yet required to act from duty, which is the second duty of self-perfection. 
See below. 
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is presented as that “by which [human beings are] capable of setting ... ends” in aiming for happiness, 
which Kant views as that by which a human being raises himself “from his animality” (Kant, The 
metaphysics of morals, 1996, p. 518). The first duty of self-perfection, the duty to raise oneself from 
animality toward one’s humanity, parallels the predisposition to humanity, which concerns man only 
as living, rational, and motivated by self-love (Kant, Religion within the boundaries of mere reason and 
other writings, 1998, p. 51). 
The second duty of self-perfection, the self-perfection of the will, requires that one do one’s 
duty from duty: the duty to perfect the will requires that one cultivate one’s will such that the moral 
law serves as “sufficient” motivation (Kant, The metaphysics of morals, 1996, pp. 522-3). For finite 
rational beings, duty requires both that an action objectively accord with the law, or be in conformity 
with duty (legality), and that the action be done from duty (morality), requiring “of the maxim of the 
action subjective respect for the law, as the sole way of determining the will by the law” (Kant, Critique 
of practical reason, 1996, p. 205). The second duty is the duty to perfect the will so that one does one’s 
duty from duty: Kant argues that there is a duty to cultivate the susceptibility to the moral law as 
subjective motivation, or, to cultivate moral feeling. While the duty to perfect the understanding 
reflects the predisposition to humanity, the duty to perfect the will reflects the predisposition to 
personality, involving not only rationality but also responsibility.40 Kant understands by this 
predisposition to personality the “susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself sufficient incentive 
 
40 Unlike humanity, personality is also not characterized as “living”, because personality – as humanity 
considered solely intellectually – does not involve the inclinations of sensibility, or appearances of any 
sort. 
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to the power of choice” (Kant, Religion within the boundaries of mere reason and other writings, 1998, p. 
51). The “subjective ground … of incorporating this incentive into our maxims seems to be an 
addition to personality, and hence seems to deserve the name of a predisposition” for this reason, 
although personality just is “the idea of humanity considered wholly intellectually,” and so without 
any influence of sensible inclinations, such that for finite rational beings the moral law, inseparable 
from respect for it, is personality itself (Kant, Religion within the boundaries of mere reason and other 
writings, 1998, p. 52).  
The distinctions between the two duties of self-perfection and between the two higher 
predispositions seem to be related more generally to a third distinction, between rationality and 
reasonableness. For Kant, rationality involves only instrumental reason, formulated according to 
hypothetical imperatives which can still be self-interested in what Kant considers the pathological 
sense. In contrast, reasonableness involves taking others into account, relying upon the categorical 
imperative, which seems to be what Kant has in mind in describing the personality as “responsible”.41 
If this is correct, then why is the second formulation of the categorical imperative given as the formula 
of humanity? If humanity is merely the capacity to set self-determined means to ends, then why does 
Kant view it as a duty to treat humanity in another person always as an end in itself? Why does Kant 
not give the formulation as “act in such a way that you always treat personality, whether in your own 
person or in the person of another, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end”?  
 
41 … although reasonable rational self-interest is possible insofar as the predisposition to humanity is 
subordinated to the predisposition to personality. 
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Kant’s answer involves freedom, as it is only “by virtue of the autonomy of [one’s] freedom 
[that one] is the subject of the moral law,” and it is “[j]ust because of this” that “a being is not to be 
subjected to any purpose that is not possible in accordance with a law that could arise from the will 
of the affected subject himself” (Kant, Critique of practical reason, 1996, p. 210). This seems to be 
another formulation of Kant’s claim that freedom is the condition of the moral law. In the “Preface” 
to the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues for two “standpoints” in which the human being can be 
represented either as a part of nature (or as an appearance), subject to “causality as natural mechanism” 
and given in empirical consciousness, or as a “being in itself” given in pure consciousness, as free 
(Kant, Critique of practical reason, 1996, p. 141n). Freedom is taken to be the condition of the moral 
law, though it is through a priori knowledge of the moral law that human beings “first become aware of 
freedom” as a “practical concept” (Kant, Critique of practical reason, 1996, pp. 140n, 141). The “law 
of causality from freedom”, as an a priori practical principle, is the “unavoidable beginning” of Kant’s 
practical philosophy, although this freedom is first known from the moral law (Kant, Critique of 
practical reason, 1996, pp. 148-9). This freedom must be postulated since the moral law commands 
categorically and universally, and so pure reason must “contain within itself a practical ground ... 
sufficient to determine the will” so that there may be “practical laws” (Kant, Critique of practical 
reason, 1996, p. 153). Kant’s “ought implies can” argument moves from the knowledge of the 
categorical imperative of the moral law, which is “objectively and universally valid” and free from any 
contingent subjective conditions, to the necessity of freedom that must be assumed (although this 
freedom cannot be theoretically cognized) for practical laws to be possible (Kant, Critique of practical 
reason, 1996, pp. 154-5). The formula of humanity, then, follows directly from freedom itself, though 
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this freedom as autonomy is only realized when the categorical imperative is freely adopted as the 
subjective maxim of action, or when the predisposition to personality is given lexical priority over the 
predisposition to humanity. The formula of humanity requires treating rational beings as ends in 
themselves, in virtue of the possibility of autonomy, but it is only in the subordination of the 
predisposition to humanity to the predisposition to personality that one can properly be said to be an 
end in oneself, or to be autonomous. Quite literally, in autonomy one’s end is within: one is an end in 
oneself.  
 
(III.2) Habermas and Affect 
In Habermas’ early work, he seemed to accept Kant’s identification of the moral law with 
moral feeling – at least for finite rational beings – in claiming that “[r]eason means also the will to 
reason” (Habermas J. , Knowledge and human interests, 1971, pp. 514-5). That is, Habermas identifies 
cognition of moral rightness with motivation by that which is cognized as right. In later work, 
Habermas rejects the possibility of a moral-theoretic answer to the question “Why be moral at all?” 
In responding to Charles Taylor, Habermas argues that the uncoupling of morality and ethics leaves 
“moral theory ... competent [only] to clarify the moral point of view and justify its universality, 
[though] it can contribute nothing to answering the question ‘Why be moral?’ whether this be 
understood in a trivial, an existential, or a pedagogical sense” (Habermas J. , Justification and 
application: Remarks on discourse ethics, 1993, p. 77). Habermas attempts to address what he 
understands as the cognitive aspect of morality with the distinction between discourses of justification 




Ethical Validity  106 
and of application that together exhaust the meaning of impartiality but rejects any morally justifiable 
solution to the problem of motivation. Habermas argues that moral discourses of justification, 
concerning what is equally in the interest of all, must be supplemented by discourses of application, 
concerning which valid norm is appropriate in context, but that both “discourses of application [and] 
justificatory discourses are purely cognitive undertaking[s] and as such cannot compensate for the 
uncoupling of moral judgment from the concrete motives that inform actions” (Habermas J. , 
Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics, 1993, pp. 13-4; emphasis added). 
Appropriateness in applicative discourses corresponds to rightness or moral validity in justificatory 
discourses, for Habermas: “In discourses of application, the principle of appropriateness takes on the 
role played by the principle of universalization in justificatory discourses. Only the two principles 
taken together exhaust the idea of impartiality” (Habermas J. , Justification and application: Remarks 
on discourse ethics, 1993, pp. 37, 129). There is no analogous distinction in the justification of fact 
claims, which Habermas takes to be important for distinguishing normative discourses from truth-
oriented discourses (Habermas J. , Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics, 1993, p. 
38). That is, we do not have to determine which truth claim is appropriately applied, given the context, 
whereas more than one valid norm might be appropriately applied, and this does depend on contextual 
features of the situation. Discourses of justification abstract from context and justify norms that are 
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equally in the interest of all, whereas discourses of application reverse the abstraction and determine 
which of the valid norms are appropriate in some concrete, particular context.42 
Still, Habermas retains a rather different reading of the identification of the moral law with 
moral feeling, in maintaining that solidarity is but the reverse face of (moral) justice.43 Habermas takes 
moral outrage over gross violations of human rights and/or crimes against humanity – such as the 
“moral feelings” of outrage that Habermas discusses in the face of the “morally obscene infliction of 
shock and terror on [the] mercilessly bombarded, gaunt, and helpless population” of Baghdad – to 
suggest the beginnings of a global solidarity that could serve as a source of legitimation from the global 
public sphere for military actions taken to prevent wars of aggression. Similarly, moral outrage plays a 
significant role in Habermas’ argument for the anticipatory justification of the illegal NATO 
intervention in Kosovo, in “Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Morality and 
Legality” (1999). Habermas continues to defend this position in “Interpreting the Fall of a 
Monument”, in The Divided West (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 100, 105, 111). 
 
42 …such that a full employment of practical reason would involve considering what Seyla Benhabib 
has called the generalized and the concrete other. See: Habermas 1990, 175-81; 1993, 153-4; Benhabib 1987, 
77-96. Klaus Günther’s account of application discourses is generally cited by Habermas: Günther 
1993. 
43 William Rehg has developed this aspect of Habermas’ position, providing the derivation of the 
principle of universalization (U), a derivation that Habermas has endorsed: William Rehg, “Deriving 
a Dialogical Principle of Universalization” in Insight and Solidarity: The Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas, 
56-83. On “solidarity”, see: H 1996, 102, 110-13, 142-3; see also: “Fundamentalism and Terror”, H 
2006a; H 2003a, 114; “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights”, 
H 2012; H 1992, 51; H 1992, 145; H 1998, 8. 
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Habermas argues that justice and solidarity presuppose one another, but that the motivation 
expressed as “solidarity” cannot be demanded, although it is required:  
[The] democratic state is sustained by a legally unenforceable form of solidarity among citizens 
who respect each other as free and equal members of their political community (Habermas J. 
, Between naturalism and religion, 2008, p. 3; emphasis added). 
According to Habermas, the liberal democratic state “depends in the long run on mentalities that it 
cannot produce from its own resources,” and it is primarily for this reason that Habermas suggests 
that secular and religious citizens have a mutual interest in translating (“salvaging”) potential rational 
contents of the religions (Habermas J. , Between naturalism and religion, 2008, p. 3). Habermas has 
increasingly presented religion in a favorable light and has suggested not only that the genealogies of 
various post-metaphysical secular concepts may be traced back to religious sources, but further, that 
it is in the interest of post-metaphysical reason to continue to attend to the religious traditions as 
potential sources of as yet un-salvaged rational contents. For example, Habermas traces the 
genealogies of justice and of solidarity back to Judaism and Christianity, respectively.  
Habermas’ account of moral feeling echoes Immanuel Kant’s moral feeling of respect for the 
moral law, a feeling that for Kant is produced a priori and so is not merely an inclination:  
the feeling of duty has its roots in the fundamental relations of recognition we always already 
presuppose in communicative action (Habermas J. , Moral consciousness and communicative 
action, 1990, p. 108). 
Habermas’ pragmatic de-transcendentalizing of Kant’s architectonic makes the Kantian distinction 
between moral feeling and contingent inclination or sentiment difficult to maintain. With the shift 
from the transcendental subject to the paradigm of discursive intersubjectivity, the distinction would 
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need to be made in terms of the at least approximate universality of moral feelings, such as the 
“negative consensus” Habermas theorizes regarding ethnic cleansing and genocide. On Habermas’ 
view, this negative consensus is a basis for anticipatory moral justification for U.N. peace-keeping 
actions and for humanitarian military intervention in cases of genocide, given the present (historical) 
development of international institutions and negative affective responses from the emerging global 
public sphere in response to wars of aggression and crimes against humanity, a situation itself made 
possible historically by the globalization of markets and the worldwide interconnectivity of 
communications media. Such moral feelings would be contrasted with the particularity of ethical 
feelings specific to some group or person, which really seem to be a sort of (mere) preference, for 
Habermas. He allows that freely chosen value preferences of persons and peoples are worthy of 
respect, as expressions of individual or collective autonomy, just not that they are morally normative 
(Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 109). I argue that there is at least a subset of ethical feelings 
that Habermas takes more seriously than this, but his general view is that ethical feelings are not 
connected to universalizable interests, and so, are connected with (mere) preferences. And this seems 
to be the locus of Habermas’ distinction between moral feeling and contingent inclination: moral 
feelings are universalizable, at least in that they are connected to generalizable interests, and ethical 
feelings are connected to the preferences of persons or peoples, but not to the preferences of all 
possibly affected.  
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(III.3) Generalizable Interests & Moral Feeling 
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents the primary goods generally as those goods it would be 
rational to have regardless of one’s plan of life. The primary goods include: basic rights and liberties, 
freedom of movement, free choice among a wide variety of occupations, income and wealth, and the 
social bases of self-respect (Rawls, Justice as fairness: A restatement, 2001, pp. 57-9). Put differently, 
one has reason to value the primary goods regardless of one’s conception of the good. The primary 
goods are presented as sufficiently generalizable that, as goods, they could be the subject of an 
overlapping consensus. Nussbaum explicitly relates her account of the aim of politics as realizing 
capabilities for as many people as possible to Rawls' goal for politics as providing the primary goods 
(Nussbaum, Sex and social justice, 1999, p. 42). The capabilities include: life; bodily health; bodily 
integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; play; the ability to 
have concern for and live with other species and the environment; and control over one’s 
environment. On Nussbaum and the primary goods, Rutger Claassen writes:  
Given the fact that Nussbaum sees her capabilities as analogous to Rawlsian primary goods, it 
is quite surprising that Rawls has never received the same amount of criticism on his list of 
primary goods. I do not have an explanation for why the attempt to list primary goods has not 
been characterised as philosopher’s hubris while Nussbaum’s list has (Claassen, Making 
capability lists: Philosophy vs. democracy, 2011, p. 507n13). 
The explanation, it seems to me, is that Rawls only intended the primary goods to be part of a 
freestanding political account, and not to provide a universal basis for moral and political rights. This 
is precisely the sort of difference that Claassen elsewhere recognizes, in arguing that Nussbaum should 
turn to Gewirth’s method of justification and away from her more recent use of overlapping consensus as 
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a source of justification, whereas in Rawls it is connected with stability, and not at all with moral 
rightness:  
The fact that a theory is supported by an overlapping consensus does not justify its substantive 
correctness. The overlapping consensus was presented by Rawls in the context of a concern 
for stability, not for substantive correctness, of his doctrine of justice as fairness. Rawls wants 
to limit his theory in Political Liberalism to democratic countries with a constitutional regime. 
Both of these qualifications provide problems for Nussbaum, who aims at a universal theory 
which is not just stable, but also correct, and potentially applicable world-wide (Claassen & 
Düwell, The foundations of capability theory: Comparing Nussbaum and Gewirth, 2013, p. 
501). 
So, Rawls would reject that the existence of an overlapping consensus provided evidence of 
the moral rightness of the capabilities approach, as well as the idea that such a consensus could ground a 
political theory of justice. Habermas would attack Nussbaum’s other primary mode of justifying the 
capabilities approach, in partial agreement with Gould. Habermas argues that any such list of human 
needs given as grounding for human rights is problematically metaphysical, and that the rightness of 
norms is only established discursively and so not grounded in anything extra-discursive. What 
generalizable interests or needs there are among humans is itself a matter for collective discursive 
engagement, and so the interests or needs themselves cannot ground valid human rights norms. 
Habermas is an anti-realist about justice in this sense. 
In “Moral Objectivity and Reasonable Agreement: Can Realism Be Reconciled with Kantian 
Constructivism?” Cristina Lafont argues that Kantian constructivism generally and discourse ethics in 
particular depend implicitly on a background assumption concerning generalizable or fundamental 
human interests or needs, which involves at least a thin, formal account of the human. On this basis, 
Lafont argues for a moral realist version of discourse ethics and argues further that carefully 
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differentiating a realist account of justice from an anti-realist account of legitimacy is the right way to 
balance the realist and antirealist aspects of Kantian constructivism.  
Lafont sets up the debate in contemporary ethics as between realists, who assimilate moral 
judgments to cognitive, factual judgments, and anti-realists, who generally embrace expressivism, or, 
the position that our moral judgments merely express non-cognitive attitudes. Kantian constructivism, 
on Lafont’s reading, is opposed both to the common realist claim that moral judgments simply 
describe a moral order that is given independently of human practices, and to the usual anti-realist 
claim that moral judgments are non-cognitive. Lafont argues that Kantian constructivism is only 
coherent on the presupposition that there is some sort of (factual) homogeneity among at least some 
of the interests of those possibly affected by a norm, and specifically, homogeneity among “those 
basic interests and needs that are necessary to sustain their lives as rational beings” (Lafont, 2004, p. 
30). And it is this presupposition of generalizable interests that “gives prima facie plausibility to the 
claim that questions of justice can be answered by a procedure that will yield single answers,” which 
is necessary to the Kantian constructivist’s claim that moral questions are cognitive, and have objective 
answers (Lafont, 2004, p. 31). Still, such generalizable interests are simply interests humans actually 
have, and so, there is no need to posit queer entities, in Mackie’s sense, as moral facts not empirically 
given.  
Lafont shows that though theorized differently, some version of this assumption runs through 
the work of several prominent Kantian constructivists. John Rawls, for example, argues that for Kant 
himself, “the contradiction in the will test of the categorical imperative presupposes ‘that we have 
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such [generalizable] needs and that they are more or less the same for everyone’ ”.44 Lafont argues that 
in Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Rawls presents a view quite like her own:  
To prevent misunderstanding, I should add that Kant’s constructivism does not say that moral 
facts, much less all facts, are constructed. Rather a constructivist procedure provides principles 
and precepts that specify which facts about persons, institutions, and actions, and the world 
generally, are relevant in moral deliberation. Those norms specify which facts are to count as 
reasons. We should not say that the moral facts are constructed, since the idea of constructing 
facts seems odd and may be incoherent; by contrast, the idea of a constructivist procedure 
generating principles and precepts singling out the facts to count as reasons seems quite clear.45 
Still, Lafont acknowledges that, in Justice as Fairness, Rawls seems to drop out of meta-ethical debate 
entirely, and neither endorses a realist nor an anti-realist position in his theory of political justice, since 
either would seem to be a comprehensive doctrine of the sort that is not justifiable as a component 
of a freestanding political theory of justice (Lafont, 2004, p. 38n21).46 But, Rawls does assume the 
existence of generalizable interests, in the index of primary goods. T. M. Scanlon relies on an idea of 
important interests based on “‘commonly available information about what people have reason to want’,” 
which “translates into information about ‘generic reasons’ that everyone would have”.47 And lastly, 
according to Lafont, Habermas’ principle of universalization (U) implicitly assumes that there are 
generalizable interests. According the U, valid moral norms satisfy the condition that: 
 
44 Lafont 2004, 32; citing Rawls 2000, 174. 
45 Rawls 1999b, 516; cited in Lafont 2004, 37n17. 
46 For Habermas, justice is the central moral concept, and so, his theory of justice is of a quite different 
sort than Rawls’. 
47 Lafont 2004, 34; citing Scanlon 1998, 204. 
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All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are 
preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation) (Habermas J. , 1990, p. 65). 
On this principle: 
only those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons can accept the 
consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the 
satisfaction of everyone’s interests (Habermas J. , 1990, p. 65).  
Habermas’ discourse theory of morality is distinctive, among Kantian constructivisms, in viewing 
generalizable interests as only specifiable through moral discourses. Still, Lafont argues, for those 
interests to turn out, through moral discourse, to be universalizable, they must already be interests, 
pre-discursively. 
Importantly, the claim that “questions of justice only make sense under the assumption” that 
there are generalizable interests is quite thin (Lafont, 2004, p. 34). This is not a claim about what those 
interests are, as given, for example, by Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities list, nor does Lafont posit a 
quasi-foundational principle of justice, like Carol C. Gould’s ‘equal positive freedom’. Rather, the 
presupposition of generalizable interests is established in much the way Habermas establishes the 
presupposition of the existence of an objective physical world that is the same for everyone, without 
establishing thereby anything in particular about that world: 
As subjects capable of speech and action, language users must be able to ‘refer to something’ 
in the objective world from within the horizon of their shared lifeworld if they are to reach an 
understanding ‘about something’ in their practical dealings. Whether in communicating about 
states of affairs or in practical dealings with people and things, subjects can refer to something 
only if they start – each on her own, yet in agreement with everyone else – with a pragmatic 
presupposition. They presuppose ‘the world’ as the totality of independently existing objects that can be 
judged or dealt with. … To say that the world is ‘objective’ means that it is ‘given’ to us as ‘the 
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same for everyone’. It is linguistic practice – especially the use of singular terms – that forces us 
to pragmatically presuppose such a world shared by all. The referential system built into natural 
languages ensures that any given speaker can formally anticipate possible objects of reference. 
Through this formal presupposition of the world, communication about something in the 
world is intertwined with practical interventions in the world (Habermas J. , Truth and 
justification, 2003, p. 89; emphasis added). 
Analogously, Lafont, argues that our practices only make sense under the relevant presupposition:  
the assumption entails only the claim that there is an overlap of such interests among all 
rational human beings, but no further claims about what they may actually be. The minimal 
claim is thus that questions of justice make sense only under the assumption that there is such 
an overlap. In this sense, this claim can be seen as part of a conceptual argument. If we came 
to the conclusion that there are no generalizable interests among all human beings, it would 
no longer be meaningful to ask whether a norm is not merely good for some people and bad 
for others, but just or unjust for anyone. As a consequence, the unconditional meaning 
attached to our current use of the notion of justice would be necessarily lost. To claim that a 
norm is unjust would be tantamount to claiming that it is not good for some of us. And this, 
of course, would no longer be the kind of overriding claim that per se invalidates the rightness 
of a norm, as our current use of the term “unjust” implies. But as long as we can reasonably 
presuppose that there is an overlap of basic interests among all human beings our judgments 
about the justice of norms can already be objectively valid: If a norm protects those interests 
for everyone it is just, if it does not, it is unjust (Lafont, 2004, p. 34). 
Lafont argues that in order for there to be any valid moral claims – and as necessary to retain the 
cognitivism that is the hallmark of Kantian constructivisms generally and Habermas’ discourse theory 
in particular – we must formally anticipate the existence of universalizable interests, even if we need 
not anticipate that any particular interest is universalizable. Still, this interpretation of the discourse 
theory of morality is realist, in that moral claims are grounded in facts about human interests, even if 
justification is still achieved discursively. Put differently, we could be right about the validity of some 
norm, if it in fact protects generalizable interests, and still that norm could be inadequately discursively 
justified. Just as – for Habermas – we can only turn out to be wrong about something in the world, 
despite having adequately justified the relevant claim(s) under earlier epistemic conditions, on the 
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presupposition of an objective world not constructed by our practices, for Lafont, we can only turn 
out to be wrong about the validity of a moral claim that we have justified under earlier epistemic 
conditions on the presupposition that there are objective universalizable interests that are not 
constructed by our practices. 
The claim Lafont introduces, against Habermas, is that moral rightness – or synonymously, 
justness, or moral validity – is not constituted by our justificatory practices but is grounded in 
universalizable interests which much be presupposed by our moral practices. On both Scanlon’s view, 
that “moral judgments of right and wrong are ‘judgements about reasons and justification,’” and on 
Habermas’ view, that “[i]deal warranted assertibility ... exhausts the meaning of normative rightness,” 
moral validity or rightness does not refer beyond our justificatory practices, but is constituted by 
them.48 But since our “moral judgments seem hardly ever to be about cognitive disagreements, but 
first and foremost about violated interests and conflictive actions”, it might seem that Lafont’s 
position makes better sense of our ordinary moral practices than views like those of Habermas and 
Scanlon, on which ideal justification constitutes rightness.49  
Recall that Habermas holds a realist position on truth, but an anti-realist position on moral 
rightness. Put differently, truth is non-epistemic, but rightness is epistemic:  
 
48 Scanlon 1998, 4; cited in Lafont 2004, 43; Habermas 2003b, 248. 
49 Lafont 2004, 43. “To paraphrase the usual objection in terms of Russell’s concern with emotivism, 
it just seems hard to believe that all [that] is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I cannot justify it” 
(Lafont 2004, 43  
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Ideally warranted assertibility is what we mean by moral validity; ... it exhausts the meaning of 
normative rightness itself as the worthiness of recognition. ... A norm’s ideal warranted 
assertibility – unlike that of a justification-transcendent claim to truth – does not refer beyond 
the boundaries of discourse to something that might “exist” independently of having been 
determined to be worthy of recognition. The justification-immanence of “rightness” is based 
on a semantic argument: Since the “validity” of a norm consists in that it would be accepted, 
that is, recognized as valid, under ideal conditions of justification, “rightness” is an epistemic 
concept (Habermas J. , Truth and justification, 2003, p. 258).50 
Cristina Lafont argues that generalizable interests ground moral claims. Lafont focuses on the discourse-
independence of these generalizable interests, as necessitating moral realism (Lafont, 2004, p. 33). Put 
differently, Lafont argues that rightness is not an epistemic concept. Against Cristina Lafont’s argument 
for a moral realist reading of discourse ethics, grounded by generalizable interests, Habermas argues 
that the basis for moral claims is the idea of a future well-ordered world that we ought to construct, 
an idea that is itself discursively constructed. Habermas argues that interests are open to discursive 
(re)interpretation, and so, are not really pre-discursively “there”. Further, Habermas argues that the 
“web of moral feelings” is only accessible from the perspective of participants in a lifeworld, and that 
our commitment to a lifeworld is ineluctable, at least from the participant perspective (Habermas J. , 
Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics, 1993, p. 47). Within a lifeworld, rightness 
signifies legitimately ordered social relations: 
[A]ssertoric statements used in constative speech acts appear to be related to facts as normative 
statements used in regulative speech acts are related to legitimately ordered interpersonal relations. 
The truth of propositions seems to signify the existence of states of affairs in much the same 
way as the rightness of actions signifies the observance of norms (Habermas J. , Moral 
consciousness and communicative action, 1990, pp. 59-60; emphasis added). 
 
50 Habermas explicitly abandons his earlier coherence conception of truth in Truth and Justification, but 
already seemed to be moving away from it in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990).  
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[C]laims to rightness...[refer] to something in the shared social world (as the totality of 
legitimately regulated interpersonal relationships of a social group) (Habermas J. , Moral 
consciousness and communicative action, 1990, p. 59).  
Against Lafont, Habermas argues that some future world of well-ordered relations (that we ought to 
construct) is the referent of moral claims, but that such an ideal construction is in no way pre-
discursive.  
Unlike for claims to truth, pragmatic failure of our normative beliefs does not occur because 
the objective world, presupposed to be the same for all, fails to fit our beliefs. Rather, pragmatic failure 
results from normative dissensus in the lifeworld:   
[M]oral beliefs do not falter against the resistance of an objective world that all participants 
suppose to be one and the same. Rather, they falter against the irresolubility of normative 
dissensus among opposing parties in a shared social world (Habermas J. , Truth and justification, 
2003, p. 256; emphasis added). 
Corroboration does not occur in a practice that can be readily differentiated from discourse. 
Rather it takes place from the outset in the linguistic medium of communication – even though 
people first ‘feel’ the consequences of moral injury (Habermas J. , Truth and justification, 2003, 
p. 256; emphasis added). 
Habermas seems right that we come to know that the justification of our beliefs is less secure than we 
might have thought in a different way, with respect to truth claims or rightness claims. Pragmatic 
failure in coping with the objective world and in the lifeworld seem to be distinct. Further, Habermas 
seems right that the fact that we do not have to determine which valid truth claim to apply in context 
differentiates truth-oriented discourses from moral discourses, wherein we still must determine which 
valid norm is appropriate in context. But the need to re-examine beliefs because of failure of 
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corroboration already implies that what is at issue is the justification for our moral beliefs, but not 
necessarily the rightness or wrongness of those beliefs. 
Further, Habermas allows that we first “feel” the consequences of moral injury. He seems to 
allow moral feeling to play an evidentiary role, in fact: 
When there is no restitution for the initial injury, our unambiguous reaction will harden into 
smouldering resentment. This enduring emotion lays bare the moral dimension hidden in 
every insult. Unlike fright or rage, which are immediate responses to an injury as it occurs, 
resentment is a response to the disgraceful wrong done to one by another. Resentment is an 
expression, albeit a relatively powerless one, of moral condemnation (Habermas J. , Moral 
consciousness and communicative action, 1990, p. 45).51 
Habermas makes this evidentiary role explicit in analogizing the function of feelings in moral 
justification and the function of perceptions in theoretical justification:  
Feelings seem to have a similar function for the moral justification of action as sense 
perceptions have for the theoretical justification of facts (Habermas J. , Moral consciousness 
and communicative action, 1990, p. 47).  
An elaborate moral argument is related to the web of moral feelings and attitudes as a 
theoretical argument is to the stream of perceptions (Habermas J. , Moral consciousness and 
communicative action, 1990, p. 51). 
Habermas argues that the sensory experiences of that world that provide evidence correspond to the 
moral feelings that give reason to (re)enter normative discourse, just as failure in dealing with the 
 
51 This passage occurs in a discussion of P.F. Strawson’s “linguistic phenomenology of ethical 
consciousness”, though Strawson’s work is used – as is often Habermas’ strategy – to present his own 
position. Perhaps surprisingly, Habermas cites Friedrich Nietzsche as also having seen a “genetic link 
between the ressentiment of those who have been injured or insulted and a universal morality of 
sympathy” (Habermas 1990, 109n6).  




Ethical Validity  120 
physical world motivates entering truth-oriented discourses. This is our second analogy, however: 
Habermas first argues that the idea a future world of well-ordered relations plays a role in moral 
discourses analogous to the role played by the idea of an objective world in theoretical discourses. But 
even if Habermas is right in arguing, against Lafont, that there’s nothing for legitimately ordered 
interpersonal relations to be, above and beyond the redeemable validity claims we make about such 
relations, it is far from obvious that there is nothing for our moral feelings to be, above and beyond 
the redeemable validity claims we make, as moral feelings play a role analogous to sense perceptions. 
Moral feelings indicate what a future world of legitimately ordered social relations would require. 
Habermas’ anti-realist position on moral rightness is in tension with his view that there can be “moral 
injury” prior to discursive justification of the moral norm according to which one’s feelings could be 
understood as moral. Rather, it seems more apt to claim at most that the moral injury is connected to 
a moral claim that we have yet to adequately justify, perhaps, but which could turn out to be right.  
The conception of moral feeling, internal to Habermas’ account, suggests that while his 
account of moral justification is plainly epistemic, and discursively produced, his account of moral 
rightness is not epistemic in the same sense, but rather, depends on a reference to extra-discursive felt 
experiences in the life-world, just as theoretical discourses depend on reference to extra-discursive 
sense experiences which, ex hypothesi, refer to the same independently existing physical world. Though 
Habermas takes experiences of moral feeling to play an evidentiary role analogous to sense experience 
in truth-oriented discourses, he generally underplays the significance of this evidentiary role. Still, 
although moral feeling is not independent of subjects, and so not objective in that sense, it is 
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independent of normative discourses, as moral feelings are not (only) discursively produced in the way 
that normative justification is, according to Habermas. Therefore, unlike a future world of well-
ordered relations that we ought to construct according to the deliverances of normative discourses, 
Habermas’ stated correlate in normative discourses to the independently existing world which must 
be presupposed in truth-oriented discourses), moral feeling is independent of discourse in a significant 
sense. Habermas’ phenomenology of intersubjective moral feeling plays a more significant role in his 
discourse theory than is usually recognized, and this phenomenology suggests that his account of 
moral validity is not wholly epistemic. 
 
(III.4) The Ethical Feeling of Hope 
In “To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning Without God Is a Futile Undertaking: 
Reflections on a Remark of Max Horkheimer,” Habermas objects to Max Horkheimer’s “profound 
skepticism concerning reason,” which leads to Horkheimer’s praise of “the dark writers of the 
bourgeoisie for having ‘trumpeted far and wide the impossibility of deriving from reason any 
fundamental argument against murder’ ” (Habermas J. , Justification and application: Remarks on 
discourse ethics, 1993, p. 134). Habermas writes: “I have to admit that this remark irritates me now 
no less than it did almost four decades ago when I first read it” (Habermas J. , Justification and 
application: Remarks on discourse ethics, 1993, p. 134). Habermas’ “irritation”, here expressed 
perhaps only as a psychological motivation toward the development of a post-metaphysical 
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conception of communicative reason that is not “equally indifferent to morality and immorality”, 
suggests what he takes to be a deeper – and not merely personal and psychological – imperative:  
…that we have some sort of intellectual ground, even if only a quasi-transcendental one, in 
order to counter irrationalism and the moral barbarism that follows in its wake (Aboulafia, 
Bookman, & Kemp, p. 4).  
In conversation with Mitchell Aboulafia, Habermas has suggested that the most difficult aspect of his 
philosophy to defend is his quasi-transcendentalism, and that the problem that makes defense of this 
quasi-transcendentalism imperative is the Holocaust. The Holocaust, then, is the real problem that 
motivates Habermas’ turn to Kant, and his effort to theorize a detranscendentalized a priori that can 
serve post-metaphysical reason, operating under conditions of methodological agnosticism, as support 
for morality: we must have rational grounds for countering moral barbarism.  
In Knowledge and Human Interests (1971), Habermas appeared more open to utopian possibilities 
arising from a rather different philosophical anthropology, an anthropology that has progressively 
been eclipsed in his movement toward formalism and proceduralism, or as he often frames it, his 
retreat from Hegel back to Kant. Consider Habermas’ expression of hope in this passage: 
Moral insights effectively bind the will only when they are embedded in an ethical self-
understanding that joins the concern about one’s own well-being with the interest in justice ... 
Theories of justice that have been uncoupled from ethics can only hope that processes of 
socialization and political forms of life meet them halfway (Habermas J. , Truth and 
justification, 2003, p. 4; emphasis added).52 
 
52 This ‘uncoupling’ occasions Habermas’ formalist account of morality and his procedural account of 
legitimacy. 
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Perhaps, Habermas is suggesting what we may yet hope, in claiming that the uncoupling of ethical 
world-views from theories of justice still permits us to hope that social and political forms of life will 
meet theories of justice based in universal morality halfway, inculcating the individual motivation and 
collective solidarity necessary to realize a just society. Perhaps, though, the claim is stronger: perhaps, 
rather than claiming that we may hope for support from background social and political forms of life, 
Habermas could be read as claiming that we must hope for such support, in that we cannot do 
otherwise. This reading accords nicely with the imperative driving Habermas’ project more broadly: if 
we must have grounds for countering moral barbarism, and the only possible support would come 
from ethical forms of life that cannot be universally justified, then we must hope that ethical forms of 
life provide the necessary support. 
Although Habermas explicitly rejects Kant’s postulate arguments concerning the existence of 
a divine being and an immortal soul, this imperative guiding Habermas’ work is not unlike the 
motivation driving the formulation of Immanuel Kant’s postulates of reason (Habermas J. , Religion 
and rationality: Essays on reason, god, and modernity, 2002, pp. 78-82). On Onora O’Neill’s reading, 
Kant defends both an account of reasonable hope and of reasonable faith, giving an account of hope 
and faith within the bounds of reason. Reasonable faith is content-rich, and includes the postulates of 
God and immortality as substantive beliefs, which serve as reasonable answers to the question “What 
may we hope?” Reasonable hope, though, is “merely formal, or negative, unlike more determinate hopes 
for God and immortality or for specific modes of historical progress,” leaving open “the possibility 
that hopes for human destiny may be articulated in social, political, and historical, this-worldly terms 
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rather than in other-worldly terms” (O'Neill, Kant on reason and religion, 1997, pp. 289, 303). What 
we must hope, on O’Neill’s reading, is that morally right action is not pointless: 
All that Kant argues is that we must postulate, assume, hope for the possibility that our moral 
commitments are not futile: we must hope for the possibility of inserting the moral intention 
into the world. This bare structure of hope – the canon of hope – can be expressed in a range 
of vocabularies (O'Neill, Kant on reason and religion, 1997, p. 304; emphasis added).53  
We must hope that right action is not futile, for example, or more substantively, we must hope that 
right action might lead to happiness. But with reference to any more substantive object of hope, or to 
substantive answers to the question “What may I hope?”, Kant theorizes a sort of faith or belief that 
is neither held without any convincing reasons, as in the case of mere opining, nor objectively defensible, 
as in knowing, but which is held for reasons that are subjectively convincing: 
Between opinion and knowledge Kant places Glaube, whose obvious translation would be 
belief or faith, and which he characterises as holding something for reasons that are objectively 
insufficient but subjectively sufficient (O'Neill, Kant on reason and religion, 1997, p. 280). 
Habermas, then, could be read as suggesting an answer to Kant’s third question: we have reason to 
hope that ethical forms of life will provide the necessary support. Still, Habermas does seem to stop 
short of taking this to be an answer to the stronger question: “What must we hope?” It seems, though, 
that he does think that we must have rational grounds for countering moral barbarism. 
 
53 O’Neill refers to answers to the question “What must we hope?” as the canon of reasoned faith; by 
contrast, any answer to the question “What may we hope?” is one possible organon of reasoned faith; 
all possible answers to the latter question must incorporate the “canon of reasoned faith”, on O’Neill’s 
reading (O’Neill 1997, 303). Kant’s three questions, answering to all the interests of reason, are: “What 
can I know?”, “What ought I to do?”, and “What may I hope?” (Kant 1998, 667). 
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 I argue that Habermas’ architectonic depends on an at least under-theorized ethical 
standpoint. That is, ethical claims are associated with a level of analysis that is neither (a) merely 
subjective: e.g. my contingent emotions, now; nor (b) morally normative: e.g. human rights; nor (c) 
objectively descriptive: e.g. Realist descriptions of the balance of power between institutional actors. 
We must believe that there are rational grounds for countering moral barbarism, and given current 
conditions, the only hope seems to be the intersubjective justification of moral claims paired with a 
background support provided by forms of life that socialize persons with the necessary motivations, 
support that we can only hope will be forthcoming. But the motivation to resolve dissensus 
discursively cannot be understood as itself a moral motivation. Rather, it must be an ethical one. 
However, as discussed in Chapter One, it seems that if Habermas were committed to a pre-
discursive distinction between normative standpoints, he would be violating the terms of his own 
post-metaphysical project, in a way that would appear to leave him open to the core objection he raises 
against John Rawls, in “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason”: Habermas argues that 
Rawls pre-determines what must be left to participants in actual discourses (Habermas J. , Inclusion 
of the other: Studies in political theory, 1998, p. 57). Habermas accuses Rawls of deciding 
monologically what must be left to dialogical controversy: “What Rawls in fact prejudges is the 
distinction between modern and premodern forms of consciousness, between ‘reasonable’ and 
‘dogmatic’ interpretations” [ (Habermas J. , Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics, 
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1993, p. 95); (Habermas J. , Inclusion of the other: Studies in political theory, 1998, p. 57)].54 The 
problem for Habermas is not dogmatism per se. This is not all that surprising since on Habermas’ 
account discourses occur against the background of the non-problematic naïve “Platonism of the life-
world”. That is, on Habermas’ view we ordinarily operate with many background assumptions that 
are not justified, and this only becomes a cause for concern when we encounter resistance or 
experience pragmatic failures of coping, where either the physical world or others in our social world 
“resist” the truth or rightness of our background assumptions. Habermas’ concern more broadly is 
with fundamentalism, rather than dogmatism, where fundamentalism entails efforts to coerce those 
to whom the relevant actions could not (as yet) be justified. Habermas’ distinction between dogmatism 
and fundamentalism is instructive: both involve believing based on reasons not amenable to general 
or universal acceptance, but only fundamentalism involves demanding “even to the point of violence” 
that others believe likewise, based on reasons they could reasonably reject (Habermas J. , Between 
naturalism and religion, 2008, p. 10). Habermas is critical of fundamentalism, but not necessarily of 
dogmatism. Against Rawls, Habermas argues that it cannot be determined a priori that the cognitive 
contents of various dogmatic religious doctrines are irrational, or even that such contents are not 
universalizable. But this means that deciding in advance that religious beliefs or ethical values, neither 
of which are as yet publicly justified, should be excluded from public debate, is itself a fundamentalistic 
 
54 I am not concerned here with whether Habermas’ reading of Rawls on this point is correct, though 
I am not sure that it is, only with his criticism of pre-discursive decision about the extension of 
categories.  
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decision, as this seems to justify coercive constraints on public debate that are not themselves 
justifiable to those so constrained.  
Further, Habermas defends – contra Rawls – a reciprocal, symmetrical duty to work toward 
translation into generally acceptable terms whatever elements turn out (empirically, historically) to be 
amenable to such translation. The “duty of translation” is defended on several grounds, starting from 
Habermas’ commitment to not pre-discursively assessing the (ir)rationality of that which might yet 
provide new normative resources. Then, there is the inability of a post-metaphysical reconstruction of 
the moral point of view to address issues of motivation. Further, there is the fact that, according to 
Habermas, “liberal political orders remain dependent upon solidarity among their citizens, a solidarity 
whose sources could dry up as a result of an ‘uncontrolled’ secularization of society as a whole”.55 So, 
given that solidarity is the necessary reverse face of justice, and yet is unenforceable, any new 
normative resources that could be provided by such translation would be helpful given the 
motivational weakness of post-metaphysical reason, whereas simply prohibiting the use of religious or 
ethical reasons in public debate might exacerbate the dissolution of whatever solidarity remains. 
Habermas gives genealogies of the concept of ‘human dignity’ and of the paired concepts of 
‘justice’ and ‘solidarity’ as arising from a Hebrew morality of justice and a Christian ethics of love, 
which exemplify such translation. Habermas’ rational reconstruction of the genealogy of the rational 
 
55 On solidarity, see: Habermas 1996, 102, 110-13, 142-3; see also: “Fundamentalism and Terror”, 
Habermas 2006a; Habermas 2003a, 114; “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of 
Human Rights”, Habermas 2012; Habermas 1992, 51; Habermas 1992, 145; Habermas 1998, 8. 
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contents of modernity is explicitly incomplete, although arguably, as rational reconstruction, 
Habermas’ genealogy is only intended to show a possible history of the cognitive contents of 
“modernity”, and further, his view seems to require that alternative genealogies be constructible, 
because: 
non-Western cultures must appropriate the universalistic content of human rights with their 
own resources and in their own interpretation, ones that establishes a convincing connection 
to local experiences and interests [ (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 35); see also: 
(Habermas J. , The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights, 2012)].  
Azizah al-Hibri, for example, offers a Qur’an-based argument for women’s human rights, and argues 
that the Qur’an provides an earlier genealogical source for the moral equality of women than is available 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition (al-Hibri, 1997). Enrique Dussel argues that Bartolomé de las Casas’ 
conception of “consensus populi” provides a substantially earlier theorization of intersubjective 
legitimation, suggesting a quite different genealogy of critical reason than that given by Habermas, 
tracing the genealogy of the project of critical reason not to Kant’s first efforts at rational translation, 
but to antihegemonic counter-discourse based in the indigenous Peruvian experience of domination 
at the hands of the Spanish encomenderos [ (Dussel, Twenty theses on politics, 2008, p. 15); (Dussel, The 
underside of modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the philosophy of liberation, 1999, pp. 
41n40, 152n36)]. But Habermas intends to leave space for alternative genealogies of this sort and is 
only concerned to show that claims that might now be seen as rationally justifiable are conceivably 
themselves translations of elements of traditional religious and ethical ways of life that – on Habermas’ 
reading – Rawls would pre-emptively exclude from public debate. 
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Enrique Dussel, like Habermas in The Future of Human Nature, is concerned with the “biological 
trajectory of the human species”, though Dussel’s formulation of the problem – “the collective murder 
and suicide that humanity is headed toward” – is quite different from Habermas’:  
Ethics of Liberation seeks to think through [the] real and concrete ethical situation in which the 
majority of humanity is immersed ... as we hurtle toward a tragic conflagration on a scale that 
is unprecedented in the biological trajectory of the human species (Dussel, Ethics of liberation: 
In the age of globalization and exclusion, 2013, p. xvi). 
Responding to Habermas, Dussel writes:  
In these texts we can see, clearly, what I call eurocentrism ... In first place, Habermas situates 
in time the beginning of this ‘counterdiscourse’: there at the beginning stands Kant ... Yet, in 
historical reality, from a non-eurocentric point of view of modernity ... this counter-discourse is 
already five centuries old: it began on the Hispaniola Island when Antón de Montesinos 
attacked the injustices that were being carried out against the Indians, and from there it reached 
the classrooms of Salamanca (since it is there that the critique of 1514 is continued with the 
theoretical and practical labor of Bartolomé de las Casas, and it is there also where this counter-
discourse will be expressed in the university lectures of Francisco de Vitoria concerning De 
indiis) (Dussel, The underside of modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the philosophy 
of liberation, 1999, p. 135). 
In part, Habermas might simply respond that the genealogy he offers of critical reason is only one of 
many that might be constructed, and that it is explicitly a reconstruction from within culturally located 
perspective. Only to the extent that Habermas is understood as giving a history of critical reason would 
this form of eurocentrism – and in a sense, Habermas is intentionally adopting a eurocentric 
perspective in giving genealogical accounts – be as problematic as it seems to Dussel. I do not mean 
to underestimate the discursive effects, under persisting conditions of global white supremacy, of a 
white German philosopher giving a Eurocentric genealogical account of the cognitive contents of 




Ethical Validity  130 
modernity even if from within an explicitly adopted European perspective. I only aim to point out 
that this exercise, properly understood, is different from a history of the same.  
Still, Habermas persists in viewing what he terms ‘multiple modernities’ as merely modernities 
of different speeds, with our type of society at the head of the curve and others playing catch-up, a 
totalizing move with a rich history in colonial thought. Linda Martín Alcoff writes:  
Both Leopoldo Zea and Enrique Dussel have written about the ways in which the western 
notion of reason is Eurocentric and was used from the beginning of the Conquest to judge 
the humanity of the Indians ... [T]he practices of other cultures cannot be understood in their 
alterity so they are portrayed as inferior copies or less mature developments of European 
forms of rationality. In this way, (purportedly) universal standards and articulations of 
rationality serve colonial and neocolonial policies by providing a uniform yardstick for 
measuring uneven development [ (Alcoff, Visible identities: Race, gender, and the self, 2006, 
p. 274); see: (Dussel, Eurocentrism and modernity (Introduction to the Frankfurt lectures), 
1993, p. 36)]. 
Neither Dussel nor Alcoff present a radical critique of reason as necessarily Eurocentric, nor of all 
universality as presumptively neocolonial. Rather, the argument is that in reconstructing a history of 
reason, European philosophers have often used the reconstructed conceptual map to then situate non-
European cultures somewhere in the history of Europe. 
Habermas himself is generally critical of taking the perspective of one’s culture as the 
perspective, for example, in arguing, following the illegal invasion of Iraq (2003), that “the normative 
authority of the United States of America lies in ruins,” due to what he views as a temporal reversion 
to the imperial logic suited to the Roman Empire: “The ‘universalism’ of the ancient empires was 
[such that t]hey perceived the world beyond the indistinct horizon of their frontiers from a perspective 
centered on their own worldview” (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, p. 35). Habermas is critical 
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of the ‘universalism’ of the United States because, in invading Iraq illegally, the U.S. seems to be taking 
its own ethical worldview as universal. Still, in performing the critique, Habermas finds it necessary to 
present the problematic case as located in the (ancient) history of reason, though here, it is not a neo-
colonial other presented in this manner, but the one remaining super-power.  
Consider Habermas’ discussion of political ethics and revolutionary morality: 
[There are frequent cases] where material living conditions and social structures are such that 
moral-practical implications spring immediately to the eye and moral questions are answered, without 
further reflection, by the bare facts of poverty, abuse, and degradation. Wherever this is the case, 
wherever existing conditions make a mockery of the demands of universalist morality, moral 
issues turn into issues of political ethics. How can a political practice designed to realize the 
conditions necessary for a dignified human existence be morally justified? The kind of politics 
at issue is one that aims at changing a form of life from moral points of view, though it is not 
reformist and therefore cannot operate in accordance with existing laws and institutions. The 
issue of revolutionary morality (which incidentally has never been satisfactorily discussed by 
Marxists, Eastern or Western) is fortunately not an urgent one in our type of society (Habermas J. , 
Moral consciousness and communicative action, 1990, p. 208; emphasis added). 
Habermas’ assertion that the problem of revolutionary morality is not urgent in our type of society 
suggests that at least in 1990 he had not taken sufficiently seriously the normative significance of the 
interrelation between the global North and the global South, and the interdependence of the multiple 
modernities experienced in what Habermas considers our type of societies and in those not 
recognizing the “civilizing constraints” with which Habermas later sees the United States as breaking: 
What distinguishes the neoconservatives from the ‘realist’ school of international relations is 
the vision of an American global political order that has definitively broken with the reformist 
program of UN human rights policy. Although this vision does not betray the liberal goals, it 
shatters the civilizing constraints which the UN Charter, with good reason, has placed on the 
means of realizing these goals (Habermas J. , The divided west, 2006, pp. 27-8; emphasis 
added).  
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It seems to me that what Habermas considers the problem of revolutionary morality can only be taken 
to not be a pressing issue in “our type of society” to the extent that one insufficiently reflects on the 
historical dependence of European modernity on colonial practices, slavery, and genocide, and the 
relevant persisting economic and political structures [See: (Pogge, 2005) (Mills, 2017)]. The point is 
not only that these things happened, and that European modernity has dirty hands, but that European 
modernity was – and is – structurally dependent on such practices, which leaves the question of 
political ethics – of how to alter existing conditions to better realize the demands of universal morality, 
where presently there is insufficient institutional support – a far more open question than Habermas 
sometimes recognizes, at least because it requires an ethics. I suggest that Habermas’ ethics of the species 
fits his description of revolutionary morality, as a political ethics concerned with changing a form of 
life.56 
Recall that Habermas uses a functional argument to defend the procedure of discursive 
justification, and that discourse is foundational only in the limited sense that we have no alternative as 
a mode of coming to an agreement with others in language, or, of settling disagreement consensually 
(Habermas J. , Truth and justification, 2003, p. 11). Both Raïner Forst and Karl-Otto Apel object to 
Habermas’ functional argument [ (Forst, The right to justification, 2012) (Apel, 2002)]. Forst modifies 
discourse ethics such that there is a moral right to justification, and Apel argues that discourse ethics 
must be supplemented with a teleological “Part B,” though for Apel, this teleological “Part B” is also 
 
56 ...or, as here, with resisting the changing of a form of life, which bears comparison with Habermas’ 
objection to the “revolutionary” stance of Bush Administration (Habermas 2006, 27). 
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properly moral rather than ethical, as Apel thinks there is a universalizable good toward which our 
actions and institution-building ought to tend (Apel, 2002, p. 200). Habermas counters that a moral 
justification of morality is incoherent – or, problematically metaphysical – and that under conditions 
of post-metaphysical thought, following the disconnecting of theories of justice and ethical 
worldviews, no valid answer can be given to the question “Why be moral, at all?” (Habermas J. , 
Between naturalism and religion, 2008, pp. 77-97). Any transcendental understanding of the a priori 
conditions of practice can no longer claim the full universality and necessity to which Kant aspired, 
and these transcendental conditions can no longer be conceived as noumenal, but rather must be 
conceived as inner-worldly (Habermas J. , Truth and justification, 2003, pp. 18-19). A 
postmetaphysical theory of justice must depend on socialization into ethical and/or religious forms of 
life that ‘meet it halfway,’ leaving no way to rationally reconstruct evaluative criteria for assessing better 
or worse forms of life except from within the relevant worldviews of various ethical and/or religious 
traditions.57 Ethical and/or religious values are not capable – without some sort of “translation” – of 
being generally accepted in inclusive actual discourses, so, according to Habermas there is no ethical 
validity claim, and yet, moral norms depend upon socialization into at best arational forms of life to 
motivate moral action. 
 
57 For Habermas, ethical and religious worldviews are arational (rather than necessarily irrational), 
including the major world religions, but also, Aristotelian ethics, for example. However, to be clear, 
Habermas does not simply conflate ethical and religious worldviews. On socialization: “The 
disposition to act responsibly is contingent on processes of socialization and the degree of success in 
identity formation. But an identity cannot be produced by argument ... The extent to which rational 
motives actually influence action depends on the individuals, the circumstances, the interest positions, 
and the institutions involved” (Habermas 1993, 128). 
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In the face of what he takes to be the threat of “liberal eugenics”, Habermas’ agnosticism 
about ethics seems to shift. Habermas’ core concern in The Future of Human Nature is the possibility 
that liberal eugenics, governed only by market imperatives and free consumer choice, might undermine 
a necessary pre-condition for achieving the moral point of view. Still, Habermas also argues that liberal 
eugenics would not violate valid moral norms, given that such interventions would be performed on 
pre-personal human life, and not on persons who could participate in discourses. Raïner Forst objects 
to Habermas’ claim that “[n]o argument from the moral language game itself can be mustered against 
a eugenic self-instrumentalization of the human species which changes the very rules of the game,” as 
according to Forst, with this move Habermas is no longer operating within a formalist architectonic 
(Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, pp. 71n58, 92). Really, this amounts to the same 
objection Forst lodged against Habermas’ functional argument, in that Habermas is here only arguing 
that morality cannot itself be morally defended, or, that a moral right to moral justification is 
incoherent.  
I agree with Forst that Habermas’ architectonic is changed by his defense of an ethics of the 
species, but I do not think that he must drop the formalism and commit to a substantive ethical 
position just yet. I also agree with Forst that Habermas’ functional argument gives rather weaker 
support than seems to be needed, but more importantly, I think that the same argument could be 
understood rather differently, as an ethical argument, with ethics situated in a different place in the 
architectonic. Forst argues that formal accounts of ethical life, and particularly Axel Honneth’s ethical 
formalism, face a dilemma, either being so formal as to collapse into procedural morality or insufficiently 
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universalizable and so risking paternalism.58 It seems to me that an analysis in terms of the necessary 
preconditions of morality suggests general values which might be as justifiable with reasons most could 
accept, and which would not thereby collapse into moral norms. It seems that these necessary 
preconditions have a status not unlike the presuppositions implicit in the practice of discursive 
communication, which are not morally normative for Habermas, though perhaps, they might also be 
understood as unavoidable ethical presuppositions. 
I argue that Habermas' necessary pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action are 
those of a particular – if generalizable – form of life. As such, there is a worldview in discourse ethics, 
which takes the form of necessary preconditions of the moral point of view, much like the values put 
forward in Habermas’ ethics of the species. However, this means that, as Habermas himself 
maintains, these 'necessary presuppositions' are not moral oughts, and yet, contra Habermas, they are 
worth valuing. Put differently, Habermas argues that the necessary pragmatic presuppositions are 
 
58 Forst 2011, 73. Axel Honneth develops a formal conception of ethical life in terms of recognitive 
ethics (Honneth 1996, “Intersubjective Conditions for Personal Integrity: A Formal Conception of 
Ethical Life”, 171-9). In The Future of Human Nature, Habermas takes up the problematic of 
instrumentalization that was central to the early Frankfurt School (e.g. Horkheimer and Adorno’s The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment), and to Georg Lukács (History and Class Consciousness), whose concept of 
reification was recently reinterpreted by Axel Honneth, and rather more literally than usual: “Unlike 
the notion of ‘instrumentalization’ [of the sort that worries Habermas, on my reading], reification 
presupposes that we completely fail to perceive the characteristics that make [some] persons into 
instances of the human species in any true sense” (Honneth 2012b, 148). Honneth gives examples 
that include the wartime atrocities and genocides of the last century, but denies that capitalist 
exploitation/alienation involves reification, or even that slavery does, since wage slavery and actual slavery 
both depend on the human qualities of those instrumentalized. Nonetheless, for Honneth, reification, 
like the self-instrumentalization of human nature that concerns Habermas, disrupts a “necessary 
presupposition of our social lifeworld” (Ibid. 149).  
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justified functionally, and I argue that the presuppositions are neither moral nor merely functionally 
justified but are properly ethical. This implies an ethical obligation to enter discourse, connected with an 
at best generalizable though not universalizable form of life. Further, it seems that the status of these 
necessary preconditions, which are indirectly confirmable via empirical work, have a status not unlike 
the presuppositions implicit in the practice of discursive communication, which are not morally 
normative for Habermas. I argue that the necessary presuppositions of communicative action might 
be better understood as unavoidable ethical presuppositions. 
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Dissertation Conclusion  
 
 
In this dissertation, I have argued that discourse theory requires an ethical goodness claim, 
that Jürgen Habermas implicitly depends upon an ethical worldview, and that we have good reasons 
to see some ethical values as more defensible than others. Nonetheless, this is at best the start of a 
larger project. In this conclusion, I will first summarize my arguments thus far. Then, I will consider 
a particular case, with the aim of clarifying the distinctions I have defended. And finally, I will say a 
bit about my plans for future work, building off this dissertation. 
 
 
(1) Overview of Dissertation 
(1.a) Chapter One: Ethical Validity 
 
In the first chapter, “Ethical Validity”, I started with reflections on Habermas’ work following 
Knowledge and Human Interests, during the period he was beginning to develop the Theory of Communicative 
Action (and well before he developed his discourse theory of law and democracy). During that period, 
Habermas occasionally appeared concerned about the proceduralism toward which his work 
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increasingly tended. I pointed out that the structure of the concern is isomorphic with the concern 
Habermas expresses with respect to the possibility of our genetic inheritance being left to the market: 
that since he has argued that we can only justify moral claims discursively under certain rather exacting 
conditions, his own view is lacking in resources to address a possible future in which “liberal eugenics” 
undermines the preconditions necessary for achieving the moral point of view. That is, just as we 
cannot say that we have a moral obligation to settle conflict discursively, we likewise cannot say we 
have a moral obligation to proscribe liberal eugenics. 
My core concern in the rest of the first chapter is to work through the implications of the 
moves Habermas makes as a result of this concern, ultimately arguing that the “ethics of the species” 
that Habermas puts forward is itself a normative ethics, and no longer purely a meta-ethics, as had 
been given in his discourse theory of morality.59 My argument in Chapter Two parallels the argument 
of this chapter, though there the focus will be on the discourse theory of law and democracy rather 
than, as here, the discourse theory of morality. In the first two sections of the chapter, I develop a 
reading of Habermas’ discourse theory of morality. In the first section, I start by offering a general 
overview of the distinctive features of Habermas’ discourse approach to morality, arguing that the 
justification of moral norms must, for Habermas, proceed discursively, and further, that this feature 
of his approach is what most decisively distinguishes it from Rawlsian approaches, which on 
Habermas’ understanding depend on monological justificatory strategies. Perhaps reasoning alone one 
 
59 Raïner Forst, analogously, argues that with this move Habermas leaves the realm of deontological 
morality (Habermas J. , The future of human nature, 2003, p. 125n58). 
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could achieve subjective practical certainty, but not moral justification. At best, such solitary reasoning 
might be a useful way of preparing for discursive engagement with others. In moral discourses, the 
aim – according to Habermas – is consensus on the rightness of some norm under consideration. 
Rightness is the validity claim at stake in moral discourses, analogous to the truth claim at stake in 
theoretical discourses. Rightness is epistemic in that it is entirely an achievement of our discursive 
practices, that is, of trying to come to an understanding with others in language. In concluding the 
first section, I lay out the basic feature of discourse as a practice, which depends on ideals which are 
implicit in actual discourses, such as the egalitarian communicative ideal of inclusion. I take pains to 
make clear that this ideal governing discourse is not itself a moral norm, but rather is one of several 
necessary pragmatic presuppositions of discourse as a practice. Basically, just taking this 
presupposition, we could not take any agreement discursively achieved as justified if we have excluded 
some persons from participation. So, in this way the pragmatic presuppositions of discourse are 
functionally or pragmatically justified, and not morally justified. For Habermas, claiming otherwise 
would involve one in a vicious circularity. It seems clear, then, that Habermas is offering something 
akin to a metaethics, concerning how we justify moral norms, or as he more often frames his project, 
he has retreated from substantive normative content to formal analysis of the situation of discourse. 
In the second section, I argue that Habermas’ distinction between morality and ethics is best 
read as a formal, epistemic distinction. Since Habermas’ prose at times suggests otherwise, implying 
that there is substantive difference between the sorts of things that are norms and the sorts of things 
that are values, I spend some time laying this out clearly. Still, I believe this is an uncontroversial 
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reading of Habermas’ account of the morality/ethics distinction. Basically, moral norms are, 
descriptively, those normative items that purport to be universally justifiable, and normatively, moral 
norms are those normative items that we have justified discursively. By contrast, ethical values are, 
descriptively, those normative items that we take to be in some sense particularistic, and connected 
with some or another way of life, but normatively, ethical values are those normative items that we 
have not be able to justify in moral discourse (or at least, we have not yet been able to justify them). 
So, the distinction is epistemic in that whether something counts as a justified moral norm or a 
particularistic ethical value is entirely dependent on our practices.60  
In sections three and four, I consider two more concrete cases. First, in section three, I present 
Habermas’ argument that we have quasi-moral duties to at least some non-human animals, using the 
discussion to illustrate the principle of universalization (U), as Habermas’ formulation of (U) is – as 
he acknowledges -- anthropocentric. Habermas’ position is anthropocentric at least in that moral 
norms are justified through discursive procedures of coming to an understanding with others in 
language, a practice he sees as uniquely human. Still, Habermas argues that “our moral feelings” 
suggest to us that non-human animals have some sort of moral statues – that they are not for us to 
 
60 In this chapter, I also distinguish between the idea of a justified ethical value – which given 
Habermas’ way of epistemically distinguishing between moral norms and ethical values sounds a bit 
nonsensical at this point – and ethical justification, as when someone debates how most authentically 
to live their life, given the individual that they are. In this very limited sense, Habermas allows for 
ethical justification (because it’s possible that your argument supporting your life choices as the best 
way to be authentically who you are could be convincing to others, even all others). But this sort of 
ethical justification is not a justification of an ethical value that we all ought to recognize, and so I do 
not dwell on this point. 
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dispose over as we wish – even if they are not at all protected by the sort of moral norms that can 
only be justified in communities of persons taken to be equals. Non-human animals are incapable of 
the reciprocity required by (U), and in two ways: non-human animals are unable to take themselves to 
be under obligations to others, and, non-human animals are unable to object discursively to the 
consequences and side-effects some norm’s general observance might have on their interests. Non-
human animals are unable to take a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ position in discourse. So, Habermas rejects the 
suggestion that non-human animals have moral rights. Still, he argues that we have quasi-moral obligations 
to at least those animals with which we interact, although he offers little other than “our moral 
feelings” as evidence. In this section, I also work through the partial parallels between Habermas’ 
account of morality as partially compensating for the vulnerabilities generated by social forms of life 
(and the indirect empirical confirmation of discourse ethics using evidence from sociology and 
psychology that this implies), and of our quasi-moral duties at least toward those animals with which 
we interact, again because their ways of being in community with humans produces specific sorts of 
vulnerabilities. Still, Habermas argues that this sort of fiduciary duty toward non-human animals is far 
less “deep-seated” than the sorts of harms to personal integrity to which socialized persons are 
vulnerable.  
In the fourth section, I work through Habermas’ account of an ethics of the species, 
occasioned by (what he sees as) the threat of a future liberal eugenics, where our genetic inheritance 
is simply left to the vagaries of markets. Leaving choices about non-therapeutic intervention in the 
genetic material of pre-personal human life would potential undermine a series of what he calls 
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“natural presuppositions” that make possible the justification of moral norms. Certainly, pre-personal 
human life cannot engage discursively in much the way that non-human animals cannot participate in 
moral discourses. But with “liberal eugenics”, Habermas’ concerns go well beyond this inability, 
although for this reason, he is committed to the claim that such pre-birth intervention would not be 
morally wrong. Habermas argues that liberal eugenics might have three possible consequences. Firstly, 
Habermas argues that liberal eugenics might undermine the possibility of ethical freedom, from the first-
person perspective of the person who was subjected to non-therapeutic intervention. That is, such a 
person might not be able to see themselves as free to take up their life as entirely their own project, as 
some other person(s) – who should be peers – would have partially taken the role of author. Such 
persons might be less able to see themselves as authentically themselves. Further, this could result in 
seeing oneself as not the equal of other persons, particularly in relation to those persons who had 
intervened. This leads to a second possible consequence of liberal eugenics: persons unable to take 
themselves to be the sole authors of their lives might also not be able to take moral responsibility for 
themselves, since they might see who they are as authored by another. So, this would be a further 
harm, beyond the harm to ethical freedom, a harm to one’s moral self-understanding. At this point, it 
seems clear to Habermas that allowing liberal eugenics would put morality as a whole at risk, as some 
persons might not be able to individuate in such a way that they could take themselves to be (and be 
seen as) equals, a necessary presupposition of moral discourse. Now, we seem to have a harm not just 
to one’s phenomenological experience of freedom and to one’s moral self-understanding, but to the 
possibility of justifying moral norms, at all. Habermas takes each of these possible harms to result 
from another sort of harm, arguing that the possibility of liberal eugenics brings into focus a “natural 
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presupposition” that had previously simply been taken for granted: that we are all subject to the genetic 
lottery in roughly the same way. That is, the contingency of the biological basis of human life would no 
longer be something all persons would be subjected in the same way. Rather, some person(s) would 
have intervened in the role of biological nature, in part authoring one’s self. Though the consequences 
for ethical freedom and for moral self-understanding were carefully couched in terms of possible 
consequences, here Habermas argues that we are up against a necessary connection, between the 
contingency of life’s beginnings, which has never been at our disposal, and the freedom to give one’s 
life an ethical shape. Given this much stronger claim, then, Habermas argues that although liberal 
eugenics would not violate justifiable moral norms, it would undermine the future possibility of 
justifying such norms. So, liberal eugenics presents a threat to morality as a whole. And it is this that 
pushes Habermas beyond his formalistic, procedural metaethics. Tentatively, he affirms that at least 
in those cases where there is a threat to morality as a whole, we ought to affirm that the practice of 
moral discourse is itself good, and as such, ought to be protected, for example by proscribing liberal 
eugenics.  
In the final section of Chapter One, I compare the two cases considered, noting that in each 
case Habermas has moved beyond the straightforward epistemic distinction between ethics and 
morality with which he has generally worked. Roughly, norms/values are either justifiable to all with 
reasons they can accept, or they are not. I argue that at this point, having partially left the 
proceduralism of earlier work, the necessary next step must be to work out the features of the sort of 
normative ethics that Habermas begins to develop, going beyond the narrow case of a possible future 
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liberal eugenics on which he is focused.. At least, he seems committed to the claims that (1) anything 
that could reasonably be expected to harm both the capacity for ethical freedom and one’s moral self-
understanding is ethically bad; (2) that anything that would threaten human practices for which we have 
no coherent alternatives is ethically bad, and that (3) we ought to avoid or proscribe it. And conversely, 
we ought to affirm as ethically good anything that protects human practices that enable us to individuate 
and become authentically ourselves, to take responsibility for ourselves, and to resolve conflict 
discursively. More simply, Habermas here seems to offer an argument that we ought to the necessary 
preconditions both of ethical life and of morality. At best, though, such ethical values could only be 
mostly justifiable, so it would be necessary to develop a different approach to validity claims, where 
they need not be either categorically justified, or simply not justified. In this dissertation, I aim only to 
defend the position that discourse ethics depends on a background ethics that is disavowed when the 
focus is on the procedures of the speech situation. Clearly, one element that will be more significant 
in any suitably modified discourse ethics is the attention that must be paid to consequences, and 
specifically in the cases considered thus far, harms. In allowing that there are harms of sufficient 
magnitude that they generate obligations, Habermas has opened the door to consequentialist 
considerations, and a new balance will need to be struck between rightness claims and goodness 
claims, given that Habermas has allowed that an ethical claim – that liberal eugenics would be bad – 
has trumped the claim of morality – that liberal eugenics would not be wrong. Ethical values, though, 
cannot be universally justified, and so cannot be attached to a validity claim of the sort Habermas has 
thus far theorized. Rather, at best such values could be generalizable, and convincing to most with 
reasons they could accept. I argue that in the case of non-human animals, if it is true (as Habermas 
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argues) that we are less able to take ourselves to be responsible moral beings while treating animals 
with which we interact cruelly, then again we seem to have a subjective pre-condition of achieving the 
moral point of view. Not treating animals cruelly (and for that matter, not destroying the natural world, 
on which we depend) could, it seems, be justified as a species-ethical value, rather than as quasi-moral 
set of duties. Lastly, I argue that the modification I am proposing to discourse ethics has another 
significant effect: it reopens the question of whether there are better and worse forms of life, rather 
than simply leaving such questions aside in favor of a focus on the necessary pragmatic 
presuppositions of moral discourse. Now, the question of how best to support our human forms of 
life returns, and in a rather more consequentialist form than one might expect. What forms of life 
enable us to resolve conflict discursively? Under what circumstances are we in fact able to meet as 
equals? Are there material conditions that must be satisfied in order for inclusive deliberations to be 
possible? What must we alter about how we live on this planet, in order to survive (a necessary pre-
condition of achieving the moral point of view, certainly)?  
As to the question with which I started, of whether we have an obligation to attempt to resolve 
conflict discursively rather than through violence, it seems that the modification I am suggesting of 
Habermas’ formalism allows us to give a better answer. Habermas is committed to the claim that we 
cannot justify a moral obligation to settle conflict through discourse. Rather than a moral argument, 
Habermas gives a pragmatic argument: if we want to settle conflict nonviolently, then we simply have 
no alternative than to attempt to resolve it discursively. This, of course, does not give us any normative 
reason to prefer nonviolent conflict resolution. I believe that we can accept (with Habermas) that we 
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cannot justify to all with reasons they could accept the moral demand that all conflict be resolved 
nonviolently, and further, we can accept (with Habermas) that attempting to morally justify the moral 
point of view involves one in viciously circular reasoning. Still, I do not believe that accepting these 
claims commits one to the further claim that we can only pragmatically justify an obligation to 
discursive conflict resolution, nor to the further claim that the moral point of view can only be 
pragmatically justified. Rather, most of us, most of the time, have good reason to resolve conflict 
nonviolently, thru civil discursive engagement. This does not mean that we have a moral obligation of 
civility any more than of nonviolence. Rather, I suggest that we have an ethical duty, in general, to aim 
for consensual resolution of conflict, a duty with normative heft, but weighted with neither moral nor 
pragmatic necessity. More simply, it seems to me that we have good reason to say that nonviolent 
resolution of conflict is good, even if we also have good reason to say that nonviolent resolution of 
conflict is not morally obligatory. 
 
 
(1.b) Chapter Two: Civil Disobedience and Military Intervention 
In the second chapter, I make a similar argument, though responding to Habermas’ discourse 
theory of law and democracy in Between Facts and Norms, rather than his discourse theory of morality.61 
 
61 In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas criticizes Dworkin for attempting to embed politics in an 
ethics, because (he argues) any normative ethics making substantive statements is thereby confined to 
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As in Chapter One, I focus on two particular cases – civil disobedience and humanitarian military 
intervention – and my argument develops out of my reading of the cases. I briefly consider the 
argument that the orientation toward consensus itself produces various sorts of injustice but find it 
unconvincing. Still, I argue that a general ethical framework going beyond morality, legitimacy, and 
the legality from which legitimacy is produced is useful, if not implicitly assumed (Habermas J. , 
Between Facts and Norms: Toward a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 1996, pp. 62-4) 
On Habermas’ view, legitimacy is generated out of law produced through inclusive procedures 
of democratic will formation in which the will of the demos is freely and collectively enacted, so that all 
those who are subject to the law can see themselves – at least via representatives – as authors of the 
law. Legitimacy-producing procedures will equally respect each citizen’s capacity to take a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
position on any policy. Habermas sees these two traits of legitimate democracies as involving a 
(paradoxical) balancing of popular sovereignty (wherein the will of the demos is democratically enacted) 
and human rights (respecting the individual autonomy of each citizen). Just as Habermas’ account of 
the moral point of view was formal, his account of legitimacy is procedural in this way.  
 
some particularistic context: the context in which that ethics arose, whether personal or historical. 
Certainly, I do not argue that Habermas tries to patch a whole in his moral theory (or theory of justice, 
which amounts to the same) with an ethics taken as equally certain. Rather, I accept that an ethics 
cannot achieve the sort of universal validity to which moral and theoretical discourses aspire. Still, I 
think that that rather more shaky ground is preferable to the necessity (however pragmatic) imported 
by Habermas usual way of defending his project (Habermas J. , Between Facts and Norms: Toward a 
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 1996, pp. 62-4). 
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Without returning to the details of Habermas’ account of civil disobedience, my general 
concern was that Habermas advocates tolerance for civil disobedience (under certain fairly stringent 
conditions)62 that is enacted for moral reasons, even though it (definitionally) involves transgressing 
the normatively binding law of the state. Not just any moral reason will do, of course; Habermas 
requires that the relevant moral reason be a dissenting interpretation of what the constitution requires. 
So, basically, Habermas interprets morally justifiable civil disobedience as necessarily adverting to a 
differing interpretation of an antecedently justified constitutional principle (which, on his reading, 
could itself be morally justified). So, civil disobedients are engaged not in dissent over the justification 
of basic norms/principles. If they were, it seems that Habermas would see such illegal actions as 
revolutionary rather than reformist. Justifiable civil disobedience, for Habermas, will always be 
reformist, appealing to the majority concerning some dispute over the appropriateness of an 
interpretation of those norms. So, civil disobedience is a sort of discourse of application rather than of 
justification, if often carried out by non-discursive means. Tolerance of civil disobedience, under these 
circumstances, is defended as a way of demonstrating that the legitimacy of the constitutional state is 
not reducible to its current legal order, and further, that the project of the constitutional state is 
ongoing rather than reducible to its current institutional embodiment. 
In international law, Habermas remains a proceduralist, arguing that the ban on wars of 
aggression (1928) replaced the ethical distinction between just and unjust wars (grounded in any of a 
 
62 Very little of what has historically been viewed as civil disobedience would count as such, on 
Habermas’ account. 
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number of particularistic world views: natural law, religion, etc.) with a procedural distinction between 
legal and illegal wars. Habermas’ critique of the invasion of Iraq (2003) at first appears fairly complex, 
but ultimately bottoms out in the claim that because the invasion was illegal, it was illegitimate. So, there 
is at once a contrast between Habermas’ consideration of the justifiability of illegal action in the case 
of civil disobedience and in the case of humanitarian military intervention. Of course, civil 
disobedience is (for Habermas definitionally) nonviolent, and a military invasion never is, so that 
distinction is salient as well. Still, unless we attach a fairly strong ethical imperative against violence to 
the analysis of both cases of illegality – and it cannot be a moral imperative speaking against violence 
as long as Habermas leaves open the possibility of justifiable military invasion – it is not immediately 
obvious why the sorts of illegality are analyzed so differently, with one analysis pointing towards the 
ongoing nature of constitutional project and the other reductively referencing the law as it is at present. 
This is particularly an issue since Bush’s Coalition of the Willing (claimed to) believe(d) that there 
Saddam Hussein was using chemical weapons of mass destruction (and on children, at that). So, the 
invasion was rationalized on the basis of a differing interpretation of what international law required. 
President Bush could have employed the erga omnes clause that Habermas cited to morally justify the 
illegal intervention in Kosovo, in fact, given that it did seem that crimes against humanity were taking 
place in Iraq (even without the supposed weapons of mass destruction). Of course, it’s no small thing 
that Bush’s invasion was never retroactively legitimated as was the Kosovo intervention, as Habermas 
predicted it would be. Habermas argues that the near-global solidarity in outrage at both the genocide 
taking place in Kosovo and at the barbarity of the invasion of Iraq provided both (a) a preliminary 
source of legitimation from the informal global public sphere for the NATO intervention, and (b) 
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some license to believe that the invasion of Iraq would not be retroactively legitimated. Still, in the 
absence of a legitimate democratic constitutionalization of world society – or, in the absence of 
verifiable criteria of legality – Habermas can at best appeal to what the states and citizens of the world, 
hypothetically, could assent to were there a process of inclusive democratic will formation. Solidarity 
provides at best a partial solution here, as legitimation from the informal global public sphere is not 
matched in Habermas’ model by developments in the formal global public sphere in such a way that 
legitimacy can be properly produced from legality. I argued that this puts Habermas’ strong legalism 
into question. It seems to me that a background ethics is doing a good deal of unacknowledged work. 
For example, Habermas is committed to the claim that a full constitutionalization of world society is 
what we ought to working toward, but though he certainly has arguments to support this claim, it is 
by no means obvious that the only way to restrain political violence --  and war -- is through the further 
juridification of international, transnational and cosmopolitan law. Just as in the case of the discourse 
theory of morality, I think Habermas ought to be understood as making an ethical argument, that we 
ought to aim for a full constitutionalization of world society, rather than falling back on the 
(misleading) claim of pragmatic necessity. The pragmatic necessity supported by the functional 
arguments seems to import a bit of universality that is out of place at the ethical level, and the defense 
of discursive – rather than violent, for example – settling of conflict requires an argument at that level. 
Saying that we have no coherent alternative but to resolve political conflict via further 
constitutionalization of international law seems to obscure the ethical claim in play. I argue that 
Habermas requires a defensible general ethics, but that such an ethics must be understood as 
contestable, and certainly not as universally necessary, in either a normative or a functional sense. Just 
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as in his moral theory, Habermas seems to depend upon an ethical argument, that we ought generally 
to try to settle conflict discursively, in his theory of law and democracy he is at least committed to the 
ethical claim that legally mediated conflict resolution would generally be better than resolution through 
violent conflict. If one accepts the general ethical values Habermas seems to endorse, then the rest of 
his project follows rather more readily, setting parameters for further moral principles and their 
consensual justification.  
 
 
(1.c) Chapter Three: Normative Affect 
In the third chapter, I consider the relation between normative affect and normative 
justification. I argue that Habermas at least uses normative feelings as a sort of evidence, motivating 
him toward sometimes surprising projects, including the moral feeling he cites explicitly as driving his 
theorizing of our quasi-moral obligations to non-human animals, and in response to the invasion of 
Iraq (2003), the moral feeling of outrage-in-solidarity against that invasion, which he sees as suggesting 
a preliminary near-consensus from the informal global public sphere. At least, Habermas frequently 
begins from a phenomenological account of our moral feeling. Certainly, I do not mean that he 
straightforwardly takes the deliverances of his emotions as directly informing him about moral matters, 
only that normative affect plays a larger role in his work than is usually noticed. Tracing Habermas’ 
uses of normative affect, it becomes clear that different emotions are associated with moral violation, 
including outrage and horror, while failing to live up to some particular (individual or communal) 
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ethical standard tends to be associated with pity or condescension. In discussing violations of his 
species ethics, though, the affect tends to be disgust, as at something obscene. And the relevant 
positive affect seems to be hope. 
My primary conclusion in this chapter is that Habermas’ use of normative affect, and 
particularly his repeated and explicit analogizing of the role of affect in normative discourses and the 
role of sense perception in truth-oriented discourses, gives reason to see his account of moral rightness 
(and for the same reasons, ethical goodness) as non-epistemic. I do not mean to suggest that he sees 
affect as directly providing justification for moral beliefs (because justification is plainly epistemic / 
discursively produced), but rather more simply, that he must presuppose the generalizable ability to 
be affected by – and motivated by – the needs of others. He seems to depend on the presupposition 
that human beings are susceptible to the same affective responses,63 or, that there are universalizable 
moral feelings. Moral feelings are universalizable at least in that they are connected to generalizable 
interests, but ethical feelings are connected to the ways of life of some persons or peoples, and not to 
the interests of all possibly affected. Further, this presupposition directly parallels the presupposition 
that there is a single physical world that we all perceive. 
Finally, I argue that Habermas’ frequently expressed hopes that our ethical forms of life will 
meet our moral discourses halfway suggests an under-theorized ethical standpoint. That is, ethical 
 
63 And this parallels the capacity to be affected by the moral law, in Kant. Also in Kant, the motivation 
by the moral law is crucially important, just as in Habermas, affects are not to be taken as any sort of 
direct evidence of what the moral law is. 
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claims are associated with a level of analysis that is neither (a) merely subjective: e.g. my contingent 
emotions, now; nor (b) morally normative: e.g. human rights; nor (c) objectively descriptive: e.g. Realist 
descriptions of the balance of power between institutional actors. We must believe that there are 
rational grounds for countering moral barbarism, and given current conditions, the only hope seems 
to be the intersubjective justification of moral claims paired with a background support provided by 
forms of life that socialize persons with the necessary motivations, support that we can only hope will 
be forthcoming. But the motivation to resolve dissensus discursively cannot be understood as itself a 
moral motivation.64 Rather, it must be an ethical one. So, as I have argued in each chapter, from a 
different angle, I think that discourse ethics is in fact best understood as a normative ethics. In the 
first chapter, I argued that taking anything that improved the abilities of persons and peoples to 
achieve the moral point of view to be ethically good would be a useful next step, beyond Habermas’ 
initial ethics of the species, which was still nearly entirely focused on a possible future involving liberal 
eugenics. In the second chapter, I brought into question whether the only ethically good way to avoid 
harm to the capacity of persons and people to achieve self-determination and the moral point of view 
was really the further juridification of world society. And in this final chapter, I argued that the 
pragmatic presuppositions of discourse were themselves presuppositions of a way in which societies 
could organize themselves, although it does not seem to me pragmatically necessary that all societies 
do so, nor that all societies gradually constitutionalize all their relations. 
 
 
64 As Habermas argues, against Raïner Forst. 
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(2) A Concrete Case: The Petraeus Protests 
As a case study in what I see as the usefulness of the set of distinctions I have defended in this 
dissertation, consider the protests over the hiring of General David Petraeus at the City University of 
New York (CUNY). During the first month of the Fall semester in 2013, there were student-led 
protests centered around Macaulay Honors College (CUNY), protests that were admittedly impolite, 
and which used aggressive, uncivil rhetoric. On the day of Dr. Petraeus’ first class at Macaulay Honors 
College, students called him a “war criminal” and repeatedly, a “piece of shit,” accused him of “sexual 
abuse,” and chanted “Every class, David.”65 Macaulay Honors College Dean Ann Kirschner issued a 
statement condemning the protests and defending the value of civility,66 a statement that was later 
echoed by the CUNY University Faculty Senate Executive Committee (UFS), citing their defense of 
Kristofer Petersen-Overton with respect to academic freedom.67 Petersen-Overton objected to the 
UFS’s analogy between his case and Dr. Petraeus’ right to teach without harassment or obstruction:  
[T]he UFS opposed the administrative overreach in my own case and supported my immediate 
reinstatement at Brooklyn College. I was grateful for this principled stance, but I do not 
remember anything being said about harassment, epithets, or verbal attacks—all of which I 
 
65 See video from September 9th, 2013 (last accessed 
7/18/18).http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DIbl28O99Lg (last accessed 7/18/18). 
66 Kirschner’s September 11th statement: 
http://www1.cuny.edu/mu/forum/2013/09/11/statement-from-dean-ann-kirschner-macaulay-
honors-college/ (last accessed 7/18/18). 
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experienced as a result of the controversy surrounding my seminar. Indeed, it would have been 
inappropriate to make such a statement; to do so would have been to place the instructor’s 
personal comfort above the legitimacy of free speech. The students at Brooklyn College who 
opposed my presence on campus had every right to do so. We can quibble about the tone of 
protests, but it’s not clear to me how protests alone (in public space no less) constitute a threat 
to a teacher’s ability to carry out their responsibilities.68  
Petersen-Overton takes it to be unclear why the tone of a protest that makes an instructor personally 
uncomfortable, particularly when conducted on public sidewalks rather than in the classroom, would 
be sufficient to overrule the protestors’ speech rights. Still, these protests led to the arrest of several 
students, with a multitude of videos of the arrests promptly posted on YouTube showing cuffed 
students punched in the kidneys by officers of the New York Police Department.69 CUNY Interim 
Chancellor William P. Kelly’s statement two days later says nothing about the arrests, or the alleged 
police brutality, but merely echoes the values defended in the earlier statements from Dean Kirschner 
and from the UFS: 
By nature, universities nurture the reasoned expression of dissent, including the right of 
peaceful protest. CUNY has long embraced the responsibility to encourage debate and 
dialogue. Foreclosing the right of a faculty member to teach and the opportunity of students 
to learn is antithetical to that tradition, corrosive of the values at the heart of the academic 
enterprise. We defend free speech and we reject the disruption of the free exchange of ideas. 
Accordingly, CUNY will continue to ensure that Dr. Petraeus is able to teach without 
 
68 Petersen-Overton’s response, posted on September 17th, 2013, is available online: 
https://sites.google.com/site/universityfacultysenatecuny/UFS-
blog/cunyfacultyweighinontheufsexecutivecommitteestatementconcerninglastweek’spetraeusincident 
; last accessed 8/16/16). 
69 This video from September 18th, 2013, shows a student punched in the kidneys: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=IPtn5--
IVDo&oref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Ffeature%3Dplayer_embedded%2
6v%3DIPtn5--IVDo&has_verified=1 (last accessed 7/18/18). 
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harassment or obstruction. In so doing, we join with the University Faculty Senate in 
defending the right of CUNY faculty members to teach without interference.70 
It seems to me that hiring Petraeus was not an unreasonable action. Objecting to the overall direction 
the university seems to be taking also seems reasonable. That Kelly would defend the former head of 
the Central Intelligence Agency against being inconvenienced by protesters, and not defend CUNY 
students against what looks to be police brutality, seems less reasonable, as Corey Robin recognizes, 
rather more polemically: 
The delicate flowers of academic freedom at CUNY wilt before the jeers and jibes of a few 
students but warm to the blazing sun of the state. A four-star general who led two brutal 
counterinsurgency campaigns in Eurasia, a former head of the CIA whose hazing rituals at 
West Point alone probably outstrip anything the NYPD did to these students, requires the 
fulsome support of chancellors, senates, and deans. But six students of color beaten by cops, 
locked up in prison for a day, and now facing a full array of charges from the state, deserve 
nothing but the cold silence of their university. So much tender solicitude for a man so wealthy 
and powerful that he can afford to teach two courses at CUNY for a dollar; so little for these 
students, whose education is the university’s true and only charge.71 
 
70 Kelly’s statement from September 20th, 2013, is available online: 
http://www1.cuny.edu/mu/forum/2013/09/20/statement-from-interim-chancellor-william-p-
kelly/ (last accessed 7/18/18). The idea that universities ‘naturally’ nurture the reasoned expression 
of dissent is curious: “By nature, universities nurture the reasoned expression of dissent”. 
71 From Corey Robin’s blog post on September 21st, 2013: 
http://coreyrobin.com/2013/09/21/david-petraeus-voldemort-comes-to-cuny/ (last accessed 
7/18/18). It is, perhaps, unkind that Robin uses the dollar salary against Petraeus, as Petraeus’ earlier 
salary of $200,000 for a single course was reduced to a dollar in response to protests and objections, 
including a strongly worded letter from Bill de Blasio (during his campaign for mayor of New York 
City) demanding that Petraeus’ salary match that of those with similar teaching arrangements (which 
for adjuncts at CUNY, would be around $3,000/course): http://observer.com/2013/07/bill-de-
blasio-goes-to-war-with-david-petraeus/ (last accessed 7/18/18). See also: http://www.psc-
cuny.org/news-events/cuny-faculty-protests-hiring-david-petraeus (last accessed 7/18/18). 
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On Overton-Petersen and Robin’s readings, CUNY officials take the style of the protest to negate the 
moral and legal right to protest. Perhaps there are cases in which this makes sense, such as in the 
classroom, where the values of the institution might be seen as taking precedence. In part, Ann 
Kirschner’s September 11th, 2013, statement reads:  
We may disagree, but we must always do so in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding. 
While the college supports the articulation of all points of view on critical issues, it is essential 
that dialogue within the academic setting always be conducted civilly.72 
Reading the statements of Kirschner, Kelly and the UFS charitably, perhaps it is the classroom context 
that concerns them. Still, the protests leading to arrest and alleged police brutality occurred on public 
sidewalks, and not “within the academic setting”. 
Kirschner’s phrasing, concerning what we must do, and what is essential to dialogue within the 
academic setting, serves to obscure distinctions that seem to be worth making. That is, there are 
different sorts of necessity in play, not clearly distinguished by Kirschner. The first claim, that we must 
always be respectful when we disagree, is not limited in scope, but neither is it entirely clear what sort 
of claim this is. It could be a pragmatic claim:  
‘If we want to come to an understanding or reach a compromise with persons with whom we 
disagree, we must be as respectful as possible of one another’.  
But, were Kirschner’s a pragmatic claim, it is not clear that it would take precedence over another, 
commonly accepted, individual moral claim, also institutionalized as a legal right: ‘Other things being 
 
72 http://www1.cuny.edu/mu/forum/2013/09/11/statement-from-dean-ann-kirschner-macaulay-
honors-college/ (emphasis added; last accessed 7/18/18). 
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equal, we must respect the right to freedom of expression of even those with whom we disagree’. For 
there to be a conflict between Kirschner’s claim and the commonly accepted moral right to free 
expression, it would need to be a moral claim, which would be a surprising elevation of the duty of 
civility, and of a reciprocal right to be treated in a civil manner:  
‘We may disagree, but morally, we must always do so in a spirit of mutual respect and 
understanding. 
Taken as stated, this is the most likely interpretation of Kirshner’s claim, as it is presented as a 
categorical imperative. There is a least a third option, that Kirschner’s ‘must’ is ethical, in that it 
references something good, although not a good that is protected by a right:  
‘It would be better to live in an ethical world in which we settle disagreements by coming to 
an understanding or reaching a compromise, so, if we aim to make this possible, we must be 
respectful of one another when we disagree’.  
This sort of ethical claim shares a feature with the pragmatic claim above: they are both conditional, 
contingent upon, in the case the pragmatic claim, acceptance – as a personal preference – of the purpose 
of coming to an understanding or reaching a compromise, and in the case of the ethical claim, 
endorsement of the ethical view that it would be better to settle disagreements in this way. Neither the 
pragmatic nor the ethical ‘must’ is categorical, as would be a moral ‘must’, and as Kirschner’s claim 
suggests. Still, I believe that the moral and the ethical claim also share a feature, which is that neither 
depends simply upon mere preference. The pragmatic claim simply asserts how we ought to act if our 
preferences align with the stated purpose. If our preferences conflict with this purpose, the ‘must’ in 
no way obliges. But, both the moral and the ethical claim concern what we ought to do, in a way that 
is not simply dependent upon our purposes.  
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That there are several possible sorts of normativity in play in Kirshner’s claim is, of course, 
debatable. Still, I am concerned that lack of clarity concerning these distinctions tends to obscure 
public discourse on normative issues. For example, as in the debate over student protest at CUNY, 
what seems to be an ethical obligation – the duty of civility – is elevated to a moral duty, in part 
because it is seen as a normative obligation not based in mere preference, and thereby comes to be 
seen as directly competing with the moral duty to respect free expression rights. Put differently, the 
lack of a concept of ethical obligations as giving us reasons for action at least in some contexts tends 
to lead to a slide from (merely) pragmatic/utilitarian reasons for action, based in self-interest, to taking 
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(3) Future Work  
 
In future work, I aim to articulate the conceptual terrain that I see linking Habermas’ discourse 
theory with Jacques Rancière’s poststructuralism and with Enrique Dussel’s Latin American ethics of 
liberation, specifically with the aim of developing an account of the ethical goodness claim defended 
in my dissertation.  
According to Habermas, moral norms are justified discursively but ethical values cannot be 
justified. Further, for Habermas the practice of justifying moral norms discursively is itself not 
justifiable morally, but only functionally or pragmatically, in that we have no functional equivalent for 
the practice. This means that Habermas cannot justifiably say that it would be ethically better to settle 
disputes consensually rather than through violent conflict, only that we have no non-coercive 
alternative to discursive resolution of disagreement. Rancière critiques consensus accounts including 
Habermas’, rejecting the project of normative political philosophy as invariably concerned with 
‘purifying’ politics. Rancière counterposes the practice of democracy – never decided in advance, at any 
level of abstraction – to the police logic that progressively colonizes politics, contra Habermas, who 
argues for the expansion of the domain of the ‘logic of the police’ globally, institutionalizing a ‘global 
domestic politics’ in which at least constitutional norms would be decided in advance, and in which 
military actions could be understood as policing. Still, Rancière is unable to provide evaluative criteria 
for assessing better and worse kinds of police, though he insists on this normative distinction, and one 




Ethical Validity  161 
is left with an account of always provisional, momentary irruptions of politics in the midst of the 
consensual police order.  
Omar Dahbour argues that the “root of the problem with theories of ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ – to use Habermas’ phrase (for his own theory, among others) – is that they fail to posit 
substantive values that can serve as a basis for deciding upon particular principles” (Dahbour 2013, 
237n28). At the very least, though, it seems that Habermas is committed to the ethical claims that it 
would generally be better to settle conflict non-violently and consensually, and that legally mediated 
conflict resolution would generally be better than resolution through violent conflict. These are 
contestable claims, certainly, but deciding upon these ethical values begins to set parameters for further 
moral principles and their consensual justification. However, Habermas’ claim that we have ‘no 
coherent alternative’ to this path rings hollow in the face of ongoing political violence, and, seems 
aimed at investing discursive conflict resolution with an air of necessity, however pragmatic, that 
disguises the ethical conversation in play. As long as plainly oppressive political structures persist, 
revolutionary violence will remain an ethical option, and simply claiming that we have ‘no coherent 
alternative’ to discursive resolution of conflict if we want to settle conflict non-violently provides little 
clarity. I have argued that Habermas requires a defensible general ethics, but that such an ethics must 
be understood as contestable, and certainly not as universally necessary, in either a normative or a 
functional sense. My core concern, which I take to motivate Rancière’s view also, is that the pragmatic 
necessity supported by Habermas’ functional arguments seems to import a bit of universality that is 
out of place at the ethical level, whereas the defense of discursive rather than violent means of settling 
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conflict requires an argument at that level. Arguing, as Habermas does, that we have no coherent 
alternative but to resolve political conflict via further constitutionalization of international law seems 
to obscure the ethical claim in play. Still, that there is an ethical claim here, a claim that may be supported 
with better or worse reasons, also gets lost in Rancière’s simple dichotomy between the logics of 
consensus and of policing. One of my core areas of future research will be this Habermas/Rancière 
debate, with the aim of theorizing an ethics of dissensus. How are we to think about the conflicting 
claims of differently positioned minoritized populations? When there is wide-spread agreement on a 
value or norm among – for example – feminists, but widespread agreement on a different and 
conflicting norm among – for example – queer people, with both moments of minority consensus 
standing in conflict with currently hegemonic norms, how might we assess such disagreements? Is it 
possible to accept both claims as affirming goods worthy of valuing, even within the conflict, or must 
sides be taken? For example, can we affirm coherently that anti-porn feminists are correct, that 
widespread consumption of violent pornography leads to real harms to women, and so, is a bad thing, 
while also accepting that queer activists who defend pornography as having served liberatory ends are 
affirming something actually good, despite the contradiction? That is, might the possibilities opened 
up by a conception of ethical justification, which is always partial rather than universal, enable us to 
better conceptualize the conflicting claims of counter-hegemonic movements, without forcing a 
decision between the conflicting claims? And further, might this also better enable the formation of 
effective counter-hegemonic blocs? Though for Habermas conflicting moral norms cannot both be 
justified, a conception of the justification of ethical values opens up the possibility of affirming 
conflicting goods, though this would step well beyond Habermas’ discourse ethics. 
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Against the formalism of Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, Enrique Dussel argues that discourse 
theorists get things precisely backwards, in elevating the formal over the material, and in claiming that 
the validity of norms and values is constructed through formal discursive procedures. Dussel reverses 
the priority of the right over the good, positing a material principle at the root of goodness claims that 
obliges us to work to support the material bases of every human life. Dussel argues that Apel and 
Habermas inadequately account for the material preconditions of communicative rationality, that the 
materiality of concrete human life must take normative precedence over the rights of personhood, 
that understanding is necessarily situated, and that this situatedness is normatively significant, rather 
than something to be overcome in an idealizing ascent out of material, bodily particularity. Dussel 
argues that this sort of error would be less likely to occur, were we to consider normative questions 
from the standpoint of those victimized by existing social and political structures, which would 
necessitate a radical shift in perspective from a reconstruction of the moral point of view as an 
(impossible ideal) inclusive discourse situation in which all are considered as equals. Still, Habermas’ 
species ethics at least reopens the conversation concerning the relation between the right and the 
good, specifically regarding the material preconditions of human life and the necessary preconditions 
of the moral point of view. In future work, I plan to develop my conception of an ethical goodness 
claim, in light of Dussel’s defense of prioritizing the good of those most disadvantaged by current 
social and political structures, while taking seriously Rancière’s critique of consensus-driven political 
theory. More specifically, I plan to develop a somewhat different approach to an ethical validity claim, 
taking seriously the idea of a validity claim that is not seen as ‘justifiable to all affected’ within the 
current system, but as seen from the positionality of those excluded from or dominated by the current 
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system. This suggests reconsidering the antirealism of discourse theory, as a basis for justifying not 
only the general ethical validity claim, but more significantly, the counterhegemonic ethical validity 
claim. With respect to the former, normative affect – the ability of humans to affected by the suffering 
of others, in particular – is already playing a role in Habermasean discourse theory and suggests itself 
as involving a very thin account of the human, which must be presupposed by Habermas to make 
sense of his account of morality, in a way that is analogous to the presupposition of an objective 
physical world, in truth-oriented discourses. With respect to the latter, the materiality of suffering 
might be seen as grounding normative claims, not so much the (unmet) generalizable needs of the 
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Appendix One: Collapsing Logical and Practical Necessity: Alan 
Gewirth’s Dialectically Necessary Method 
In this essay, I critique Alan Gewirth’s defense of universal moral human rights, showing that 
his core argument manifests a slide from prudential to moral necessity, or, from what we must do in 
our own self-interest to what we must do, from a moral point of view. Further, his argument turns on 
obscuring distinctions between logical, prudential and moral necessity. I offer an original argument 
against Alan Gewirth’s defense of universal moral human rights to freedom and well-being. First, I 
argue that rather than leading to what he terms a ‘dialectically necessary’ conclusion, his argument is 
contingent on affirmation of the principle of strict correlativity of rights and duties, which he uses as a 
logical principle. Second, I argue that this in fact exhibits a larger problem: Gewirth equivocates 
between sorts of necessity, conflating pragmatic necessity with logical necessity. Gewirth’s concern, 
and that of his student Deryck Beyleveld, is that if moral rights are not necessary truths in some sense, 
then morality is ultimately arbitrary:  
If moral principles are grounded on claims that agents are not committed to as a matter of 
logical necessity, then these grounds possess a contingency that is antithetical to their supposed 
categorical character – with the result that the force of moral argument becomes strictly ad 
hominem, as it can rest on no more than variable inclinations, intuitions, ideals, or properties 
over which, in the final analysis, there can be no rational adjudication (Beyleveld, 1991, p. 2; 
emphasis added). 
So, the worry that motivates Gewirth and Beyleveld is the concern that, if normative claims are not 
taken as necessary and categorical, then they rest on no more than mere preference.  
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(1) The Dialectically Necessary Method 
Alan Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) aims to establish the 
PGC as the supreme moral principle, which must be affirmed by all agents pursuing purposes, entailing 
that equal human rights to freedom and well-being must be accorded to all prospective purposive 
agents. Gewirth claims that his “supreme moral principle can be given stringently rational justification, 
in that self-contradiction is incurred by any actual or prospective agent who rejects this principle” 
(Gewirth, 1991, p. viii.). I will refer primarily to the following version of “The Argument to the 
Principle of Generic Consistency”: 
(1): “I do X for end or purpose E.” 
(2): “E is good”. 
(3): “My freedom and well-being are necessary goods”. 
(4): “I must have freedom and well-being”. 
(~5): “I do not have rights to freedom and well-being”. 
(~6): “It is not the case that all other persons ought to at least refrain from removing or 
interfering with my freedom and well-being”. 
(7): “Other persons may (i.e., It is permissible that other persons) remove or interfere with my 
freedom and well-being”. 
(8): “I may not (i.e., It is permissible that I not) have freedom and well-being”. 
(5): “I have rights to freedom and well-being”. 
(9): “I have rights to freedom and well-being because I am a prospective purposive agent”. 
(10): “All prospective purposive agents have rights to freedom and well-being”. 
(11): Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself (Gewirth, 
1996, pp. 16-19). 
This argument appears in several formulations in Gewirth’s Reason and Morality (1978) and The 
Community of Rights (1996), without the argument itself undergoing any change in logical structure. 
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Deryck Beyleveld’s The Dialectical Necessity of Morality (1991) presents several clarificatory 
reconstructions of the argument, to which I will occasionally refer.73 
According to Gewirth, the problem of deriving an “ought” from an “is” may be overcome by 
situating the argument within “the conative standpoint common to all agents” possessing minimal 
rationality, where minimal rationality requires only a grasp of the basic standards of deductive and 
inductive logic, including the law of non-contradiction (Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, pp. 
16, 27, 329-30). Denial of the PGC or of any of the inferences of the argument to the PGC, by a 
purposive agent from within their subjective viewpoint, amounts to denial that one is an agent 
pursuing purposes. Two sorts of necessity are involved in Gewirth’s “must”, as this “must” involves 
both premises that must be affirmed by any purposive agent in the context of action because of the 
necessary features of purposive agents and of actions, and premises that follow from one another as a 
matter of logical necessity. I argue that conclusion to the PGC is not necessary in either sense, but rather, 
contingent at least upon acceptance of the principle of strict correlativity of claim-rights and duties. 
Further, even granting that the argument is contingent in this way, the argument also begs the question 
in assuming precisely what it aims to establish: that needs entail rights. 
Gewirth defines human rights as those rights humans have because they are human, though this 
definition does not establish which human rights humans possess: “We may assume, as true by 
 
73 Gewirth endorses Beyleveld’s formulations: “[Beyleveld] has provided what may be called a rational 
reconstruction of [my argument to the PGC] whereby its various parts are presented in their most 
compelling formulations and their logical structure is spelled out in a helpfully formalized way” 
(Gewirth, 1991, p. vii.). 
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definition, that human rights are rights that all persons have simply because they are human” (Gewirth, 
1982, p. 41). Gewirth compares his own argument affirming human rights to freedom and well-being 
to Anselm’s ontological argument:  
Just as Kant pointed out that to derive the existence of God from the concept of God is mere 
verbal exercise, so it may be held that to derive ... obligations from the concept of human 
rights here envisaged is similarly verbal (Gewirth, 1996, p. 7). 
Gewirth acknowledges that he derives reciprocal human rights claims from the concept of human 
rights, but denies that this is a merely verbal exercise, with the significant asymmetry with Anselm’s 
ontological argument given by the dialectical necessity of the conclusion: Gewirth concludes not to an 
existence claim, but rather to what a purposive agent must conclude from their subjective perspective 
(i.e. “A holds or thinks that she has rights to freedom and well-being”) (Gewirth, 1996, p. 21). Gewirth 
distinguishes his “dialectically necessary method” from both assertoric and contingent forms of 
argument. Assertoric arguments aim to establish claims independently of the perspective of any 
particular agent, and they are generally presented in the form of statements made by the speaker or 
writer.74 In the dialectical method, by contrast, “the argument begins not from statements made by the 
writer or speaker himself but rather from statements presented as being made or accepted by a 
purposive agent, and it examines what they logically imply” (Gewirth, 1996, p. 16). According to 
Gewirth, the premises of the argument are those that any purposive agent must affirm, in the context 
of action, and the inferences between them are logically necessary. In part, all premises are necessary 
 
74 Both Nussbaum’s presentation of the capabilities list and Gould’s defense of the objective value of 
equal positive freedom involve assertoric arguments in Gewirth’s sense. 
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in that they consist of statements that “logically must be made or accepted by every agent because 
they derive from the generic features of purposive action” (Gewirth, 1996, p. 16). So, the conclusion 
of the argument to the PGC, though categorical, is still relative to the subjective perspective of any 
agent, in the context of action. Put differently, Gewirth does not make a metaphysical claim about the 
existence of rights but argues instead that one cannot – without contradiction – claim that one is a 
purposive agent and that other purposive agents do not have rights to the necessary conditions of 
action. The conclusion to the PGC is only necessary from within the subjective perspective of any 
agent with purposes. Gewirth does not directly assert the necessary truth of rights claims, but rather 
claims that denial of the rights of any prospective purposive agent to the necessary conditions of action 
is inconsistent with the claim that one is a purposive agent.  
So, using the dialectically necessary method, Gewirth claims that the problem of converting 
an “is” to an “ought” may be surmounted, while still affirming that such a derivation invariably begs 
the question when using the “assertoric” method. Beyleveld devotes a substantial chapter of his 
defense of Gewirth to this claim, arguing that most criticism depends upon failure to grasp the 
significance of Gewirth’s method (Beyleveld, 1991, pp. 91-147). Gewirth does not contest the 
fact/value dichotomy per se, but rather constructs a method of argument from within the perspective 
of any purposive agent that he takes to generate a morally normative necessary conclusion out of the 
prudential values any agent expresses in action, while affirming that the dialectically necessary 
conclusion – that any purposive agent must affirm the rights of all prospective purposive agents to 
freedom and well-being – does not imply that all prospective purposive agents have rights to freedom 
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and well-being, as an assertoric statement of fact. That is, Gewirth argues that an agent cannot affirm 
being a purposive agent and that other agents do not have rights without self-contradiction (Beyleveld, 
1991, p. 15). It is not an incidental feature of the argument that it proceeds from within the subjective 
perspective of any purposive agent, in the context of action, but rather is essential to the intended 
dialectical overcoming of the “is/ought” problem.  
 
(2) The Contingent Affirmation of Strict Correlativity of Rights and Duties 
Gewirth’s argument for the PGC starts with several claims that he believes must be affirmed 
by any agent with purposes, where these need not be explicitly formulated by the agent: 
(1): “I do X for end or purpose E.” 
(2): “E is good”. 
(3): “My freedom and well-being are necessary goods”. 
(4): “I must have freedom and well-being”. 
Gewirth argues first that, in the context of acting, any purposive agent must affirm the statement “I 
do X for end or purpose E.” Given that the agent in question is a purposive agent, they must act for 
a purpose, which at this stage of the argument may be any purpose at all. Given that the argument 
takes place in the context of action, they act, and in acting as a purposive agent, “I do X for end or 
purpose E” is implied.  
Second, in the context of acting toward any purpose E, Gewirth claims that any purposive 
agent must also affirm that “E is good”. This need not mean that the agent thinks that the purpose is 
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morally good, though they might (Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, p. 18). Further, they might 
think that the purpose is morally quite bad, or that nothing at all is morally good. All that is required 
at this stage of the argument is that in acting for a purpose, an agent demonstrates that they value that 
purpose, and so must affirm the statement “E is good”.  
Then, Gewirth claims that any purposive agent must affirm the statement: “My freedom and 
well-being are necessary goods”. Gewirth presents freedom and well-being as the proximate generic 
conditions of action, elsewhere described as “the procedural and the substantive conditions of action, 
or, again respectively, as involving the efficient causes and the final causes of action” (Gewirth, Reply 
to my Critics, 1984, pp. 14-15). On Gewirth’s view, actions are voluntary or free in that it is “assumed 
that the persons addressed can control their behavior by their unforced choice while having knowledge 
of relevant circumstances” (Gewirth, Reason and Morality, 1978, p. 13). For Gewirth, freedom 
includes not only voluntariness, but also the absence of external constraint. Further, in that action is 
purposive, and purposive action is success-oriented, Gewirth thinks it reasonable to extend 
purposiveness to include the general (or “generic”) conditions required for success, which he refers 
to collectively as ‘well-being’. In aiming for any particular purpose, one necessarily aims also at having 
available the necessary conditions for succeeding as elements of one’s purpose, in Gewirth’s view 
(Gewirth, Reason and Morality, 1978, p. 15). So, the generic conditions of action are freedom and well-
being, in the sense that actions require the capacity to do otherwise and the aim of success, the 
possibility of which depends upon external conditions to some extent, such that freedom and well-
being are structural features of action that the agent must affirm as necessary goods. Affirming that 
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“My freedom and well-being are necessary goods” is necessitated from the subjective perspective of 
any purposive agent because in order to act, given Gewirth’s theory of action, any agent must have 
freedom and well-being as the “conditions of action and generally successful action” (Gewirth, Reason 
and Morality, 1978, pp. 13-16). 
Note that Gewirth sometimes subsumes freedom under the category of well-being, in a 
position secondary to “life”. That is, from within the perspective of any purposive agent, the primary 
value turns out to be well-being, with life and freedom as the first two specifications of well-being 
(Gewirth, Reason and Morality, 1978, pp. 218, 254). I will follow his more frequent usage, with 
freedom and well-being understood as distinct necessary goods, and, with freedom a condition of any 
sort of action at all and well-being a condition of successful action.  
Gewirth’s argument mirrors Kant’s transcendental arguments in the first Critique. Though 
Gewirth does not generally present the argument to the PGC as a transcendental argument, Beyleveld 
confirms that it is, relating Kant’s transcendental arguments in the first Critique to Gewirth’s 
dialectically necessary method, with freedom and well-being understood as the necessary conditions 
of action (Beyleveld, 1991, pp. 117-18, 476). Curiously, Beyleveld also suggests that Kant wholly 
subordinates practical to theoretical reason, which Kant explicitly denies in the second Critique 
(Beyleveld, 1991, p. 476). Ultimately, Gewirth does not conclude that we have rights, but that (in the 
context of action) we must take ourselves (and all other prospective purposive agents) to have rights 
to freedom and well-being. Analogously, Kant argues against the transcendental realism of Newton, 
particularly with regard to the absolute reality of space, and presents space as necessarily constructed 
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by the understanding, and so transcendentally ideal, given by pure intuition. In the Critique of Practical 
Reason Kant is not discussing the phenomena, which must appear to be determined, but rather the 
will, because of which Kant theorizes the possibility of physics differently from the possibility of 
ethics. That the possibility of ethics requires taking the will to be free in no way implies (for Kant) that 
the will is free, as this is something that theoretical reason cannot show. The necessity Gewirth claims 
for the PGC is more like the sort of necessity involved in the pure intuition of space, for Kant, than 
like the sort of necessity claimed in the Critique of Practical Reason, on my reading. But though I think 
this point is significant for understanding Gewirth’s overall argument, it is beyond the scope of my 
concerns in this chapter. 
The claim that these are necessary goods only implies that the agent values them, and any further 
specification of well-being in the case of any particular purposive agent will vary depending on their 
purposes, so in Gewirth’s terminology, these are prudential goods. At this point, the agent aims for 
success and needs freedom, as both the ability to choose and the absence of obstruction, and well-
being, including as conditions of success whatever external conditions are necessary. There is no 
differentiation built into the argument at this stage between what the agent takes to be well-being and 
what well-being is, just as affirming that one’s purposes are “good” need not involve a claim that they 
are morally good. If what I want to do is quite bad, there are external conditions that will be required, 
and these count toward “well-being”. Aileen Wuornos’ need for guns, as a condition of acting toward 
her purposes, would count in assessing well-being from her perspective, at this stage of Gewirth’s 
argument. That her purpose might be to kill people for enjoyment, with guns rather than, for example, 
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poison, has no bearing on whether this purpose is “good” from her perspective. As a purposive agent, 
I must be able to choose and be unobstructed in order to act freely with the aim of realizing my 
purposes, and I must have the external conditions needed for generally successful action. As such, 
according to Gewirth I must affirm that, “I must have freedom and well-being”. The “must” here is 
prudential, according to Gewirth, in that in order to achieve any of my purposes, I must have freedom 
and well-being, at least to some degree. 
In the second part of the argument to the PGC, Gewirth aims to establish via reductio that any 
purposive agent must affirm that they have rights to freedom and well-being: 
 (4): “I must have freedom and well-being”. 
(~5): “I do not have rights to freedom and well-being”. 
(~6): “It is not the case that all other persons ought to at least refrain from removing or 
interfering with my freedom and well-being”. 
(7): “Other persons may (i.e., It is permissible that other persons) remove or interfere with my 
freedom and well-being”. 
(8): “I may not (i.e., It is permissible that I not) have freedom and well-being”. 
(5): “I have rights to freedom and well-being”. 
The reductio assumes the rejection of (~5): “I do not have rights to freedom and well-being”. In 
rejecting (5), the purposive agent must also reject (~6), according to Gewirth: “All other persons ought 
to at least refrain from removing or interfering with my freedom and well-being”. In rejecting (6), the 
purposive agent must affirm (7): “Other persons may (i.e., It is permissible that other persons) remove 
or interfere with my freedom and well-being”. In affirming (7), the purposive agent must affirm (8): 
“I may not (i.e., It is permissible that I not) have freedom and well-being”. But according to Gewirth, 
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(8) contradicts (4), completing the reductio. As a result, according to Gewirth any purposive agent must 
affirm (5): “I have rights to freedom and well-being”. So, although Aileen Wuornos needs guns to 
achieve her purposes, she need not have them to achieve any generic purpose whatsoever, in the way 
that Gewirth claims she needs freedom and well-being in general, and so her need for guns to achieve 
some of her purposes does not establish her right to these non-generic conditions of action, only her 
rights to freedom and well-being.  
The good in (2) and the rights in (5) could be moral rather than prudential, according to 
Gewirth, if the purposes involved satisfy the requirements of his definition of morality: “a set of 
categorically obligatory requirements for action that are addressed at least in part to every actual or 
prospective agent, and that are concerned with furthering the interests, especially the most important 
interests, of persons or recipients other than or in addition to the agent or the speaker” (Gewirth, 
Reason and Morality, 1978, p. 1). This stipulative definition is presented assertorically rather than 
dialectically, in that Gewirth directly asserts the definition. Still, Gewirth’s claim that the PGC is the 
supreme principle of morality rests upon it, although the argument through the prudential rights claim 
(5), which will concern me in this chapter, does not. Properly moral value does not arise until the 
universal rights claim (10), according to Gewirth, and it is only at that point that we could ascertain 
whether the goods in (2) and rights in (5) are moral goods or rights (Gewirth, The Community of 
Rights, 1996, p. 18). 
Gewirth’s move from the rejection of (5) to the rejection of (6) involves a problematic 
inference, in my view, as this move is neither prudentially nor logically necessary: it depends neither 
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upon what the purposive agent must affirm in the context of action, nor upon the “minimal 
rationality” that Gewirth takes to be essential to being a purposive agent, as minimal rationality 
requires only a grasp of the basic standards of deductive and inductive logic, including the law of non-
contradiction (Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, pp. 19, 22, 329-30). The inference depends 
upon the strict correlativity of rights and duties. Gewirth states that he is talking about claim-rights, 
or rights that are strictly correlative with duties:  
the rights that are here in question are ... claim-rights, that is, rights that entail correlative duties 
at least to refrain from interfering with persons’ having the objects of their rights and, in certain 
circumstances, to help persons to have these objects (Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 
1996, p. 8). 
Gewirth presents claim-rights and duties as strictly symmetrical, though having “different contents 
and a different valuational status, in that rights are to duties as benefits are to burdens” (Gewirth, The 
Community of Rights, 1996, p. 9). On Gewirth’s account of rights, rights directly entail duties, but I 
argue that this is substantive claim and not a logical principle. Beyleveld asserts that the principle of 
correlativity is a logical principle, rather than a stipulative definition (Beyleveld, 1991, p. 57). In my 
view, the inference is question-begging, in that it depends on a stipulative definition, and then uses 
this definition as if it were a logical principle to generate a duty from a right, or rather, in this reductio 
formulation, to generate the absence of a duty from the absence of a right.  
Gewirth’s dependence on the principle of correlativity as a logical principle rather than a 
substantive premise is clear in this formulation: “Suppose he rejects (5). Then, because of the 
correlativity of claim-rights and strict ‘oughts,’ he also has to reject (6)” (Gewirth, The Community of 
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Rights, 1996, p. 17).75 In order to establish that any purposive agent must affirm that they have rights 
to freedom and well-being, Gewirth initiates a reductio, assuming for the sake of argument that “I do 
not have rights to freedom and well-being” (~5). Anything may be assumed in a sub-argument but 
getting the negation of the assumption out of the sub-argument and into the argument proper requires 
the derivation of a contradiction by logical principles. However, Gewirth uses the principle of 
correlativity to get to the denial of (6): “All other purposive agents have a duty to (at least) refrain 
from interfering with my freedom and well-being” (~6) (Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, 
p. 17). A purposive agent need not affirm the correlativity of rights and duties, and even if some 
particular purposive agent does affirm the correlativity of rights and duties, it is not logically necessary 
that they affirm this, nor would this affirmation legitimate the use of the principle of correlativity as a 
logical principle. I am unaware of any contemporary argument for the principle of correlativity as a 
logical principle of induction or deduction, but many have argued against it, or argued for some 
modification of correlativity from the simple bilateral relation Gewirth assumes. For example, Tim 
Hayward argues that the “correlativity thesis (which Cranston’s view of universal rights presupposes) 
does not hold in a straightforward way for any rights in a human rights or constitutional context, since 
these are never simple bilateral relations” (Hayward, 2005, p. 51). Onora O’Neill has written 
extensively on the priority of duties, against the priority of rights over duties defended by many others 
 
75 Gewirth uses “strict ‘ought’” and “duty” interchangeably in statements of the principle of 
correlativity. Note that because Gewirth leaves open the possibility here that “duties may have grounds 
other than rights”, arguably this also leaves open the possibility that there might be duties in the 
absence of rights, which would also block the inference from (5) to (6), as the absence of rights need 
not imply the absence of duties. Since Gewirth’s argument does not depend on duties having other 
grounds, I will not press this concern further here. 
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[and further, for Jürgen Habermas duties are prioritized morally, but rights, legally: (Caney, Justice 
Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory, 2005); (Dworkin, 1977); (Griffin, 2009); (Habermas J. , 
Between Facts and Norms: Toward a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 1996); (Nussbaum, 
Frontiers of Justice, 2006); (O'Neill, Bounds of Justice, 2000)]. The justificatory priority of duties, 
defended in Kantian terms, is central to the arguments of Towards Justice and Virtue (1996) and The 
Bounds of Justice (2000), in which O’Neill argues explicitly against the symmetry of rights and duties 
(O'Neill, Towards justice and virtue, 1996). The necessary point for my purposes is only that Gewirth 
depends on his version of the principle of correlativity as a logical principle, when it is neither logically 
necessary nor uncontested. In order to establish the existence of rights, Gewirth assumes at least that 
“if there are rights, then they are strictly correlative with duties and if there are duties then they are 
strictly correlative with rights”, which is not a logical principle but a substantive assumption, a hidden 
premise of the argument. With this premise, which a purposive agent need not affirm, the inference 
from (5) to (6) could be made. Though this does not show that the argument necessarily fails, it does 
show at least that Gewirth uses the dialectically contingent method, rather than the dialectically necessary 
method. Given that a purposive agent accepts the principle of correlativity, the argument may move 
forward, though not to a dialectically necessary conclusion. The conclusion is contingent upon 
affirming the correlativity of rights and duties. 
This critique is significant in that it is the critique that Gewirth levels against John Rawls. 
Against Rawls, Gewirth argues that his own argument is superior specifically in that it concludes with 
dialectical necessity to what he claims is the supreme principle of morality. By contrast, Rawls uses the 
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“dialectically contingent method”, in that there is no reason that anyone must enter the Original 
Position. According to Gewirth, the Original Position is a contingent procedure in this sense at least, 
and so “incapable of establishing any categorical moral judgments or principles” (Gewirth, The 
Community of Rights, 1996, pp. 26-7). Gewirth also argues, against Rawls, that his own argument 
“takes humans as they actually are” rather than “artificial[ly] stripping away ... all particularizing 
properties of human selves” (Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, p. 27). Arguably, Gewirth’s 
starting point – “the conative standpoint common to all agents” – involves a parallel strategy, though 
I will not address this further here [although see Virginia Held: (Held, Reason and economic justice, 
1985, pp. 37-8)]. Without the principle of correlativity as a logical principle, I argue that Gewirth is in 
precisely the same position he ascribes to Rawls, in that there is no reason that a purposive agent must 
affirm the principle of correlativity. However, even accepting that the argument is contingent is this 
way, in the next section I argue that there is a more pressing problem with Gewirth’s argument, as he 
fails to secure the contradiction needed to exit the reductio sub-derivation. 
 
(3) Assuming that Needs Entail Rights 
This is Gewirth’s argument through the establishment of the prudential rights claim (5), with 
the purportedly contradictory statements highlighted, though recall that it is not until the universal 
human rights claim (10) that there is any constraint on what could count as the good – or the well-
being – of purposive agents; in premises (1) through (9), any normativity affirmed need only be 
prudential, based on the preferences of the purposive agent: 
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(1): “I do X for end or purpose E.” 
(2): “E is good”. 
(3): “My freedom and well-being are necessary goods”. 
(4): “I must have freedom and well-being”. 
(~5): “I do not have rights to freedom and well-being”. 
(~6): “All other persons ought to at least refrain from removing or interfering with my 
freedom and well-being”. 
(7): “Other persons may (i.e., It is permissible that other persons) remove or interfere with my 
freedom and well-being”. 
(8): “I may not [It is permissible that I not] have freedom and well-being”. 
(5): “I have rights to freedom and well-being”. (Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, p. 
18); (Beyleveld, 1991, p. 38). 
Since (4) and (8) contradict, according to Gewirth, the purposive agent must affirm (5): “I have rights 
to freedom and well-being”. For there to be a contradiction, (4) and (4a), below, must be logically 
equivalent, and (8) and (8a) must be logically equivalent: 
(4):  “I must have freedom and well-being”. 
(4a):  “It is impermissible that I not have freedom and well-being”. 
 
(8): “It is permissible that I not have freedom and well-being”. 
(8a): “It is not the case that I must have freedom and well-being”. 
The logical structure of the sentences suggests that Gewirth views “I must” and “It is not permissible 
that I not” as logically equivalent in a way that is analogous to the relation between the basic operators 
of modal logic. It seems that he takes “must” and “may” to be logical operators functioning 
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symmetrically with “It is necessary that” and “It is possible that”.76 If these were symmetrical modal 
operators, then just as “It is necessary that X” is equivalent to “It is not possible that not X”, for 
example, “I must have X” would be directly equivalent to “It is not permissible that I not have X.”  
In (4), the purposive agent asserts that they need freedom and well-being, in the sense that 
whatever their other purposes, they must have freedom and well-being in order to accomplish these 
purposes, although interestingly, Gewirth argues that an agent can give up their rights to freedom and 
well-being, but only in order to give up having purposes entirely, legitimating physician-assisted 
suicide, for example, while maintaining the standard liberal view that one cannot consent to slavery [ 
(Beyleveld, 1991, pp. 29, 77-8); (Appiah, 1997, p. 622n5)]. So, (4) is also equivalent to: 
 (4b):  “I need freedom and well-being (in that freedom and well-being are necessary goods)”. 
This already implies that it is at least possible that the purposive agent not have freedom and well-
being, in that were it not possible that they not have freedom and well-being we would have no cause 
to worry about rights in the first place. However, if the term ‘need’ were simply equivalent to the 
modal operator for necessity, (4b) could be expressed as: 
 (4c):  “It is necessary that I have freedom and well-being (in order to achieve my purposes)”. 
 
76 There is interesting work in deontic logic that is relevant here, but extensions of traditional logic 
beyond the basic standards of deductive and inductive logic would exceed the requirements Gewirth 
imposes on the reasoning of purposive agents (Gewirth 1996; 19, 22 329-30. See also: 1978, 23; 
Beyleveld 1992, 329-30, 415-16). 
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And if the necessity involved were a simple modal operator, (4c) would be equivalent to: 
 (4d):  “It is not possible that I not have freedom and well-being”. 
As stated, this is plainly false, which suggests that the sort of necessity operating in the initial premise 
(4) is not of the modal logical sort but is a different kind of necessity. 
Turning to (8), Gewirth argues that the reductio leads the purposive agent to affirm that it is 
permissible that other people interfere with their freedom and well-being. He argues that this 
permissibility arises through the positing of the negation of rights, such that the notion of 
“permissibility” enters the argument through the posit that initiates the reductio. That is, Gewirth posits 
the negation of (5) in order to establish (5). In denying rights, by the principle of correlativity the 
purposive agent denies that others have duties, and this indicates that others may interfere with their 
freedom and well-being. The phrase “may interfere” is ambiguous. It could mean that it “is permissible 
that others interfere”, but it could equally mean that it “is possible that others interfere”. On the latter 
interpretation, note that the purposive agent does successfully derive a contradiction, though with (4d): 
(4d):  “It is not possible that I not have freedom and well-being”. 
(8b):  “It is possible that I not have freedom and well-being”. 
Interpreted in the strict modal terms of possibility and necessity, (4d) and (8b) do contradict, but at 
the expense of what appears to be a plainly false claim: “it is not possible that I not have freedom and 
well-being” (4d). Still, following this interpretive strategy seems to be the only way to achieve a 
contradiction in the reductio. 
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Another way of framing the difficulty here is in terms of Gewirth’s own claims concerning 
precisely where (not necessarily moral) normativity enters the argument. According to Gewirth, (4) is 
not a normative claim, whereas (8) is a normative claim, as Gewirth explicitly claims that normativity 
first arises in the assumption of the sub-derivation (~5), with the notion of permissibility, and that (6) 
through (8) are normative claims (Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, p. 17). Though Gewirth 
argues that within the subjective perspective of the purposive agent it is possible to derive an “ought” 
from an “is”, he does not claim – and indeed rejects the claim – that “ought” statements are “is” 
statements. He is not claiming that there are rights, but only that from the subjective perspective of a 
purposive agent rights must be affirmed; the dialectically necessary method concludes to what a 
purposive agent must affirm, rather than to what exists, retaining a distinction between “is” and 
“ought” statements. But, if (4) and (8) are different sorts of statements, in that one refers to what is 
and the other to what ought to be, it is not obvious how they could contradict, from any perspective. 
Another way of considering the difficulty with the supposed contradiction between (4) and (8) 
is in terms of gradation. According to Gewirth, in (4), the purposive agent must affirm that they must 
have freedom and well-being, and in (8) they affirm that it is permissible that others interfere with 
their freedom and well-being. The prudential “must” that motivates (4) comes in degrees, even if there 
is a threshold beneath which the degree of freedom and well-being does not matter, because beneath 
such a threshold there is insufficient freedom and/or well-being either to have purposes, or to have 
any possibility of success in acting toward those purposes. In affirming that they must have freedom 
and well-being (4), the purposive agent is discussing things that may be interfered with to various 
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degrees, and that need not be fully removed all at once. In order to achieve any of their purposes, 
agents need freedom and well-being to some extent, but not that they be maximized such that any loss 
of or interference with their freedom and/or well-being would make their purposes unachievable 
(Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, p. 24). By contrast, the logical “must” that motivates the 
inferences of the argument does not come in degrees in any sense, nor does the concept of 
“permissibility” involved in (8). However, in saying that it is permissible that others interfere with their 
freedom and well-being (8), there is no directly symmetrical gradation. Permissibility is a binary 
concept, in that an activity is simply permissible or impermissible. If (4) and (8) were in contradiction, 
it does not seem that they would operate differently with respect to the question of gradation. If the 
“must” is graduated, however, and permissible/impermissible is a simple binary, the concepts at issue 
would seem to be different, such that a contradiction is not achieved.  
Consider (4) and (8) in relation to Gewirth’s account of agency. Gewirth’s account of agency 
entails that beneath a certain threshold, one is not fully a purposive agent, as there are degrees of lack 
of agency, such that others have reduced duties, but squaring this with the further claim that “especially 
those who are most deprived” ought to be protected is challenging, since “humans who are less than 
normal agents have the generic rights to the degree to which they approach being normal agents” 
(Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, pp. 4, 24). This suggests an ambiguity in Gewirth’s 
account: lack of what is needed may equally reduce the extent to which one is an agent, thereby 
reducing entitlements, or increase the need for protection of rights, thereby increasing entitlements. 
Joseph Raz presents a related worry: Gewirth “believes, for example, that there is a general (over-
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ridable) right to freedom because ‘freedom is a necessary condition of human purposive action’ – a 
claim which is evidently false if it means that slaves cannot act purposively. In fact, there could never 
have been any economic interest in having slaves but for the fact that slaves can act purposively, and 
thus be useful to their owners” (Raz, Human Rights without Foundations, 2010, p. 324). Raz argues 
that James Griffin’s view is superior to Gewirth’s in “relying not only on the fact that people value 
their personhood, but on its being valuable”, he argues that Griffin is stuck with a similar problem to 
the one he attributes to Gewirth, in that Griffin also ties rights too closely to his account of agency 
(Raz, Human Rights without Foundations, 2010, p. 325). Gewirth, of course, would reject this 
suggestion as employing the assertoric rather than dialectical method. In any case, returning to the 
relation between Gewirth’s account of agency and the statements in question, recall that the first 
statement affirms the prudential necessity of freedom and well-being, as conditions of action (4). If 
we want to minimize the difficulty arising from gradations of need (or of freedom and well-being), we 
could specify a minimal level as necessary to agency, bringing (4) into line with Gewirth’s account of 
agency. For Gewirth, purposive agency is itself a threshold concept symmetrical with this account of 
freedom and well-being, but in an inverted sense: there are degrees of partial agency up to a threshold, 
though after the conditions of agency are satisfied all agents are equally considered agents. Being an 
agent does not come in degrees, although not being an agent does, according to Gewirth (Gewirth, 
The Community of Rights, 1996, p. 24). Similarly, having the conditions of agency could be read as 
only coming in degrees upon dropping below a certain threshold. These transformations of (4) and 
(8) include this feature of Gewirth’s argument: 
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(4e):  “I must have freedom and well-being, because below a certain threshold my 
possibilities of action and generally successful action are reduced, in approximate accord with 
the degree of reduction”. 
(8c): “Others are permitted to interfere with my freedom and well-being to any degree”. 
The second statement concerns the permissibility of others interfering, from within the subjective 
perspective of the purposive agent (8c). It is derived from the negation of the prudential rights claim 
(5) as the assumption of the reductio (or, the leading assumption of a sub-derivation according to the 
principle of negation elimination) but remains within the subjective perspective.  
So, the duties asserted are not the duties of others per se, but rather what the purposive agent 
must affirm concerning the actions of others. In rejecting rights (~5), the purposive agent (by the 
principle of correlativity) also rejects the duty of others not to interfere with their freedom and well-
being (~6), from the subjective point of view. Since they need not affirm a duty not to interfere, they 
must affirm that others may interfere, or, that others are permitted to interfere (7), and it follows that 
it is permissible that the purposive agent not have freedom and well-being (8) from within their 
perspective, supposedly in contradiction with (4), which Gewirth takes to necessitate the affirmation 
of the prudential rights claim (5). On my reading, Gewirth sees (8) as asserting that, from the subjective 
perspective of the purposive agent, the conditions of agency are not necessary, as the “must” of the 
original formulation of (4) derives directly from the necessity of these conditions for action and 
generally successful action. If this were the case, the contradiction would arise most plausibly from 
sentences of this sort: 
 (4): “I must have freedom and well-being”. 
(8a): “It is not the case that I must have freedom and well-being”. 
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However, these are the statements as they appear in the argument: 
(4):  “I must have freedom and well-being”. 
(8): “It is permissible that I not have freedom and well-being”. 
Gewirth’s claim is that the purposive agent cannot affirm (4&8), because this would be self- 
contradictory: 
 (4&8): “I must have freedom and well-being and it is permissible that I not have 
freedom and well-being”. 
Rewriting this including further detail given by Gewirth’s account of agency, we get: 
(4e&8c): “I must have freedom and well-being, because below a certain threshold my 
possibilities of action and generally successful action are reduced, in approximate accord with 
the degree of reduction; and others are permitted to interfere with my freedom and well-being 
to any degree”. 
Formulated in this way, there is some difficulty with seeing (4e&8c) as self-contradictory: the first 
conjunct involves a partially graduated notion of necessity, and the second conjunct uses a binary 
conception of permissibility/impermissibility. Further, (4) is a first-person sentence, and (8) is not, 
even if both are affirmed from within the agent’s subjective perspective. It is rather difficult to see 
how a direct contradiction between sentences with different subjects could occur, or, how to 
transform the sentences such that they have the same subject, without changing the meaning of the 
sentences entirely. As written, (4) concerns needs, from the agent’s perspective, while (8) concerns the 
actions of others, from the agent’s perspective. What agents need, including what they need from 
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others,77 is simply not directly convertible into what other agents are permitted to do, in the way that 
would be required for the contradiction to obtain, without a further substantive premise about the 
relation between needs and duties (Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, pp. 4, 24, 38-44).78 
However, the purpose of Gewirth’s argument is precisely to establish such a relation, in the universal 
human rights claim – the Principle of Generic Consistency, or PGC – affirmed in the conclusion of 
the argument, so it is not available as a substantive premise for use at this point, in transforming “I 
must have” into “They ought not.” The reductio posits the negation of prudential rights, which is how 
normative obligation – rather than logical necessity, or necessity for action and generally successful 
action – enters the argument according to Gewirth (Gewirth, The Community of Rights, 1996, p. 17). 
So posited, there is no way to get obligation and the definitionally correlative rights out of the sub-
 
77 At least non-interference, given the argument so far. Ultimately, Gewirth argues for positive as well 
as negative rights, and the second chapter of The Community of Rights is devoted to this task (Gewirth, 
1996; 4, 38-44). That he concludes that positive rights “warrant serious and active governmental 
concern for protecting and promoting the freedom and well-being of all humans”, rather than the 
freedom and well-being of all purposive agents, might be cause for concern, a point acknowledged in 
Beyleveld’s preference for “universal agents’ rights” over “human rights” (Beyleveld, 1991, xiv.). 
Gewirth claims that the PGC extends to all humans, as all humans are “actual, prospective, or potential 
agents” (Gewirth, 1996, 19). 
78 In Justice Beyond Borders, Simon Caney makes a rather quick claim, similar to Gewirth’s here, but using 
(in Gewirth’s terminology) the assertoric rather than the dialectical method: “persons have an interest 
in physical safety and this issues straightforwardly in a right not to be killed or physically harmed since 
these actions violate that interest” (Caney, 2005, p. 73). Caney does not mean that there is a relatively 
simple argument with only a few additional uncontroversial premises. Rather, Caney claims that the 
argument from an interest in physical safety to a right not to be killed or physically harmed “moves in 
a fairly uncontroversial manner directly from a core interest to an important right and does not require any 
additional premises” (Caney, 2005, p. 73; emphasis added). Though this provides further specification, 
in that Caney clarifies that he is discussing “core” interests and “important” rights, I still do not see 
how this inference is straightforwardly necessary. 
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derivation without assuming precisely what needs to be established: that any agent must affirm that 
they have a right to what they must have.  
____________________________________ 
In this essay, I have argued that Alan Gewirth fails to establish that any purposive agent must 
affirm that they have rights to freedom and well-being, and thus does not establish the apodictic 
foundations intended for human rights claims. This is the case because he treats the principle of 
correlativity, a substantive assumption, as if it were a principle of classical logic, and because he 
assumes that needs entail rights in order to establish that needs entail rights. 
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Appendix Two: Aiming for Resonance: Iris Marion Young’s 
Phenomenology & Theory of Justice 
In this essay, I offer a reconstruction and critique of Iris Marion Young’s two theories of 
justice, with the aim of showing that though her first, procedural, theory of justice corresponds closely 
with Habermas’ account of morality, her second, ideal, theory of justice aligns better with the account 
of ethics I began to defend in Chapter One. Further, I argue that considering her ideal theory of justice 
alongside her phenomenological work offers a different path both for defending normative realism in 
discourse theory, grounded in normative affect, and for supporting an ethical goodness validity claim 
in addition to the moral rightness validity claim. 
 Iris Marion Young argues that norms and policies are only justified if they result from 
inclusive deliberative procedures, but she also theorizes universal normative ideals that she uses as 
critical tools in evaluating procedural outcomes. On my reading, both the norms governing procedures 
and the universal normative ideals are based on the principle of equal moral worth. In this chapter, I 
present an original reading of Young’s two approaches, considering her procedural approach and then 
her universalism, arguing that Young gives a unified and consistent foundationalist account of justice, 
but that because the foundational principle of equal moral worth is merely assumed, her account fails 
to provide the justification for humanitarian military intervention that she claims it provides. However, 
I argue that though Young seems left with a relativistic position, with her theory of justice seemingly 
standing on nothing more firm than subjective preferences, her view might be further developed by 
taking seriously the validity claims at stake in what she terms her assumptions, which she takes herself 
to have reason to view as valid. Further, I suggest that though Young’s work in phenomenology 
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appears to be wholly separate from her theory of justice, a way forward is available, when considering 
them in conjunction. Young’s argues that her proposed ideals matter to the extent that they “resonate” 
with others. In Chapter Three I proposed that Habermas makes an analogous move in relation to 
moral feeling, arguing that Habermas’ discourse theory of morality depends at least on a thin claim 
regarding human nature: that humans are susceptible to motivation by moral feeling, or, that there are 
affects that are universalizable. That is, Habermas’ position only makes sense on the presupposition 
that there are claims of justice that can move us all. 
 
(1) Young’s Procedural-Deliberative Account of Justice 
Young first gives an account of justice as deliberative, partially following Jürgen Habermas, 
but objecting to what she views as the foundational role played by the pragmatic presuppositions of 
communicative action that undergird his deliberative model. I think Young misreads Habermas on 
the status of the presuppositions, as for Habermas the necessary presuppositions of communicative 
action are neither morally normative nor foundational in Young’s sense, but rather, are necessary only 
in that they are necessary to the practice of coming to an understanding with others in language. As 
such, they are pragmatically necessary. If our aim or purpose is to come to an understanding with others 
in language, then, according to Habermas, we must presuppose certain things. Habermas, like Young, 
aims to avoid depending on “transcendent normative verities”. Young rejects foundationalism, and 
on her deliberative model, the only ground for claiming that a decision is just is that it has been reached 
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through a procedure governed by procedural norms of inclusion, equality, publicity, and 
reasonableness: 
In the absence of a philosopher king with access to transcendent normative verities, the only 
ground for a claim that a policy or decision is just is that it has been arrived at by a public which 
has truly promoted the free expression of all needs and points of view [ (Young, Justice and 
the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 92); see also: (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, pp. 
23-5; emphasis added)]. 
Young’s account of procedural-deliberative justice shows the influence of postmodernism’s suspicion 
of transcendental justificatory strategies and universalistic foundations, in rejecting a substantive 
account of justice in favor of a formal one. This is similar to the move Habermas makes, in arguing 
that substantive, comprehensive ethical ways of life are unjustifiable under modern 
“postmetaphysical” conditions: “philosophy no longer has the right to intervene in this struggle of 
gods and demons ... [but] retires to a meta-level and investigates only the formal properties of processes 
of self-understanding, without taking a position on the contents themselves” (Habermas J. , The future 
of human nature, 2003, p. 4; emphasis added). Note that in the passage above Young presents the 
legitimating procedure as actual rather than hypothetical. For Young, a policy is just if it is the result 
of a just procedure. Young is particularly wary of universal claims, and she denies the possibility of 
any sort of grounding for normative claims other than unforced agreement among all who are bound 
by the norms. Young does not give any independent criterion that might be used to assess the justness 
of the results of an otherwise just procedure, because she insists that the only ground for claims of 
justice is procedural: if the procedure is just, then so are the results. With normative principles of 
inclusion, equality, reasonableness, and publicity built into procedures of the deliberative body, the 
outcome is just. 
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Following from this procedural-deliberative account of justice, Young provides an account of 
rights that is also procedural-deliberative: “[r]ights are ... institutionally defined rules specifying what 
people may do in relation to one another” (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 25). 
On this procedural-deliberative model, there are no rights before institutional enactment. Young 
defines all grounded or justified norms and policies in procedural-deliberative terms: "the rationality 
of norms can be grounded only by understanding them as the outcome of discussion including all 
who will be bound by them" (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 118). Young 
argues that “regulation must be inclusively democratic ... which means that all those whose actions are 
regulated must participate together in the process of formulating regulatory institutions and 
procedures” (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, p. 260). Human rights only exist where codified 
in law, and only those party to the enactment of the law are legitimately bound by it, differentiating 
neither between conditions on the legitimacy of national and supranational regulation nor between 
civil rights and human rights. As such, there appear to be no valid human rights norms where there 
are no democratically enacted regulations concerning them. Because only democratic procedure could 
legitimate norms or policies, according to Young, the only supranational humanitarian intervention 
that could be justified would be internal, in a sense, as intervention could only be justified among 
states that had been involved in forming a supranational regime responsible for policing human rights 
conditions. This view presents possible challenges, among them that it appears to reduce morality to 
(democratic) legality. It also appears to evacuate the category of justified military intervention, as any 
analogous action would, instead, take the form of policing. I will return to these concerns, once I have 
reconstructed Young’s second, ideal, account of justice. 
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Young worries that “humanitarianism is fast becoming the primary justification for military 
action, especially from the United States”, and she is concerned that, increasingly, the violation of 
human rights by a state is viewed as justification for breaching that state’s sovereignty: “The judgment 
has become widespread that the sovereignty of states which seriously violate human rights can be 
overridden by outsiders who seek to prevent or sanction such violation … The assumption seems to 
be strong that it is morally permissible and may be morally required for states to engage in military 
action against states that violate human rights” (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, pp. 6, 100-1). Young 
cites as an example the President’s Saturday morning radio address, given November 17, 2001, for the 
first time by the First Lady, Laura Bush, “which was devoted to condemning what she called the 
Taliban’s war on women and justifying the US war as an effort to free Afghan women” (Young, Global 
Challenges, 2007, p. 134). Young sees this as a “cynical attempt” to gain support for an unjust war, 
and she worries, further, that “[e]ven before the war ... feminist focus on women under the Taliban 
constructed these women as exoticized others and paradigmatic victims in need of salvation by 
Western feminists,” setting the stage for Laura Bush’s address (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, p. 
135). Young goes on to argue that some Western feminists who were critical of Taliban practices 
“failed to consider [these] women as equals” and offered no principled way to distance themselves 
from “paternalistic militarism” (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, p. 135). Though Young does argue 
that the Taliban should have been “condemned for its policies” toward women, her concern with 
avoiding paternalism leads her to conclude that “[t]o the extent that global law enforcement is 
necessary, it is only legitimate if the world’s peoples together have formulated the rules and actions of 
such enforcement” (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, p. 139). Given only her procedural-deliberative 
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model of justice, the basis for this condemnation of the Taliban is unclear, which is the sort of 
difficulty that appears to motivate Young’s supplementation of her procedural-deliberative model with 
a universalist account of justice. 
Note that Young’s use of ‘legitimate’ here is inconsistent with her established account of 
violence, which derives from her reading of Hannah Arendt’s distinctions between power and violence 
and between legitimacy and justification: only power can be legitimate, never violence, and normative 
valuation is a possible exercise of power; violence can never be legitimate, but it can be justified [ 
(Young, Global Challenges, 2007, pp. 84-91); see also Carol C. Gould’s critique of Young’s distinction: 
(Gould, Interactive democracy: The social roots of global justice, 2014, pp. 179-96)]. Habermas 
distinguishes between legitimacy, which is produced from legality, and rightness or justice, justified 
through moral discourses, in his discourse theory of law and democracy and his discourse theory of 
morality, respectively. Young seems to be aiming for a similar distinction, though at times she appears 
to misread Habermas’ discourse theory of morality as a theory of democracy. The democratic principle 
and the moral principle, for Habermas, are independent specifications of the discourse principle, and 
so not directly inter-convertible, in the way that Young’s view sometimes suggests. I return to this 
aspect of Habermas’ position particularly in Chapter Four, below. 
Carol C. Gould reads Young as a pure proceduralist, arguing that her view is circular (Gould, 
Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, 2004, pp. 18, 32). Gould argues that the same problem 
emerges in other accounts of the relation between democracy and justice that have been influenced, 
like Young’s, by Habermas, including that of Robert Dahl (Gould, Globalizing Democracy and 
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Human Rights, 2004, pp. 22-5). Gould sees a similar problem in Joshua Cohen’s account of 
“democracy as an ideal deliberative procedure that legitimates outcomes”, though it should be noted 
that neither Cohen nor Habermas define legitimate outcomes as just (Gould, Globalizing Democracy 
and Human Rights, 2004, pp. 18-9). Basically, Gould’s worry is that without an independent 
substantive account of justice, we have no means of critiquing unjust outcomes. Rather, with 
normative principles of inclusion, equality, reasonableness, and publicity built into the structure and 
procedures of the democratic body, the outcome is “presumptively guaranteed” to be just:  
In effect, the justice in the consequent is already contained in the antecedent of this political 
proposition, so that the just outcome follows analytically, so to speak (Gould, Globalizing 
Democracy and Human Rights, 2004, p. 25).  
There are a few alternative interpretations of Young’s position available here, none of which are happy. 
First, if all non-ideal procedures generate unjust results, then all results are unjust, as – on Young’s 
own account – no actual procedure ever perfectly instantiates procedural ideals. Second, if injustice in 
outcome is simply referred back to procedural failure, a regress is initiated, as then the norms 
governing the ideal procedure require justification.  
At times, Young seems to take the procedural moment to be hypothetical, or to involve 
counter-factual reasoning, rather than to necessarily involve actual deliberative procedures. In the 
following two passages, just results are what participants would arrive at under ideal conditions, rather 
than what participants actually decide: 
What counts as a just result is what participants would arrive at under ideal conditions of 
inclusion, equality, reasonableness, and publicity (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, pp. 
31, 33).  
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Because there is no theological or socially transcendent ground for claims about justice, just 
norms and policies are simply those that would be arrived at by members of a polity who freely 
communicate with one another with the aim of reaching an agreement (Young, Justice and 
Communicative Democracy, 1993, p. 103). 
This version of Young’s deliberative model moves already in the direction of an ideal theory of justice, 
and ultimately, I will argue that both her deliberative model and her ideal theory of justice will be 
grounded on the ideal principle of the equal moral worth of persons. But first, in the next section I 
argue that Young acknowledges the circularity of her deliberative account of justice as diagnosed by 
Gould (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, pp. 33-4), and adds a second account of justice to 
provide an independent criterion for critiquing unjust results of deliberative procedures, and further, 
to support the norms governing such procedures. Young’s second, substantive account of justice is 
not presented as generating justified claims, but rather seems to be used as a critical tool in the 
deliberative process of developing just norms and policies. 
 
(2) Young’s Ideal-Universalistic Theory of Justice 
Young is concerned about the dangers of universal foundations in political philosophy, arguing 
that universal theories:  
(1) are “too abstract to be useful in evaluating actual institutions and practices”;  
(2) “implicitly conflate moral reflection with scientific knowledge”;  
(3) tend to present the dominant perspective as correct, excluding other perspectives; and most 
significantly,  
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(4) presume an impossible perspective [ (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, 
pp. 4-5) (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, p. 14)]. 
Young is concerned that normative claims, when taken as universal, may represent only the 
perspective of the powerful, and may silence those differently situated. As such, she argues that only 
norms and policies that result from inclusive democratic processes should be viewed as justified or 
grounded. However, although Young adopts a proceduralist view of justice and attempts to build 
normative ideals into democratic procedures so that the procedures themselves more or less 
analytically yield just results, and despite reservations about the dangers of universals, Young 
nonetheless theorizes a pair of universal values that together define ideal justice. Since Young uses 
simply the term ‘justice’ in both her procedural and her ideal accounts, for the rest of this chapter I 
will mark terms used in these distinct accounts with subscript numerals. I use the subscript1 to specify 
terms in Young’s procedural-deliberative approach, justice1, and the subscript2 to specify terms used 
in her ideal-universalistic approach, justice2.  
Young describes her universalist values as assumptions, though based in moral argument, 
because she thinks that for norms or values to generate binding responsibilities or to justify coercive 
action, they must be grounded via deliberation including all those subject to those norms or values 
(Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 92). Young gives an account of justice2 as 
grounded in the equal moral worth of persons (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 
37). The ideals that Young derives from this first principle – self-development and self-determination 
– are offered as personal contributions in a global dialogue aimed at producing what Young takes to 
be more just2 outcomes (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 5). The ideals of self-




Ethical Validity  199 
development and self-determination are Young’s reformulation of ideals of equality and freedom, on 
her reading the central ideals of liberalism and civic republicanism respectively, a reading that appears 
indebted to Habermas’ account of liberalism and republicanism [For Habermas’ most extensive 
treatment see: (Habermas J. , Between Facts and Norms: Toward a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, 1996)]. They are presented as alternative ideals for imagining what Young takes to be a 
more just2 future. See, for example, Young’s interpretation of self-determination as non-domination:  
I offer non-domination as a normative ideal for interpreting self-determination. Ideals are not 
proposals or direct guides for action. The main purpose of normative ideals is to awaken 
political imagination about alternatives (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, p. 70).  
In her presentation of the ideal of non-domination as her preferred interpretation of self-
determination, Young claims that she intends to “explain and defend the moral value of a conception 
of self-determination as relational autonomy or non-domination”, a conception that she finds 
“particularly apt for trying to imagine alternative institutional possibilities” in “Palestine/Israel,” 
although she concludes that the “alternative [she has] imagined for Palestine/ Israel is not a political 
proposal [because p]olitical actors involved in the conflict themselves must develop those” (Young, 
Global Challenges, 2007, p. 76). Though Young offers moral arguments for her ideals, still, they are 
presented as no more than imaginative approaches to envisioning alternatives that might be taken up 
by those actually engaged in concrete political conflicts. 
So, Young posits two universal values, which she terms the values of the good life, as ideals:  
• self-development, or the ability to develop and use one’s capacities and express one’s 
experience; and  
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• self-determination, or the freedom to make choices and determine the conditions of one’s 
actions.79  
A society is just2 to the extent that it promotes – or at least does not restrict – these values (Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, p. 33). These two values correspond to two social conditions that 
define injustice2:  
• oppression is the institutional restriction of self-development, and  
• domination is the institutional restriction of self-determination [ (Young, Justice and the 
Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 37); see also: (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, pp. 
31-3)].  
A society is unjust2 to the extent that there are conditions of oppression or domination, or, to the 
extent that there is institutional restriction of self-development and/or self-determination. In Justice 
and the Politics of Difference (1990), Young writes:  
[T]hese are universalist values in the sense that they assume the equal moral worth of all 
persons, and thus justice requires their promotion for everyone. To these two general values 
correspond two social conditions that define injustice: oppression, the institutional constraint 
on self-development, and domination, the institutional constraint on self-determination 
(Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 37; emphasis added).  
 
79 Young cites Gould (1988) for the first of these two values (Young 2000, 31n; see also: Gould 1998, 
40-1). Still, both "values of the good life” are remarkably similar to those entailed by Gould's principle 
of justice: equal positive freedom. 




Ethical Validity  201 
Young's general values of the good life remain unchanged in Inclusion and Democracy (2000) and they 
are still presented as corresponding to the general conditions of domination and oppression (Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, p. 31). Justice2 is still presented as an abstract general principle 
supporting the elimination of institutional conditions of domination and oppression (Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, p. 33). In Global Challenges (2007), she argues from this standpoint 
that prima facie claims of justice2 concerning human rights2 can be recognized cross-culturally [ (Young, 
Global Challenges, 2007, p. 57); see also: (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, pp. 264-5)]. And, 
even in her early work, Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young already makes the procedural claim of 
justice1 that "the rationality of norms can be grounded only by understanding them as the outcome of 
discussion including all who will be bound by them" (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 
1990, p. 118). Her view on these points seems largely consistent over time: the recognition of claims 
of justice2 indicates the need for institutions capable of legitimating just1 norms and policies, and 
though we can recognize the justness2 of claims, inclusive deliberation is required to ground them as 
just1 claims. Young claims that her account of injustice2 “understood in terms of the categories of 
domination and oppression holds ... for any social context in the world today, as well as for relations 
among nations or states” (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, pp. 258-9). Young does 
not distinguish between the conditions as applied to domestic and to supranational institutions, and 
despite reservations about universals, Young defends abstracting from and generalizing across social 
contexts:  
Normative theorists sometimes speak from a position abstracted from social context and 
assert general principles that they claim have the same meaning in all contexts. Such 




Ethical Validity  202 
abstraction is sometimes useful, and I rely on some of this work in my discussion. Nor would 
I deny that some general principles can be asserted across social contexts” (Young, Inclusion 
and Democracy, 2000, p. 14).  
Young softens this universality with her suggestion that domination and oppression may take different 
forms in different contexts, but she claims nonetheless that they are unjust2 in any context.  
In her late works on global justice, Young theorizes a new model of responsibility and gives 
an account of structural injustice that appears to be a species of injustice2. Young’s purpose in developing 
a conception of structural injustice is to clarify injustices2 that do not result from the intentional actions 
of any agent, and to highlight what she takes to be the responsibilities of all who are involved in 
perpetuating structures that lead to injustice2, complementing the traditional liability model of 
responsibility, which involves blame, with her social connections model of responsibility, which entails 
obligations to work to change unjust2 structures, and not blameworthiness. Her basic argument is:  
(1) “obligations of justice arise between persons by virtue of the social processes that 
connect them” (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, pp. 162-3);80  
(2) structural injustice2 exists when these social processes systematically make large groups 
of people vulnerable to domination and/or oppression;  
 
80 Young cites Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, Onora O’Neill, and Alan Buchanan as arguing in 
different ways toward this conclusion. 
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(3) “political institutions are the response to these obligations rather than their basis” 
(Young, Global Challenges, 2007, p. 162);81   
(4) so, “all agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes that produce 
injustices have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices” (Young, Global 
Challenges, 2007, pp. 159-60, 162, 170).  
Though Young develops her account of structural injustice2 and her social connections model of 
responsibility in response to the specific case of injustice2 in the global apparel industry, she claims 
that “the social connection model of responsibility applies to every case of structural injustice, whether 
local or global” (Young, Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model, 2006, p. 107; 
emphasis added). Further, structural injustices2, as Young defines them, serve as the basis for her 
claims about responsibilities that she takes all of us to have, even though the ideal of justice2 that 
supports her assessment of obligation is, on her own account, merely her own imagined ideal for a 
better world, arising from reflection on sweatshop conditions and the claims of the anti-sweatshop 
movement. Young claims that her “[i]deals are not proposals or direct guides for action,” and that the 
“main purpose of normative ideals is to awaken political imagination about alternatives,” but she also 
argues that her ideals show that most of us have actual responsibilities to act in relation to injustice2, 
and that the extent of global structural injustice suggests that most of us “share more responsibility 
 
81 Young sees this as the “great insight of social contract theory”, reading John Locke as arguing that 
the “moral status of political institutions arises from the obligations of justice generated by social 
connection, as some of the instruments through which these obligations can be discharged”. 
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than we can reasonably be expected to discharge” [ (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, pp. 70, 182); on 
the role of imagination in political ideals, see: (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, pp. 
5-6, 256) (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, p. 10)]. Though Young presents her ideals as useful 
tools for critical reflection, she seems to claim far more than this when she argues that her ideals 
illuminate obligations that precede and necessitate individual action and institution building. Further, 
Young uses her ideal account of human rights2 to justify humanitarian military intervention, so I turn 
now to her universalist account of human rights2. 
Despite Young’s concerns about the use of universals in political theorizing, which lead her 
to claim that her own universalistic ideals are merely assumptions to assist in imagining alternatives to 
current injustices2, in her last works on conditions in sweatshops she also gives a universalist account 
of human rights2: 
The meaning of [basic human] rights ought to vary little with local culture or level of industrial 
development. Exhaustion and the need to pee are cross-cultural experiences. The right to 
assemble and organize ought to be recognized everywhere, and it is everywhere wrong to 
intimidate and beat people who try to exercise this right. To say these are rights is to say 
precisely that there is no moral argument for trading them off against profits, or policies 
designed to foster economic growth, or the earnings of workers (Young, Global Challenges, 
2007, p. 165). 
Young claims that basic human rights2 are universal, and include worker’s rights to use the bathroom, 
to adequate rest, to public assembly, and to labor organizing. Though there may be some variation in 
what a given culture takes to be acceptable frequency with which to use the bathroom, or takes to be 
adequate rest, this variation should be minor. Although Young presents human rights2 norms as 
universal, specific human rights claims arise in context, and responsibility to work to correct injustices2 
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varies depending on degree of social connection. Young suggests several parameters for reasoning 
about the extent of responsibility arising from social connections. Those with the greatest ability to 
influence processes that produce injustice2, who acquire privilege through unjust2 processes, or who 
have other interests in maintaining unjust2 structural conditions bear the greatest responsibility for 
changing such conditions (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, p. 181ff). So, Young does not argue that 
specific human rights2 claims are universal in the sense that all are equally responsible for addressing 
them. Rather, human rights2 norms are universal in the sense that all are equally obliged to respect 
them. Although specific human rights2 violations are blameworthy violations of universal norms, such 
violations do not generate equal universal responsibilities. 
This view of human rights2 appears to be in direct conflict with Young’s procedural-
deliberative model, as here Young argues that human rights2 are universal, and precede and morally 
necessitate the formation of institutions for their protection (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, p. 148). 
As suggested by her account of structural injustice2, claims of injustice2 are the basis for the formation 
of institutions, and just2 policies are those that eschew domination, oppression, and the violation of 
human rights2. These appear to be contradictory claims: 
 [R]ights are institutionally defined rules specifying what people may do in relation to one 
another (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 25). 
Human rights principles are fundamental moral standards of right and good whose meaning 
and validity do not depend on particular institutions (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, p. 147). 
The apparent conflict is resolved by recognizing that Young is using ‘rights’ with two different 
referents, alternately as institutionally defined rules and as universally applicable ideals, or what I have 




Ethical Validity  206 
termed rights1 and rights2. If Young is not read as operating with this dual definitional structure, her 
view is inconsistent, which is most clear in her conflicting accounts of rights. Distinguishing the 
referents allows an independent criterion to critique procedural outcomes, just as Gould argues a 
strong account of human rights requires. My reading renders her view consistent and resolves the 
appearance of equivocation. Unsurprisingly, Young takes herself to be bound by “[c]onsistency, 
empirical support, and like criteria” (Young, Intersecting Voices, 1997, p. 4). Alison Jaggar considers 
Young’s view in terms of “internal consistency, ... comprehensiveness, relevance, and substantive 
acceptability”, concluding that “Young’s work is at least arguably more comprehensive, relevant, and 
normatively acceptable than Rawls’ ” (Jaggar A. , 2009, p. 100). However, Jaggar considers neither the 
apparent conflict between Young’s two theories of justice, nor the apparent circularity in the 
procedural-deliberative model. Because her two theoretical approaches are distinct, the ambiguity in 
her use of terms within each approach is less problematic than the inconsistency that would result 
from reading each term with a single referent. Once the referents are distinguished, Young’s claims 
are no longer contradictory. Although norms1 and policies can only be grounded or justified 
deliberatively, the universal ideals of justice2 provide independent criteria for criticizing outcomes. 
However, returning to Young’s account of intervention2 reveals further difficulties. 
Young argues that there are situations in which outsiders have a moral obligation to intervene2, 
even where there is no legitimate supranational governing institution. Her most frequent claim of this 
sort is that “[o]utsiders can morally require ... that self-governing peoples respect equally the basic 
human rights of all individuals who come within their jurisdiction” (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 
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2000, p. 264). But occasionally, Young makes the stronger claim that at times outsiders have a 
responsibility to interfere with the actions of self-governing peoples: 
The self-determination of a people should not extend so far as to permit the domination of 
some of its members by others. For reasons other than those of mutual aid, namely reasons 
of individual human rights, outsiders sometimes have a responsibility to interfere with the self-
governing actions of a group in order to prevent severe human rights violations. This claim 
introduces a whole new set of contentious questions, however, about how human rights are 
defined, who should decide when they have been seriously violated by a government against 
its members, and the proper agents and procedures of intervention (Young, Global 
Challenges, 2007, p. 57; emphasis added).  
Young’s view on humanitarian military intervention appears to be partially compatible with Habermas’ 
position, developed in relation to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, that one need not “accept the 
maxim that victims are to be left at the mercy of thugs,” discussed at length in Chapter Four, below 
(Habermas J. , Bestiality and humanity: a war on the border between legality and morality, 1999, p. 
271). Young argues that – ideally – human rights2 claims ought to be heard by a legitimate human 
rights1 regime, and that claims of injustice2 are the basis for the formation of just1 institutions capable 
of protecting human rights2. However, such a legitimate global regime for the protection of human 
rights2 does not exist, and Young turns quickly to the need to establish such a regime, only briefly 
considering the question of what could count as justified intervention under such non-ideal 
conditions. Young proposes four criteria to assess whether military intervention is justified, derived 
from “very general moral principles” governing assessment of domestic cases of police brutality, a 
particularly acute example of Young working with an overly close domestic/international analogy 
(Young, Global Challenges, 2007, pp. 94-5, 99, 102-3). The use of state violence within a constitutional 
regime is just flatly different from the same state enacting violence elsewhere, which why we have – 




Ethical Validity  208 
and still require – a police/military distinction, a distinction that will not collapse until or unless all 
possible places are under one constitutional regime, and maybe not even then, depending on how the 
components of sovereignty are disaggregated along the way, such that we are at once under multiple 
regimes at different levels, and with different competencies, as Habermas takes to be the case already, 
for example, in Germany and the European Union. I return to the police/military distinction in 
Chapter Four, in the context of Habermas’ positions on civil disobedience and on humanitarian 
military intervention. For my purposes in this chapter, I only require Young’s claim that there can be 
a responsibility to intervene militarily in the event of serious human rights2 violations. 
Young’s values of the good life serve as independent criteria to critique outcomes, and she 
argues that recognition of claims of justice2 indicates the need for just1 institutions. One curious result 
of this definitional structure is that results of democratic procedure could be just1 — i.e. arrived at 
through just1 procedures — and yet be unjust2 as well, in that it leads to oppression and/or 
domination. Young is committed to this result, because on her view norms can only be grounded or 
justified deliberatively. Young argues that “protectionist grounds for military intervention ... must be 
limited to situations of genocide or impending genocide ... where the war actually makes rescue 
possible,” but on Young’s procedural-deliberative model, an act of genocide would only count as 
unjust1 if the procedure that led to the genocide was itself unjust1. (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 
2000, p. 136). Since surely not all affected would assent to genocide, the proceduralist could argue that 
any procedure that leads to genocide must (at least) not have been sufficiently inclusive, and so was 
unjust1. There are significant difficulties with this response, however, as discussed earlier. First, if all 
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non-ideal procedures generate unjust1 results, then all results are unjust1, since on Young’s account no 
actual procedure ever perfectly instantiates procedural ideals. This response allows for the injustice of 
genocide, though by making all deliberative results unjust, an overly broad conclusion, but which at 
least suggests the need to clarify how non-ideal a procedure must be before it is unjust1. Second, if 
injustice in outcome is simply referred back to procedural failure, a regress is initiated, as then the 
norms governing the ideal procedure require justification. Young does this by basing both procedural 
norms and ideal values of the good life in the principle of the equal moral worth of persons, to which 
I now turn.  
Young attempts to resolve these difficulties by using the principle of equal moral worth as the 
basis both of the norms of just1 deliberative procedures and of the ideals of self-development and self-
determination that define justice2, at which point her view appears to be foundationalist. In order to 
avoid the regress, Young in part endorses Habermas’ project of explicating norms presupposed in 
everyday communication, particularly emphasizing the normative ideal of equal moral worth, and 
suggesting that “[f]ree social cooperation requires that each acknowledge that ... others are ends in 
themselves and not means only” (Young, Intersecting Voices, 1997, p. 50). Young claims that the 
principle of equal moral worth entails egalitarian reciprocity, though unlike Habermas she presents 
this as an explicitly moral assumption rather than a functionally necessary presupposition of 
communicative action [note: some of Young’s reading of Habermas seems a bit confused, as she 
seems to read him as justifying the presuppositions themselves morally, whereas for Habermas it is 
only in discursive contexts operating according to these presuppositions that moral claims can be 
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justified; see: (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, pp. 23, 53) (Young, Intersecting Voices, 1997, 
pp. 4, 7, 41, 46, 49, 67) (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, pp. 14, 105)]. Further, the 
mutual acknowledgement that Young takes to be necessary for social cooperation “is the meaning of 
moral equality” (Young, Intersecting Voices, 1997, p. 50). Like Habermas, Young also offers epistemic 
arguments for inclusive deliberative democracy: if all are equally included in deliberation, this increases 
social knowledge leading to conclusions that are more likely to be wise and just [see: (Young, Global 
Challenges, 2007, p. 69) (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, pp. 22-3, 30, 56, 83, 115) (Young, 
Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, pp. 92-3, 186)]. In any case, Young’s conditions on ideal 
deliberative procedure – inclusion, equality, publicity, and reasonableness – are derived from this 
foundational value of moral equality (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, pp. 23-5). If all are to 
be treated with equal moral respect, then all affected must be included in decision-making procedures 
and have equal ability to affect outcomes, procedures must be transparent and public, and participants 
must be reasonable.  
Young’s condition of reasonableness requires that participants be open to the possibility that 
their views might be changed by the claims of others, and that they aim for consensus as an ideal. 
Young intends this as a more inclusive account of reasonableness, arguing that Habermas places too 
much emphasis on rational argument, and privileges one mode of communication at the expense of 
others (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, pp. 55-7). Young does not limit relevant deliberative 
procedures to official contexts but considers wider contexts of communicative action. Young also 
sees herself as departing from Habermas in theorizing multiple intersecting public spheres rather than 
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giving a single unified account and in endorsing not only moral claims framed as impartial rational 
arguments, but also valuing the contributions of rhetoric, narrative, and situated knowledges (Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, pp. 63-76, 167-80).82  
Alison Jaggar argues that “on Young’s view, the political ideals developed by philosophers 
should not be imagined to be universally applicable but instead should be tailored to specific contexts” 
(Jaggar A. , 2009, p. 97). However, Young extends her ideals globally: though Young acknowledges 
that her theory of justice is neither complete nor comprehensive and that other elements may be 
necessary in other contexts, she also claims that the ideals for which she argues are valid in all contexts, 
which appears to be a universal claim [ (Young, Global Challenges, 2007, p. 75) (Young, Responsibility 
and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model, 2006, p. 107) (Young, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, 1990, p. 258)]. The difficulty is that Young presents her universal normative ideals as 
critical tools for evaluating outcomes, but not as grounded or justified. Rather, she claims that her 
ideals are useful theoretical tools for criticizing conditions, and that her critical theoretical work aims 
to “evaluate the given in normative terms”: “They offer standpoints from which to criticize the given, 
and inspiration for imagining alternatives” (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 5). 
Ideals, according to Young, are crucial to “emancipatory politics ... because they dislodge our 
assumption that what is given is necessary” (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 
250). Practically useful ideals for motivating change could help in providing rhetoric, and Young 
 
82 The extent to which this is fair to the position Habermas develops in The Theory of Communicative 
Action is debatable, as his account is more complex in all of these ways than Young allows, but 
developing this argument goes beyond my purposes in this essay. 
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argues that the “affective appeal of rhetoric helps make possible the move from thinking to committed 
action that ... political judgment involves” (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, p. 69). However, 
when Young argues that claims of justice2 generate responsibilities to intervene, even militarily, in the 
face of human rights2 violations, she demands too much of her assumptions. Though her ideals could 
contribute to the deliberative process of policy formation, on Young’s view only inclusive democratic 
procedures are capable of generating grounded or justified policies. Imaginative universal ideals based 
on the principle of equal moral worth merely assumed in the process of theorizing: Young claims that 
self-development and self-determination are “universalist values in the sense that they assume the equal 
moral worth of all persons, and thus justice requires their promotion for everyone” (Young, Justice 
and the Politics of Difference, 1990, pp. 37, emphasis added). As such, these ideals provide inadequate 
support for procedural norms, and more significantly, do not appear adequate to justify military 
intervention in cases in which Young argues it is justifiable.  
 
(3) Aiming for Resonance 
In this essay, I have argued that Young ideals are presented as potentially justifying military 
intervention for humanitarian reasons, but that her ideals cannot provide the required justification. 
On my reading, Young’s two accounts of justice are unified by her foundational commitment to the 
equal moral worth of persons, as the fundamental principle of justice. This principle serves as the 
support both for the deliberative-procedural model of justice1, in that it generates the features of a 
just1 procedure, and, for the universal definition of justice2, in that it is the basis of Young’s universalist 
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values of self-development and self-determination. Young provides a consistent, noncircular 
foundationalist account of justice, based on the assumption that all humans deserve equal moral 
respect. Because Young is deeply worried about the dangers of universals, she presents her 
foundational principle as merely an assumption that guides her theorizing, such that her view stands 
on a basis no more firm than the assumptions of “one idiosyncratic feminist critical theorist over 
several decades of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century” (Young, On Female Body 
Experience, 2005, p. 4). 
Following Hannah Arendt, Young gives an interpretation of the Kantian conception of 
enlarged thought, arguing that though all persons must be recognized as equal, recognition does not 
require symmetrical reciprocity, or the ability to take another’s perspective. According to Young, for 
Kant symmetrical reciprocity requires taking the perspective of everyone. The Kantian account of 
symmetrical reciprocity depends on what Young sees as an implausible and at times pernicious idea 
of impartiality:  
Modern ethics establishes impartiality as the hallmark of moral reason. This conception of 
moral reason assumes that in order for the agent to escape egotism, and attain objectivity, he 
or she must adopt a universal point of view that is the same for all rational agents … The ideal 
of impartiality is the result of this search for a universal, objective 'moral point of view' (Young, 
Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, pp. 99-100). 
Rather, recognition of the equality of others requires asymmetrical reciprocity, or, the humility to listen 
to and engage with others in order to increase one’s understanding through dialogue (Young, 
Intersecting Voices, 1997, p. 57). Perhaps, Young thought that since no single thinker could claim 
knowledge of universals, the best that could be done would be to theorize from one’s own perspective, 
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considering what one learns from others, attempting to enlarge one’s thought without ever leaving 
one’s own perspective (Young, Intersecting Voices, 1997, pp. 57-9). However, if Young’s ideals are 
merely her assumptions articulated and “addressed to others and await[ing] their response,” then 
Young has no justification for her claim that there can be a responsibility to intervene in cases of 
serious human rights2 violation (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 5). Young 
argues that intervention is illegitimate except as resulting from deliberative procedures, and so really, 
as law enforcement or policing rather than as military intervention. Similarly, Young argues that 
outsiders should not impose democracy on self-determining peoples, though "ideally" self-
determining peoples will be governed democratically (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, p. 264). 
Young’s concern with intervention by external powers is based on her rejection of the possibility of 
monological impartiality, or, of Kantian symmetrical reciprocity:  
the problem is that a putative general standpoint remains monological. The problem we are 
trying to solve is that the agent's point of view of reasoning is not limited by another point of 
view to reveal its biases and errors … Only a process of dialogic interaction among agents 
reasoning about what is right can produce a distinction in the awareness of each between his 
or her own particular needs, interests, and perspectives and a more general understanding of 
what regulatory principles take account of the needs, interests, and perspectives of everyone 
… Only the voicing of all social perspectives on issues and proposals, I argue, can produce 
the sort of public objectivity that distinguishes partial and particular interests and judgments from 
those that can claim objectivity. … Global governance can have moral legitimacy only if such 
regulatory processes are formed through the interaction of multiple perspectives drawing on 
the experience and interests of all the world's people (Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, 
pp. 147-8; emphasis added).  
The same argument appears in Inclusion and Democracy, applied to the domestic case (Young 2000, 82-
3). If “normative judgment is best understood as the product of dialogue under conditions of equality 
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and mutual respect”, then Young has a firm basis for neither her claims about ideal procedural norms 
nor her values of the good life (Young, Intersecting Voices, 1997, p. 59).  
The claims of justice2, I take it, are still bound to be partial and particular, or at least, we haven’t 
adequate justification for taking them not to be, despite Young's moral certainty of their accuracy. 
Still, a global human rights regime, organized democratically, could justifiably intervene in any human 
rights violation, because a sort of universal would have been generated deliberatively (Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy, 2000, p. 264. 267). That is, Young argues that an "inclusive global system 
of deliberation and decision-making" could produce "the sort of public objectivity that distinguishes 
partial and particular interests and judgments from those that can claim objectivity” (Young, Global 
Challenges, 2007, p. 148). It seems that Young possesses something like moral certainty concerning 
her assumptions. Moral certainty is an Aristotelian notion originally. Concerning matters of practical 
wisdom, one can only justify general claims, and not fully true universal claims, with at best a high 
probability of correctness, at least for the phronimos, or person of practical wisdom (Aristotle, 1999, p. 
2). Similarly, Young plainly takes herself to have reason to view as correct her own general assumptions 
concerning the equal moral worth of persons and concerning procedural norms and ethical values. 
Distinguishing between generalizations and universals might have helpfully served Young. 
Consistently maintaining the distinction between generalizations and universals might have kept the 
distinction between justice2 and justice1 in sharper focus. Justice2 involves generalizations, while 
justice1 gets as close to genuine objective or impartial universality as Young will allow, at least applying 
to all those party to deliberation. Alternatively, we could see the ideals Young defends as ethical values, 
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which we have reason to support, reasons provided by her arguments, at least, but which are at best 
very general ethical values, which we might see as generating binding ethical obligations at least in 
some contexts, but which are not – or at least not yet – justified moral norms, and as such, do not 
override moral obligations.  
Young’s approach to developing political ideals, on my reading, resembles her approach to 
feminist existential phenomenology. In developing general phenomenological accounts of female 
body experience, Young takes her generalizations to aim only at resonance with others, but not to be 
accounts of how all women experience embodiment:  
I believe that these descriptions can resonate, at least in some aspects, with the experiences of 
differently identifying women, but I cannot know without their saying so (Young, "Throwing 
Like a Girl" and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy, 1990, p. 16).  
Similarly, Young argues that the only corrective for a false impression of another “is their ability to 
tell me that I am wrong about them” [ (Young, Intersecting Voices, 1997, p. 45); for discussion of this 
move, see: (Benhabib, 1992, p. 168) (Ferguson, 2009, pp. 54-5, 63-7) (Bartky, 2009)]. Young appears 
to present her political ideals in much the same fashion, as personal contributions in a dialogue 
(Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 5). However, this means that her theory is 
really only presented as her opinion and that the values she endorses are her values and perhaps those 
of others with whom her values resonate. Young presents the principle of equal moral worth as an 
assumption, though it is foundational to her account, because “perhaps not all reasonable people 
share” her assumptions (Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, p. 14). As Máriam 
Martínez notes, “cultures very often do not accept this principle of equal respect to everyone” 
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(Martínez, 2009, p. 221). This concern leads Young to (merely) assume the principle of equal moral 
worth. I believe, though, that this conception of resonance depends upon a prior assumption, never 
made explicit, that there are general claims both about bodily experience and concerning normative 
matters that could resonate with at least most others who are similarly situated, in the cases of 
phenomenological claims about female bodily experience and of general ethical values, and that could 
resonate with all others, in the case of universal moral claims. On my reading, this amounts to a quite 
general claim about human nature, concerning our capacity to be affected by the needs, interests, 
desires and suffering of others differently situated.  
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